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Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with its author. A copy of this 
thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that 
its copyright rests with the author and they must not copy it or use material from it except as 
permitted by law or with the consent of the author. 
Candidates wishing to include copyright material belonging to others in their theses are advised to 
check with the copyright owner that they will give consent to the inclusion of any of their material 
in the thesis. If the material is to be copied other than by photocopying or facsimile then the 
request should be put to the publisher or the author in accordance with the copyright declaration 
in the volume concerned. If, however, a facsimile or photocopy will be included, then it is 
appropriate to write to the publisher alone for consent. 
This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may be 
photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation. 
Abstract 
How people come to trust computing technology is an important factor in the degree to 
which they come to accept the services that such technologies are able to provide. This is 
particularly important where the usage of a technology might risk compromising a person’s 
private information, making them vulnerable to technologically mediated attack. Research 
into interpersonal trust development between people has allowed designers of systems de­
ployed using technologies such as the World Wide Web to successfully modulate a number 
of human interpersonal trust cues into the computer-mediated communication domain. 
Pervasive computing however, describes a signiﬁcant shift in the ways in which people will 
come to encounter and use interactive technologies. No longer limited to the conﬁnes of the 
desktop, people can and will be able to perform many of the technological activities they 
would otherwise do at home in any place and at any time. However, while the services that 
a pervasive computing infrastructure will be able to provide may be similar to those that 
people are used to in the traditional world of the ‘desktop metaphor’, the novel characteristics 
of pervasive computing mean that many of the trust cues that were previously available to 
technology users may no longer oﬀer an eﬀective means of helping users to place their trust 
well. 
In this thesis, a mixed methods research plan, involving both laboratory-based and ﬁeld-
based experimental design, was developed to investigate the role of human-computer trust 
in respect of two novel characteristics of pervasive computing: service discovery and secure 
ad-hoc device association. Through leveraging various artefacts in the immediate physical 
world to support information presented by services in the digital world, this thesis posits 
that the provision of user-veriﬁable links between the physical and digital worlds might 
provide a means of increasing user trust in services whose source they can otherwise not 
perceive nor verify. 
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“The age of ubiquitous1 computing is here: a computing without computers, 
where information processing has diﬀused into everyday life, and virtually disap­
peared from view. What does this mean to those of us who will be encountering 
it? How will it transform our lives? And how will we learn to make wise decisions 
about something so hard to see?” 
- Adam Greenﬁeld, Everyware2, 2006 [58]. 
1.1 Urban pervasive computing 
The notion of pervasive computing, or ‘computing everywhere’, describes a signiﬁcant shift in 
how and where people will come to encounter and use information technology. In a pervasive 
computing world, computing power will be freed from the desktop and woven seamlessly 
into the very fabric of the world around us. Within this vision, services that bear relevance 
to the current location and context of their users will be made possible through a vast 
interconnected network of deeply embedded sensors and processors that constantly monitor, 
process and share information about the world and its inhabitants. At time of writing, 
the grand theoretical vision of pervasive computing is edging towards an practical everyday 
reality. Publicly accessible wireless networking infrastructure is rapidly ﬁnding ground in 
many urban areas and, in parallel, the personal computing devices to be found in the pockets 
and bags of the public en-masse are becoming increasingly connected, and increasingly 
connect-able. Accordingly, location-based computing services that fundamentally rely upon 
mobile and ad-hoc networking communications to provide contextually relevant information 
1The term pervasive computing continues to be used interchangeably with the term ubiquitous computing 
as originally discussed by Weiser (1993) [150]. Though semantic diﬀerences between usage of these terms 
do exist, those diﬀerences are not considered as having suﬃcient enough impact to warrant diﬀerentiation 
within this thesis. This thesis will therefore maintain use of the term pervasive, and will consider the terms 
ubiquitous and pervasive as being synonymous. 
2This speciﬁc quote was sourced from the website accompanying Everyware: http://www.studies­
observations.com/everyware/samples.html. 
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are now becoming a common feature of the urban landscape. 
Pervasive systems are sustained by information about the context of their users. Perhaps 
the most important aspects to generating any reasonable understanding of a users current 
context, as researchers such as Schilit et al (1994) [130] have discussed are where [they] are, 
who [they] are with, and what resources are nearby. Thus, as pervasive computing services 
continue to evolve and mature, there will be an increased and unavoidable requirement 
for those services to be able to both glean and handle potentially sensitive information 
about people and the activities in which they engage (Adams & Sasse, 2001 [3]). These 
characteristics of pervasive computing will increase the need for pervasive system designers 
to consider the potential impact of their designs upon the privacy and security of their users’ 
data. In parallel, the machinations and requirements of pervasive technologies, particularly 
with regard to issues of personal data privacy and security will levy a substantive and new 
requirement upon human-computer trust. 
Central to the use of human trust is the identiﬁcation of who or what is under consideration 
(Seigneur & Jenson, 2005 [89]). As the infrastructure that supports pervasive services inte­
grates to such an extent that its workings are no longer visible, it will become increasingly 
diﬃcult for users to know what systems are functioning and who is oﬀering those systems. 
As a result, their knowledge and understanding about how such systems might aﬀect their 
privacy may be severely constrained (Beckwith, 2003 [12]). For all computing systems that 
require access to personal and / or private user information (be they pervasive or otherwise), 
the ultimate user acceptance of those systems will be largely dependent upon the level to 
which those systems are considered trustworthy. As will be discussed, though trustworthi­
ness is not trust, it is a signiﬁcant antecedent factor of trust. For new service vendors, this 
distinction oﬀers opportunities that are of critical importance. Designers must now, more 
than ever, convey to users that their systems are trustworthy before their users are able to 
prove it through positive experience (Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa, 2004[79]). The degree to 
which pervasive systems can successfully convey their trustworthiness to potential users is 
the central theme of this thesis, and the nature of the problem is twofold (Kindberg et al, 
2008 [74]): 
•	 Users may mistakenly invest their trust in a malevolent system that was mistakenly 
considered as being trustworthy (thus inviting attack). 
•	 Users may fail to invest their trust in a bona-ﬁde service (and thus miss out on its 
beneﬁts) because the service failed to communicate its trustworthiness eﬀectively. 
1.2	 Human-computer trust in urban pervasive comput­
ing 
Interactive and interconnected technologies such as the World Wide Web (WWW) have rev­
olutionised the way in which people are able to communicate with one another and conduct 
their daily business activities. In tandem with the beneﬁts aﬀorded by these technologies 
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however, there exist many opportunities for criminals to subvert their use for malevolent 
ends. 
That users come to trust the services provided by pervasive technologies is a critical factor in 
the degree to which such services will ultimately succeed and ﬂourish. Designers of WWW 
based services such as electronic ‘e’commerce and online consumer banking services have long 
recognised the importance of communicating the trustworthiness of their systems to their 
customers (Lee & Turban, 2001 [82], Yousafzai et al, 2003 [153]). However, to simply convey 
trustworthiness alone is not enough. The positive eﬀects of trust can only be found where 
user trust is ‘well-placed’ (Riegelsberger, 2005 [119]). Systems designers must consider the 
eﬀect of a false-negative trust investment (i.e. mistakenly accepting a malevolent system) as 
being a substantially less desirable outcome than a false-positive investment (i.e. mistakenly 
rejecting a bona-ﬁde service). Indeed, to merely uncover and exploit factors that increase 
perceptions of trustworthiness at a superﬁcial level can instead result in the undermining of 
user trust. As Riegelsberger (2005 [119]) noted, the designer’s focus should be directed not 
just upon increasing user perceptions of trustworthiness per se, but also (and substantially 
so) on increasing their ability to discriminate between what is worthy of their trust and 
what is not. 
From the perspective of computer science, solving the problems of human-computer trust 
has been considered for a long time to be synonymous with solving the problem of security. 
Within such a worldview, the panacea would ultimately be found in the development of 
ever-stronger cryptographic measures (Viega et al, 2003 [149]). With particular respect to 
the advent and subsequent development of the WWW, equating trust and cryptographic se­
curity has served information and communication technology (ICT) service developers well. 
To date, signiﬁcant improvements have been, and continue to be made in data encryption 
technologies that have served to allay very real threats to private / sensitive data. Stronger 
encryption and increasingly novel methods of establishing user authentication have now 
made high-risk activities such as administering ones own bank account via a still largely 
unregulated Internet a well established and accepted practice. However, how (and indeed 
whether) such techniques are suﬃcient when transferred to similarly risky activities within 
the pervasive domain is unclear. There is a marked diﬀerence between how pervasive com­
puting services communicate with users and how this was achieved with traditional forms 
of networking. In times past for example, access to computing-infrastructure based services 
was generally achieved through a physical connection between the user device and the host 
network, i.e. through an ethernet cable and a network ‘port’. From the standpoint of trust, 
the physical connection to a network through a ‘port-in-the-wall’ of a trusted establishment 
might allow a user to be reasonably conﬁdent that they were then connected to the network 
/ service that they expected. However, with wireless networking now becoming the norm, 
the visibly veriﬁable end-to-end link that the cable was once able to provide is now becoming 
less and less available. 
Further, the distributed, wireless and invisible nature of pervasive service provision creates 
a number of new routes for malevolent activity to which purely technical features such 
as cryptographic security may no longer be an eﬀective remedy (Butler et al, 2003 [19]). 
It is, for example, perfectly feasible within a pervasive computing scenario for a user to 
interact over a 100 percent secure connection with a bogus service provider (Grazioli & 
Jarvenpaa, 2000 [57]). The lack of a visible source of origin for wirelessly deployed services 
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may thus place demands upon human-computer trust that are above what would be expected 
from an analogous service delivered through more traditional modes of communication. 
Furthermore, as the infrastructure that drives the pervasive computing world continues to 
fade into the background, so too will many of the cues that may have helped users to assess 
the authenticity, intention and motives of previously unencountered computing services in 
the past. 
1.3 Background and scope of the thesis 
The research presented in this thesis was conducted within the UK Engineering and Phys­
ical Sciences Research Council funded research project Cityware: urban design & pervasive 
systems, grant EP/C547683/1. Speciﬁcally, this research formed part of a sub-component 
(work package) of Cityware that sought to investigate the role of security, privacy and trust 
as they related to urban pervasive computing. 
1.3.1 Relationship with the Cityware research project 
Cityware (2006-2009) was a three year EPSRC funded research project created to “develop 
theory, principles, tools and techniques for the design, implementation and evaluation of city-
scale pervasive systems as integral facets of the urban landscape.”3 A multidisciplinary re­
search project, Cityware involved aspects of architecture and urban design, human-computer 
interaction and computer science. Project partners involved in the project included The Uni­
versity of Bath, Imperial College London, University College London, IBM United Kingdom 
Ltd, Vodafone, Bath and North East Somerset Council, Hewlett Packard Labs U.K. and 
Nokia. 
Within Cityware, the author was engaged as a member of a team assigned to a speciﬁc work 
package: security, privacy and trust. The general aim of this work package was to develop 
an understanding of the mechanisms needed to defend users against threats to their privacy 
and security when they interact with services in urban environments. Within this work 
package, the author would work closely with Tim Kindberg, spending at least one day of 
his working week at Hewlett Packard Labs in Bristol. 
A conceptual / theoretical aim of the security, privacy and trust work package, and the aim 
to which this thesis was developed to address, was to investigate the role and impact of 
human-computer trust when encountering and using pervasive digital services for the ﬁrst 
time. Thus, the primary aim of the research reported here was to develop an understanding 
of the decision making process involved when people are obliged to invest their trust in order 
to (voluntarily) use a pervasive computing service of which they have no prior experience. 
The research presented in the thesis will therefore focus upon investments of a speciﬁc type 
of trust: initial situational trust. These are instances where a spontaneous trust-based 
3This speciﬁc quote was sourced from the website accompanying Cityware: http://www.cityware.org.uk. 
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relationship is made manifest ad-hoc between a human and a system that have no prior 
experience of one another. 
Given the author’s role as a member of a team of researchers, both with respect to the 
speciﬁc work package previously described, and to the Cityware project in general, there 
was a requirement from the outset to incorporate a degree of ﬂexibility in how the research 
reported in this thesis was conducted. This feature was made particularly salient in respect 
to the empirical component of the thesis. For example, while the author’s remit (in terms of 
how he came to understand and operationalise human-computer trust) was fairly wide, it was 
considered critical to Cityware that the work of the thesis would need to be directly relevant 
enough to be incorporated into deliverable security protocols. These protocols would also 
be worked on by members of the project that were not necessarily directly working on the 
same work package. 
1.3.2 Thesis scope: Pervasive situated services 
The research presented in the thesis will focus upon a particular manifestation of pervasive 
computing that the author will refer to as pervasive situated services. Situated computing 
has been described by Hull et al (1997) [64] as “the ability of computing devices to detect, 
interpret and respond to aspects of the user’s local environment”. In the context of this 
thesis, the term Pervasive situated services (e.g. Zambonelli, 2011 [156], Castelli et al, 2007 
[21]) will refer to digital services and supporting infrastructure that are embedded within, 
and directly referent to, particular places and contexts. This is in contrast to other uses of 
the term situated that have been used elsewhere in the literature; an example being Lucy 
Suchman’s [Plans and] situated actions (Suchman, 1987 [144]). 
A core feature of pervasive situated services as described here is that they must reﬂect some 
aspect of the immediate physical environment in which they are encountered. The value of 
such a capability allows for the creation of ICT services that are able to both perceive and 
interact with information that is gleaned from the immediate physical and social world of 
the user (Zambonelli, 2011 [156]). In achieving this, pervasive situated services are able to 
deliver information to users that is naturally highly contextually relevant. An example of a 
pervasive situated service might be digital content that refers to nearby physical artefacts, 
such as might be found in an environment such as a museum. In such a scenario, a pervasive 
situated service might be deployed within the museum building that would oﬀer (and deliver) 
additional information about particular exhibits to a visitor’s mobile device. Such a facility 
might well be provided as a value added service by the owners of the museum and would 
only be available to museum patrons who are physically present in the museum building. 
When discussing the notion of ‘situated-ness’, the degree to which infrastructure and services 
are attached (and limited) to the immediate environment are key measures. In terms of 
infrastructure, a large display, that ﬁxed / bolted to a wall, would therefore be considered (in 
the context of this thesis) to be highly situated. Similarly, digital service provision delivered 
through proximate / medium-range wireless digital radio signals (e.g. using technologies 
such as WiFi, ‘Bluetooth’ and ‘Near Field Communication’) can also be considered as being 
‘situated’, as receipt of such signals could only be achieved through being in close physical 
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Figure 1.1: Free Wiﬁ here: Public access wireless Internet services are becoming a common 
feature of the urban landscape. This example was observed being displayed on the door of 
a cafe in Bristol. 
proximity to the transmission source. However, it must also be considered that a given 
situated service itself need not exist in only one place at one time; they are free to manifest 
themselves on a more ad-hoc basis, perhaps forming spontaneously from an ecology of mobile 
devices that simply come to be co-located in a shared space and time. 
Within this thesis, the pervasive situated service that will be examined most directly are 
wireless Internet gateway services, commonly referred to as ‘WiFi hotspots’ (ﬁgure 1.1). An 
increasingly common feature of the urban landscape, WiFi hotspots are frequently encoun­
tered in public spaces such as cafes, libraries and public transport hubs. 
Alternative technologies such as Bluetooth and Near Field Communication (NFC) were also 
considered as candidates for examination during the early stages of the research programme. 
However, the decision to use WiFi hotspots as a focus for this research (and in particular the 
empirical component of the thesis) was made over these other technologies for several reasons. 
As a wireless ICT service of limited range that can be made available in particular places and 
times, it was felt that WiFi hotspots possessed most (if not all) of the core characteristics of 
a pervasive situated service as previously described. Further, as the empirical component of 
the thesis would likely involve the deployment of a working pervasive situated service in the 
ﬁeld, the author felt that certain characteristics of WiFi hotspots made them an excellent 
candidate as a research device. Connecting to the Internet wirelessly was a process that was 
already quite familiar to the public - if not in public space, then certainly within the home. 
This was considered (in 2006-2007) to be somewhat less the case with ad-hoc connections 
using Bluetooth, and lesser still with Near Field Communication. Lastly, the use of WiFi 
presented the opportunity to utilise interactive content delivered through a web browser 
as an experimental device. As the author already had considerable professional experience 
designing and developing interactive web content, this characteristic was considered ideal. 
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1.4	 Justiﬁcation for the research and research contribu­
tions 
The novel nature of pervasive systems invite investigation of two major issues with pertinence 
to human-computer trust. These issues are: 
1. The wireless / invisible nature of pervasive systems constrain user ability to ascertain 
the source and intention of the services they provide. 
2. User trust is often obligated by the requirement to surrender personal information 
prior to engagement with such systems. 
A requirement for human-computer trust with pervasive computing services can be found 
at two levels: computer-computer trust (in order to maximise data transport security and 
eﬃciency) and human-computer trust (in order to maximise user acceptance). While sig­
niﬁcant research eﬀorts have been, and continue to be made on the former (e.g. Kagal et 
al, 2001 [70], Satyanarayanan, 2001 [129]), research into human-computer trust that speciﬁ­
cally tackles services deployed in the pervasive domain is currently lacking. Little is currently 
known about how people understand pervasive services, and less still in how they might con­
sider and assess them in terms of their trustworthiness. The research literature that does 
investigate how mobile device-based trust-relevant interactions (such as e-commerce-based 
monetary transactions) diﬀer from established models remains scarce (Kindberg et al, 2004 
[75]). 
Such that pervasive systems require the ability to ascertain (to some degree) whom they 
are to deal with, the requirement of trust on the part of the user is often mandatory. If a 
person wishes to obtain the beneﬁts that such systems purport to provide, they must invest 
their trust in those systems; they have little in the way of alternative options available to 
them, other than to waive the beneﬁts of their use. Despite considerable progress however, 
consumer ICT services that are based upon a pervasive infrastructure are still very much in 
their infancy. Whether existing research and techniques to maximise trustworthiness and 
well-placed user trust can generalise from the static computing systems for which they were 
designed to computing on the pervasive level remains unclear. The novel contributions of 
the thesis are thus twofold: 
1.	 Theoretical: To develop a better understanding of human-computer trust as it relates 
to nascent pervasive technologies. 
2.	 Practical: To develop and evaluate means by which the trustworthiness of benevo­
lent urban pervasive services can be conveyed to users in a way that facilitates their 
discrimination from similar (and possibly malevolent) services. 
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1.5 Research questions and hypotheses 
The main aim of the thesis is to develop an understanding of how people come to trust 
emergent pervasive technologies, and how they might use evidence gleaned from their context 
and environment in order to facilitate this. In doing so, the research presented in the thesis 
sought to address how people assess the trustworthiness of such systems, and how designers 
of such systems might incorporate those processes within their designs. 
The primary prediction of this thesis is stated thus: with no a-priori knowledge of the identity 
or origin of a given situated service, the decision on whether or not to trust (and thus elect 
to use) that service will be informed in substantial part by the context and environment in 
which the situation occurs. 
To be clear, the goal of the present thesis was not to provide solutions for improving the 
security of systems per se. Instead, the present project sought to identify and investigate 
the eﬃcacy of speciﬁc evidential cues that a user can both recognise and understand in order 
to help ensure that their trust, if invested, was suﬃciently ‘well-placed’ (Riegelsberger, 2005 
[119]). The overarching research questions of the present thesis are therefore presented thus: 
1.	 RQ1: How is human-human interpersonal trust understood to operate, and how has 
this been modulated for use in human-computing applications where some degree of 
trust (on the part of the human) is obligated? 
2.	 RQ2: To what extent do people currently understand the threats and risks asso­
ciated with the use of ICT services such as the WWW? To what extent does this 
understanding translate to pervasive / situated computing services? 
3.	 RQ3: Which aspects of the situational context are considered important to users 
when they attempt to evaluate the trustworthiness of a pervasive situated service? 
4.	 RQ4: How do people utilize the aspects identiﬁed in RQ3 to make decisions about 
whether or not to invest their trust in a given situated service? 
1.6 Overview of the thesis 
In order to investigate the role and mechanics of trust in a pervasive situated service scenario, 
a mixed-methods research plan was devised by the researcher and deployed across four 
separate studies. Each study is described over a single chapter. Across the four studies, 
data was collected using a combination of laboratory and ﬁeld-based work, utilising a range 
of quantitative and qualitative measures. 
Chapter two initiates a discussion of trust in pervasive situated services through a crit­
ical discussion of research relating to human-human, human-computer and ﬁnally human-
pervasive computer trust (addressing RQ1). In Chapter three, through the development 
and use of a questionnaire, an initial investigation was conducted by the researcher to probe 
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the extent to which current users of technology consider their privacy and security in their 
current use of ICT, and the degree to which these considerations might transfer to less 
familiar pervasive computing scenarios (addressing RQ2). 
The results of the questionnaire were then used to inform the basis of the development 
of an empirical study programme that would seek to explore issues of trust as they relate 
to pervasive situated services. Chapter four describes the design of an empirical study 
programme and identiﬁes the goals of that programme. 
The empirical component of the thesis then begins in chapter ﬁve. To develop a deeper 
understanding of user perceptions of privacy, security and trust with regards to speciﬁc 
instances of pervasive situated service use, chapters ﬁve and six describe two studies that 
utilised a semi-lab-based experimental design to allow the researcher to gather qualitative 
data from participants directly. Both studies measured participants’ stated intention-to­
trust based upon their evaluation of contextually based evidence relating to the potential 
‘genuineness’ of a public WiFi ‘hotspot’ (addressing RQ’s 3 & 4). Chapter ﬁve describes 
an experiment that was designed to evaluate ways in which evidence made available in the 
immediate physical surroundings of the participants could serve as a indicator of the trust­
worthiness of a public access WiFi ‘hotspot’. Within the experiment, several co-located 
situated services were made available, and each utilised various physical and virtual arte­
facts in the surrounding environment of the participants in order to present themselves as 
being genuine. Chapter six, expanding upon the ﬁndings of chapter ﬁve describes a semi-
lab based experiment in which the presence and behaviours of other people present in the 
immediate vicinity of the participants was utilised as a means of providing evidence about 
the genuineness of a ‘WiFi hotspot’. Concluding the experimental studies chapter seven 
presents a novel ‘unattended’ ﬁeld experiment that was designed to engender true risk and 
to measure actual trust investment behaviour in response to a real-world situated service 
usage scenario. 
Finally, chapter eight summarises the contributions and ﬁndings of the thesis and provides 




“Trust is an investment by the trustor which will pay dividends only in the event 
that the trustee behaves appropriately.” 
- Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 1995: 216 [113]. 
2.1 Chapter overview 
This thesis is focussed upon how ‘well-placed’ human-computer trust, speciﬁcally with regard 
to a relatively novel variety of pervasive computing systems called situated services, can be 
both developed and supported by designers of such services. This chapter provides the 
conceptual background to the thesis. 
Such is the range of academic disciplines to which trust is considered an important topic for 
research, a comprehensive cross disciplinary examination of the wealth of literature relating 
to trust would be a formidable task. As such, the author chose not to discuss the contribution 
of any particular discipline in turn. Instead, this review will discuss aspects of trust as they 
have coalesced and emerged from a range of selected disciplines as a whole. The principle 
source of the research reported in this chapter is the ﬁeld of human-computer interaction 
(HCI), a discipline that draws heavily on research generated in psychology, sociology and 
computer science. However, literature from the ﬁelds of management / political science 
and economics will also be reported where considered as being particularly pertinent to the 
ultimate topic of human-computer trust. 
The chapter begins by introducing the function and role of trust as a device for facilitating 
asynchronous exchange between humans. The term trust is then delineated from the term 
trustworthiness, and theories as to its mechanism are presented and discussed. The chapter 
will then move on to discuss the prerequisite factors that are necessary in all trust-based 
interactions, and in doing so separate trust conceptually from other risk-taking behaviours 
such as lottery-based gambling. The development of trusting attitudes within individuals 
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is then presented, starting with the development of general trusting attitudes (propensity 
to trust) and then to more context-speciﬁc instances of trust (situational trust). Finally, 
research eﬀorts directed at the phenomenon of initial-situational trust, where a high-trust 
relationship is formed spontaneously without prior experience are presented and discussed. 
In the ﬁnal sections of the chapter, various methods by which humans seek to establish the 
trustworthiness of others as a response to speciﬁc situations are presented. This discussion 
begins with an examination of how the process of assessing trustworthiness has been un­
derstood to occur between people face-to-face, before moving on to how designers of ICT 
systems have sought to modulate these methods into the digital-interactive domain (ad­
dressing RQ1). The chapter then concludes with a discussion of research investigations into 
human-computer trust in respect of nascent pervasive computing scenarios, with a particu­
lar focus on the new trust-related problems they present, such as service discovery and user 
veriﬁcation (addressing RQ2). 
2.2 Introduction: The function and relevance of trust 
As social beings, we are often faced with the decision of whether or not to commit to 
actions of which success is dependent upon the free choices of others. Trust, “a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intention or behaviour of another” (Rousseau et al, 1998 [125]) is a common strategy that 
is used by individuals and groups to mitigate uncertainties about future events. 
As so much of the social human condition involves reciprocal value exchange, trust is gen­
erally considered to be an essential part of social and individual human life. Unbound by 
culture or nationality, its use has been oﬀered as an example of an economic primitive (e.g. 
Fismann & Khanna, 1999 [44], Zak and Knack, 1998 [155]) and as a socio-cultural norm 
(Gouldner, 1960 [55]). As the performance of actions based upon trust negates the need for 
explicit external control structures (e.g. binding legal arrangements), using trust can save 
transaction costs in terms of time, energy expenditure and resources (Zak and Knack, 1998 
[155], Delhey & Newton, 2003 [32], Sitkin and Roth, 1993 [138], Uslaner, 2002 [147]). Such 
is its usefulness, gaining insight into the means by which high-trust relationships can be 
successfully formed and fostered has aﬀorded considerable attention from a variety of aca­
demic disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and the management / political sciences 
(Mollering, 2001 [106], Lee & Turban, 2001 [82]). 
2.2.1 Initial positioning and deﬁnitions for terms to be used 
There are a number of terms that relate to trust that will used throughout the thesis. Initial 
working deﬁnitions for those terms are presented thus: 
Trustor: The principle actor, to whom the decision to invest trust (or not) ultimately 
resides. 
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Trustee: The actor to whom trust is to be potentially invested. 
Trustworthiness: A subjective assessment of the qualities of a trustee by the trustor. An 
internally generated measure of the potential likelihood that a trust interaction will 
complete as the trustor expects. 
To trust: The intentional and voluntary decision made by a trustor to invest their trust in 
a speciﬁc trustee. The act of investing something of value to a trustee, based upon the 
expectation of a mutually agreed future beneﬁt that is to be received from the trustee. 
To distrust: The intentional and explicit decision for a trustor not to invest trust in a 
potential trustee, where there had existed an opportunity to have invested trust. 
To mistrust: The past-tense result of the act of a trustee reneging upon a mutually agreed 
trust-based relationship with a trustor. The consequence of an unsuccessful investiture 
of trust. 
2.3 What is trust? 
The term trust can be used to describe several phenomena, including a type of personality 
trait and a type of social structure (McKnight and Chervany, 2001 [100]). Though per­
missible both as a noun and a verb, in its broadest sense trust is, as the sociologist Georg 
Simmel [137] describes, “an individual hypothesis that is strong enough to serve as a basis 
for practical conduct”. Trust can be used to facilitate and lubricate a diverse range of social 
interactions (Stolle, 1998 [143]) yet trust itself is internal, and its presence can be observed 
externally only by its eﬀects “trust is not an objective property of an entity; rather it is a 
subjective degree of beliefs about an entity.” Abdul-Rahman & Hailes (2000) [1]. 
2.3.1 Separating the terms trust and trustworthiness 
Though strongly related, the concepts of ‘trust ’ and ‘trustworthiness’ are both functionally 
and conceptually discrete. Trust, as Shultz (2006) [131] observes, emanates from the trustor, 
whereas trustworthiness is referent to characteristics of the trustee. Adequate delineation 
of these terms is a critical and oft-overlooked issue (e.g. Hardin, 1993 [60]). 
Trustworthiness is a purely subjective value that is aﬀorded to trustee by trustor based upon 
the level and type of trust that is required within a speciﬁc context (Corritore et al, 2003 
[27]). The trustworthiness value of a trustee can be decomposed into two basic categories of 
belief (Doney & Cannon, 1997 [39], Tan and Thoen, 2001 [145], Castelfranchi and Falcone, 
2001 [43], Nooteboom, 2005 [110], Deutsch, 1958 [34]): 
Capability / Competence Belief: The belief that the trustee is able to perform the 
trusted action to the best of their known competence. 
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Intention Belief: The belief that the trustee is motivated and intends to perform the 
trusted action to the expectations of the trustor. Various psychological and sociological 
traits have been posited as being critical in the assessment of intentional beliefs related 
to trust, the most common being perceptions of benevolence and integrity (Mcknight 
& Chervany, 2001 [100]). 
2.3.2 The mechanism of trust 
Despite widespread, intuitive and often unconscious use, an all-encompassing deﬁnition of 
the precise nature of trust itself continues to prove elusive (Schultz, 2006 [131]). Despite over 
a century of research, there remains no commonly accepted theory of its mechanism. The 
ultimate nature of trust, as much as it is discussed at all, is most commonly discussed in terms 
of being an irreducible type of faith that has been described as “nothing to do with knowledge, 
[but is] both less and more than knowledge” (Mollering, 2001 [106]). More recently, trust 
has been represented as the combination of faith and weak inductive knowledge (Mollering, 
2001 [106]) that is capable of forming a basis for conﬁdence about an ultimately unknowable 
future event. 
As Morton Deutsch (1958) [34] observed, “if people were omniscient, all actions could be 
taken with absolute certainty [and] there would be no need for trust to exist”. Thus, despite 
having no ﬁrm notion of its ultimate mechanism, most authors tend to agree that the 
principle solution that trust presents is to close a rational cognitive gulf that exists between 
uncertainty and an absolute (and thus impossible) knowledge of the future (Simmel & Wolﬀ, 
1964 [137]). As the cognitive demands involved in the hypothetical modelling of the full range 
of the potential actions of another are often unworkably vast (Egger, 2001 [41], Good, 2000 
[54]), using trust to accept a degree of uncertainty as to the future serves a useful means of 
allowing pure rationality to be temporarily short-circuited. This process, where cognition 
is allowed to temporarily satisfy itself into considering an unknowable outcome as being 
certain, has been described by Luhmann (1979) [85] as a cognitive leap. The cognitive leap 
refers to a level of reasoning that “overdraws on the cognitive base” of pure reason, eﬀectively 
ﬁlling a gap between the limits of reason and the uncertainty of pure faith. A functionally 
similar concept termed suspension has recently been oﬀered by Guido Mollering, where 
suspension is described as acting as a mediator between a base of ‘good reasons’ to invest in 
an uncertain decision in order to receive the beneﬁt, and a momentary certainty that allows 
trust to enact: “Trust is the mechanism that ‘brackets out’ uncertainty and ignorance, thus 
making interpretive knowledge momentarily ‘certain’ and enabling the leap to favourable (or 
unfavourable) expectation” (Mollering, 2001 [106]). 
2.3.3 Prerequisites of trust: uncertainty and risk 
“Trust is the expectation that one will ﬁnd what is expected rather than what 
is feared”.






The use of trust in interpersonal relationships is linked inexorably to a group of well-
established social norms, most directly reciprocity, the tendency to respond to one another 
in kind, and commitment, the keeping of one’s promises (Cialdini, 2000 [26]). To trust is to 
have a conﬁdent, positive expectation about the outcome of an interaction that is conducted 
within a situation of risk (Schultz, 2006 [131]). 
Within all arrangements that are based on trust, the agreement that is made between the 
parties involved is ultimately unbound. Indeed, for trust to exist at all, it is crucial that 
all parties involved are aware of this fact. Two conditions are thus always present in any 
situation that can feasibly support the investment of trust: uncertainty about the future (e.g. 
Sabel, 1993 [127], Lewicki & Bunker, 1997 [83], Deutsch, 1958 [34]) and risk (e.g. Mayer et 
al (1995) [91]) that the trustee will choose to behave opportunistically. The terms risk and 
uncertainty are sometimes incorrectly considered as being synonymous (Riegelsberger et al, 
2005 [120]). To be clear, uncertainty refers to situations where adverse eﬀects are possible, 
but no probabilities are known (or can be known), whereas risk is the possibility of adverse 
eﬀects with a known (and thus ultimately avoidable) probability. Such is their importance 
of their contribution to reasoning about trust, it is worth considering both terms in more 
detail. 
Uncertainty is a state of limited knowledge about a future that is unknowable, but where 
it is perceived that there are several potential outcomes to a given action. As the source of 
most potential outcomes are at the whim of the trustee, the core source of uncertainty as it 
relates to trust is directly attributed to the inability of the trustor to attain complete control 
over the interaction. To this end, it is useful to consider Luhmann’s (1979) [85] assertion 
that trust is a device for “coping with the freedom of others”. 
Risk refers to the degree of probability that at least one potential outcome of a proposed 
action would yield undesired eﬀects. Adams (1995) [4] suggests that risk can be measured in 
terms of the compound of probability and the magnitude of the adverse outcomes possible 
in the event of a negative conclusion. As it relates to trust, risk is directly referent to the 
knowledge that it is within the capabilities of the trustee to fail to honour their side of the 
agreement. 
Asides the notion that to renege upon a trust investment is generally considered to be a 
morally dubious act (Good, 2000 [54]), trust oﬀers little in the way of an explicit deterrent 
from opportunism1 . As Hardin (1993) [60] notes, “trust involves giving discretion to another 
to aﬀect one’s interests. This move is inherently subject to the risk that the other will abuse 
the power of discretion”. Indeed, there has existed a general axiom, particularly within 
traditional models of economics, that much human behaviour is rooted in individualistic 
gain maximisation (as researchers such as James (2002) [66] point out, as far as human 
behaviour goes “there is a stable preference for more rather than less”). How a trustor 
perceives a trustee as possessing freedom of opportunity is thus key. As the freedom by which 
a person is able to choose their actions increases, the incentive that is present to maximise 
their self-gain raises also. “Trust is related to the fact that agents have a degree of freedom 
to disappoint our expectations, and indeed, trust becomes increasingly more salient for our 
decisions and actions the larger the feasible set of alternatives open to others” (Gambetta, 
1988 [50]). Further, as Berg et al (1995) [14] observed, “a fundamental assumption in 
1Opportunism is deﬁned by Williamson (1985) [151] as “self interest seeking with guile”. 
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economics is that individuals act in their own self interest [. . . ] Behaviour that deviates 
from self interest is viewed as irrational”. 
It is generally agreed that notions of trust and risk are dissociable (Deriaz, 2006 [33], Mayer 
et al, 1995 [91], Deutsch, 1958 [34]), yet it is important to note that trust is not involved in all 
risk taking behaviour. At a purely functional level, to base a decision on trust appears similar 
to decisions based on gambling. However, trust and gambling diﬀer importantly in terms 
of their antecedents and potential consequences. The fundamental diﬀerence between trust 
and gambling is found within notions of perceived control. To invest trust, it is critical that 
the level of uncertainty (with regards to the eventual outcome) is perceived by the trustor 
to be within their ability to aﬀect, change or control in some way. Any true investment of 
trust thus demands that the trustor believes that the trustee has the ability, should they so 
wish, to behave opportunistically. Conversely, a pure gamble is based on a system where the 
outcome cannot be inﬂuenced in any way by the trustor. Using roulette as an example, we 
cannot invest our trust in the wheel, for the wheel cannot choose of its own volition to honour 
our expectations (Shelat & Egger, 2002 [133]). A further useful distinction between trust 
and gambling is oﬀered by Deutsch (1958) [34]. A person is considered to be gambling only 
when he perceives “that his potential gains from taking the risk are greater than his potential 
losses”. Deutsch illustrates this distinction using the scenario of a mother entrusting the 
care of her child to a babysitter. If the trust that the mother places in her babysitter to 
care for her child is fulﬁlled, her payoﬀ (i.e. the ability to enjoy a night out free of the 
care of the child) is disproportional to the negative outcome of an unfulﬁlled trust (e.g. her 
child coming to harm). However, should the outcome prove synonymous with the mother’s 
positive expectations, to invest trust in this situation would be more advantageous than to 
not invest trust. 
2.4	 The development of trusting attitudes in the indi­
vidual 
Returning brieﬂy to the theory of the Sociologist Niklas Luhmann (as presented earlier in 
this chapter), trust can be thought of as existing due to the complexity of the world, and 
how we as individuals seek to reduce that complexity to a level that our ﬁnite cognitive 
resources can eﬀectively manage. “The world presents itself (to any thoughtful person) as 
unmanageably complex. Trust serves to reduce this complexity with cognitive, emotional and 
moral expectations that some things will remain as they are or ought to be” (Luhmann, 1979 
[85]). 
Most authors agree that general attitudes to trust (e.g. the degree to which a person might 
agree with the idea that “it is generally better to trust than not to trust”) are formed 
early in life, and then reﬁned over time through life experience. Within the literature, the 
development of trusting attitudes have been discussed as occurring over a number of stages. 
The following sections present and examine these stages in turn, beginning with generalised 
trust attitudes before narrowing down to individual instances of trust behaviour with speciﬁc 
trustees. 
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2.4.1	 Basic trust and the development of an individual’s propensity 
to trust 
Trust is not exclusively found within interpersonal relationships between humans. Trust 
also serves as a useful cognitive heuristic for a myriad of other general day to day events. 
At its most pervasive level, it is suggested that there exists for everyone a degree of basic 
trust (Erikson, 1950 [42], Giddens, 1991 [52]). Basic trust is the unconscious and constant 
acceptance of the unavoidable degrees of risk and uncertainty that invade every waking 
moment of our lives. As Giddens illustrates, basic trust provides a ‘screening oﬀ ’ device: a 
“protective cocoon that permits people to get on with the aﬀairs of everyday life” (Giddens, 
1991 [52]). 
Beyond and in parallel to basic trust, all people also have a self-deﬁned level to which they 
trust other people and institutions generally. This is often described as their propensity to 
trust2 . Psychologists, focussing on individual personality tend to discuss propensity to trust 
as an individual property associated with core personality traits, individual characteristics 
and individual social / demographic features. Advocates of this view include Erikson (1950) 
[42], Allport (1961) [7], Cattell (1965) [22] and more recently Uslaner (2000) [146]. Though 
arguments continue that some level of propensity to trust may be an innate mechanism 
borne of evolution and present at birth, most authors agree that most of a person’s general 
propensity to trust is a learned behaviour from early childhood that is subsequently revised 
and reﬁned throughout adulthood. McKnight and Chervany (1998) [101] discuss propensity 
to trust (or trusting disposition) as being comprised of two levels of subjective belief about 
people in general. These beliefs are described as a person’s faith in humanity and their 
trusting stance. 
Trusting stance: The belief that, regardless of past experiences of reliability, it is better 
to deal with people as if they are well-meaning and reliable. 
Faith in humanity: A person’s level of belief that others are typically well meaning. 
Obtaining a measure of general propensity to trust within a population is of interest to 
social scientists as it oﬀers a useful indicator to current levels of societal cohesion and 
social capital (e.g. Putnam, 1993 [116]). General levels of propensity to trust have been 
measured using attitudinal questions deployed through quantitative methods such as the 
General Social Survey (GSS)3 (Glaeser et al, 2000 [53]). Results from investigations that 
have used this approach tend to indicate that signiﬁcant variance exists in propensity to trust 
across cultural background, personality type and levels of the social capital that are present 
within a given community (Hofstede, 1980 [62]). Typically, the source of a persons initial 
propensity to trust can be decomposed into the following inﬂuences: Parents / principal 
carer, personality type, cultural and socio-economic background: 
Parents / principal carer: Research by Mischel (1961) [103] and Mahrer (1956) [87] 
2Propensity to trust is also often referred to synonymously as disposition to trust.

3Within the GSS, a snapshot of trust is typically obtained using a scaled response to the question:

generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people? 
32 
found that young people who had experienced higher degrees of fulﬁlled promises from 
parents / authority ﬁgures throughout their life showed higher degrees of generalised 
trust than those who did not. 
Personality type: Research by Hofstede (1980) [62] suggested that an individual’s propen­
sity to trust is based on two core personality characteristics: optimism, and the per­
ceived capacity to control their own life. 
Cultural / socio-economic background: Cultural factors are a known contributor to 
general trusting attitudes. North American and Japanese citizens have been found 
to be more generally / readily trusting than Chinese and French (Egger, 2001 [41], 
Jarvenpaa & Tractinsky, 2000 [67], Fukuyama, 1995 [49]). Irrespective of income, 
African Americans have been found as being far less trusting than any other ethnic 
group (Patterson, 1999 [111], Marschall & Stolle, 2004[90]). Rotter (1967) [124] found 
religious people to be more generally trusting, and found higher trust in higher socio­
economic classes than lower (see also Patterson, 1999 [111], Delhey & Newton, 2003 
[32]). 
2.4.2	 The development of trust-based relationships in speciﬁc cir­
cumstances: Situational trust 
Situational trust refers to speciﬁc instances where a trust-based relationship develops be­
tween trustor and trustee in response to a particular set of circumstances. How situation-
speciﬁc trust relationships are reasoned upon and come to be formed remains the source of 
continued debate. Traditionally, economists and game theorists, including Axelrod (1984) [8] 
considered that instances of trusting behaviour that occur in response to speciﬁc situations 
are reasoned upon using a model of purely calculative rationality. Calculative-based trust 
theory (e.g. Dasgupta, 1988 [30], Malhotra, 2004 [88], Axelrod, 1984 [8]) thus works on the 
principle that humans make trust decisions based only upon a rationally derived cost/beneﬁt 
analysis. Dasgupta (1988) [30] illustrated the logic of this view in his assertion that: “If the 
incentives are right, even a trustworthy person can be relied upon to be untrustworthy”. 
Models of trust investment behaviour that follow the calculative rationality worldview tend 
to consider that new trustor-trustee relationships begin with a mindset of guarded suspicion. 
Following such models, trust-based interactions between strangers are initially limited to a 
form of trust that is deterrence based4 . In a deterrence-based trust relationship, risks relating 
to a trustee’s potential intentions are oﬀset through the utilisation of institutional control 
structures that serve to deter the trustee from behaving opportunistically. An example of an 
institutional control structure would be the legal system, where the deterrent is the implicit 
threat of legal action against the trustee in the event of their transgression. As successful 
interactions between trustor and trustee repeat however, the need for such control structures 
becomes more relaxed. At this point, the trust-relationship can develop to a new stage that 
is described as being knowledge based5 . In a knowledge-based trust relationship, the need 
for control structures is thought to diminish as, to the trustor, the likely behaviour of the 
4Some researchers, including Brenkert (1998) [17] use the term guarded to describe deterrence-based 
trust. 
5Brenkert (1998) [17]: Extended trust. 
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trustee is perceived as being more predictable based upon past experience. Finally, following 
these models to their conclusion, as successful interactions increase in number yet still, a 
further stage of trust can be achieved: shared-identiﬁcation based trust. At this highest of 
levels, trust is thought to generalise between the parties across diﬀerent contexts, with the 
need for external control structures essentially eliminated. 
However, despite often clear opportunities to behave opportunistically, people often behave 
in ways that are not in their own interest. It is thought that this may be as result of evolved 
emotional predispositions (Akerlof, 1983 [6], Frank, 1987 [48]). As a form of emotional 
psychological contract (Rousseau, 1995 [125]), the act of investing trust is understood to 
invoke positive emotional reactions in both trustee and trustor. At a basic personal level, it 
is considered psychologically rewarding to be considered worthy of the trust of another, as 
well as it is to consider another person worthy of trust (e.g. Good, 2000 [54], Pettit, 1995 
[113]). Conversely, when investments of trust are violated, there is often a strong negative 
emotional reaction; a reaction sometimes strong enough to warrant the complete dissolution 
of a previously well established trustor-trustee relationship (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998 
[135]). The contribution of aﬀective reasoning to trusting attitudes is something that recent 
models of trust development have now become increasingly aware (e.g. McAllister, 1995 
[96]). Social scientists including Lewis & Weigert (1985) [84], and an increasing number 
of economists (e.g. Nooteboom, 2005[110]) now consider trust to be more complex than 
the traditional economics models suggested, with both a calculative ‘cognitive’ component, 
based upon rational reasoning and an ‘aﬀective’ component that is based upon a strong 
positive aﬀect for the object of trust. “Trust in everyday life is a mix of feeling and rational 
thinking” (Lewis & Weigert, 1985 [84], see also Zajonc, 1980 [154]). 
2.4.3	 The development of spontaneous trust relationships with no 
prior interaction experience: Initial situational trust 
Initial situational trust refers to the phenomenon of spontaneous high trust-based inter­
actions occurring person-person or person-institution where there is no prior interaction 
history between the parties involved. Given the novel nature of pervasive computing, it 
is this manifestation of trust to which this thesis is primarily concerned. Until relatively 
recently, and as discussed in the previous section, investments of trust that occurred sponta­
neously in response to a speciﬁc situation and context had been considered as being rooted 
in a larger developmental process. Within this worldview, high levels of trust (i.e. trusted 
investments that are made in scenarios of high risk) could only be achieved as repeated suc­
cessful interactions reduced the perceived risk and uncertainty involved with dealing with 
a particular trustee (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995 [83], Brenkert, 1998 [17]). There are however 
instances where high levels of trust can occur spontaneously between parties with no prior 
interaction history. This phenomenon is referred to as initial situational trust. Research into 
initial situational trust originates from game theory, including work by Berg et al (1995) 
[14], Mayerson et al (1996) [92] and Pillutla et al (2003) [115]. 
Empirical studies of initial situational trust behaviour originated from explorations of game 
theory (Morgenstern & Von Neumann, 1953 [107]), speciﬁcally with regard to the investment 
game paradigm (Berg et al, 1995 [14]). The investment game, as described by Berg et al 
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(1995) [14] is a single-shot exercise involving two anonymous participants who have no prior 
experience of one another. Though several variations exist, the game is typically played 
thus: 
1. Two players / participants are both given some sum of real money (e.g.	 £10), osten­
sibly as a ‘showing-up’ fee. 
2. Based on the understanding that each pound sent would be tripled by the time it 
reaches participant B, participant A is asked to decide how much (if any) of their £10 
they would like to invest to the (anonymous) participant B. 
3. Upon receipt of whatever investment is made by	A, participant B is then asked to 
decide how much of the (tripled) money received to keep, and how much to send back 
to A. 
Rational logic would suggest that the incentive to reciprocate on any investment made by A 
would be low as future interactions between the same two parties were not expected, and no 
explicit deterrent from opportunism had been made explicit. In such a scenario, the rational 
choice would be for the trustee (participant B) not to reciprocate on any investment from the 
trustor (participant A), as to perform such an action would only incur an unnecessary loss. 
Further, a purely rational trustor (participant A) would already have anticipated this and 
would not make any initial investment to begin with. However, what Berg et al (1995) [14] 
instead found is that cooperation between people playing the investment game does occur, 
and occurs often; only two of the 32 participants involved in their study sent no money 
whatsoever, and many sent their entire stake. Moreover, there was a strong correlation 
between the amount initially invested and the amount sent back; the higher the sum of 
money invested, the higher the sum of money reciprocated. People, it would appear, like to 
trust, and those to whom trust is invested take at least enough pleasure from that investment 
to provide some degree of reward. 
In response to this phenomenon, Mcknight et al (1998) [101] developed a theoretical model 
of how initial-situational trust might operate. Though their model was originally designed 
with respect of organisational relationship development (1998) [101], it has subsequently 
been applied to computer mediated communications, in particular e-commerce (2002a [98], 
2002b [99]). The McKnight model considers initial-situational trusting behaviours as being 
formed of, and inﬂuenced by characteristics of both the trustor and the trustee. Within their 
model, the likelihood of an initial situational trust-based relationship forming spontaneously 
is informed by the trustor’s assessment of four sources of information: 
1. The trustor’s propensity to trust people / institutions generally. 
2. Prior experience either with the speciﬁc trustee or similar. 
3. The presence and perceived eﬀectiveness of usable risk-mitigation devices (e.g. insti­
tutional safeguards). 
4. The identiﬁcation and assessment of available evidence as to the intentions and com­
petence of the trustee. 
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2.5	 Facilitating initial-situational trust in computer me­
diated communication 
In all instances of initial-situational trust, be they human-human or human-computer, the 
trustor must reach a decision quickly as to the degree to which they consider the trustee as 
being worthy of their trust. This decision is informed in part by the trustor’s generalised 
trusting attitude (Lee and Turban (2001) [82]). Through the use of participant self-reported 
levels of propensity to trust, some researchers, including Egger (2001) [41], Kim et al (2004) 
[71], Kim et al (2009) [81] and Mcknight (2004) [102] have found that general trusting 
attitudes are indeed a useful indicator of initial-trust formation with regard to technologies 
such as e-banking and e-commerce. However, taken alone, a person’s propensity to trust is 
not generally held to be an accurate determinant of whether trust will be invested in every 
given circumstance (Johnson-George and Swap, 1982 [69]). Further to propensity to trust, 
following the McKnight and Chervany model, a substantial contribution to the development 
of initial situational trust is facilitated by the reasoned (both cognitively- and emotionally-
based) evaluation of a number of evidential ‘cues’. Such cues are gleaned both from the 
trustee, and from the situation in which the interaction occurs. 
In human-human interaction, the human face is perhaps the most important source of ev­
idence as to the underlying intentions of a potential trustee. Darwinian accounts of the 
evolution of human emotion propose that the exhibition of inner emotional states are made 
manifest (and are thus externally detectable by others) through a range of involuntary / 
unconscious behaviours. Such behaviours include pupil dilation and facial ﬂushing. Being 
diﬃcult for a trustee to mimic or control, a trustor’s ability to detect such behaviours can 
provide a useful mechanism for the trustor to make an accurate interpretation of the un­
derlying intentions of the trustee – importantly including whether they intend to lie, cheat 
or deceive. As result of this, the observation of facially based cues is well known to have a 
strong inﬂuence on the degree to which the owner of that face is likely to be considered as 
being trustworthy. 
Reaction to facially based evidential cues is thought to occur rapidly, and at the aﬀective 
rather than cognitive level6 . The logic behind the existence of what is essentially a natural 
lie-detection device is straightforward. As actions based on the misinterpretation of evidence 
of deceptive intent could have potentially lethal consequences, the ability to accurately detect 
potential ‘cheats’ would confer a useful survival advantage to people living within groups. 
It is thus not surprising to ﬁnd a degree of support for the existence of evolved cognitive 
mechanisms designed to detect cheating within Biology and evolutionary Psychology (e.g. 
Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992 [10], Macy & Skvoretz, 1998 [86], Boone and Buck, 2003 
[15], Debruine, 2002 [31]). 
6The precise mechanisms involved in the detection of physical exhibitions of behavioural intent are not yet 
fully understood. Recent advances in functional neurological imaging such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) have recently identiﬁed the amygdala, a structure located within the medial temporal lobe 
of the brain (and previously known for its role in emotional learning and memory) as being involved in a 
range of social judgements – primarily those based on facial stimuli (Phelps et al, 2006 [114]). There is now 
evidence to suggest that the amygdala may be involved in some measure of the perceptual processing of 
facial features during a trustworthiness evaluation based on facial cues (Adolphs 2002 [5], Winston et al, 
2002 [152]). 
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The communication of cues that are useful in the evaluation of trustee intention (and com­
petence) have also been found to occur in several verbally based behaviours. Cassell & 
Bickmore (2000) [20], investigating communication behaviours that are involved in human 
interpersonal trust development, highlight a number of common verbal communication ritu­
als as being involved in assessments of trustworthiness. Such communication rituals include 
‘small talk’, the seeking of ‘common ground’, and eﬀorts to invoke a sense of credibility 
through (for example) the appropriate use of technical jargon. All of these strategies share 
common goals of developing a sense of rapport, and also key into a human tendency to 
categorize and ‘unit-group’. Rapport is a sense of commonality of perspective, of being 
harmoniously ‘in-sync’. People within a state of rapport tend to consider one another as 
being in-group and thus tend to look more favourably upon one another than when rapport 
is absent. Consequently, it is unsurprising that the active development of rapport is one 
technique to which salespeople rely heavily when attempting to pitch their wares to poten­
tial customers. Unit grouping (McKnight and Chervany, 1998 [101]) refers to how people 
within speciﬁc groups tend to share similar values and goals, and how this leads individuals 
to be more likely to look upon in-group members more favourably than out-group members 
(Brewer and Silver, 1978 [18]). Unit-grouping in particular is well known to be an important 
means by which people assess the trustworthiness of other people: if they are like me, and 
I consider myself trustworthy, then they are more likely to be trustworthy (McKnight and 
Chervany, 1998 [101]). 
2.5.1	 Initial situational trust formation within interactions that are 
conducted in diﬀerent places and times 
With respect to facilitating the greatest range of potential evidence to a trustee’s trustwor­
thiness, negotiations of trust might well be thought of as being best conducted face-to-face, 
in the same place at the same time. In many situations however, performing a negotiation of 
trust face-to-face is simply not possible. In such scenarios, people must ﬁnd their evidence 
for trustworthiness by other means. 
Computer mediated communication (CMC) allows people to perform asynchronous trans­
actions across vast distances of time and space. While this oﬀers considerable beneﬁts, not 
least in terms of convenience, it also places limits upon the ways people are able to estab­
lish trustworthiness using the techniques so far discussed. Giddens (1990) [51] refers to the 
mediation of transactions across time and space in terms of degrees of embeddedness. As 
the level of mediation between the parties that are involved in an asynchronous exchange 
increases, the interaction is considered as being increasingly disembedded. As a transaction 
becomes increasingly disembbeded, the demands that are placed upon trust will be increased 
(Riegelsberger & Sasse, 2001 [117]), with a corresponding additional demand on the evi­
dence that would be required to support it. In the following sections, a number of methods 
by which evidence of trustworthiness can be conveyed to users of CMC are presented and 
discussed. 
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Virtually re-embedding the interaction through the modulation of facial cues 
into CMC 
Until relatively recently, the technical limitations of computer mediated communication 
meant that many of the more subtle cues that people use to establish trustworthiness (facial 
cues being the most obvious example) were severely impoverished or simply absent. However, 
as the range of communication modalities aﬀorded to systems such as the WWW have 
increased, designers of user interfaces and interactive technologies have been able to use 
modulated versions of human interpersonal trust cues within their systems. The modulation 
of interpersonal human-human trust cues interaction to the (more dis-embedded) human-
computer domain has been described by Riegelsberger & Sasse (2001) [117] as a process 
of ‘virtual re-embedding’. Virtual re-embedding has been discussed as being achievable in 
two general ways: 1) through improving communication transparency, and 2) through the 
imbuing of personal human trust cues to virtual agents though anthropomorphism. 
Systems such as the WWW can support both methods of virtual re-embedding in a number 
of ways. Being graphically based, websites can present digital representations of people, 
either as static photos or as synthetic representations of humans that can then be anthro­
pomorphised). The degree to which the inclusion of such imagery can increase perceptions 
of trustworthiness has been examined by a number of researchers in a variety of web-based 
contexts. Within interface design for systems heavily reliant upon trust (e.g. online bank­
ing, e-commerce), Fogg (2001 [46]), Zheng et al (2002) [157] and Steinbruck et al (2005) 
[142] all found that the inclusion of photos of ‘staﬀ’ incurred a positive aﬀective reaction in 
participants that viewed them. Inclusion of such imagery was later found to increase user 
perceptions of the trustworthiness of the company whose staﬀ the images were purported 
to be representing. However, results have not been entirely conclusive: Riegelsberger et 
al (2002) [118] found no general signiﬁcant eﬀect upon perceptions of trustworthiness, and 
indeed some evidence that the inclusion of staﬀ photographs had a negative eﬀect upon 
trustworthiness. Similarly, while Hertzum et al (2002) [61] found strong positive aﬀective 
reactions to virtual agents who were represented by photos of real people, negative reactions 
were found to be associated to those that were represented by an artiﬁcial personiﬁcation 
(e.g. computer-modelled and animated). 
Indicators of trustee investment 
Through the act of seeking to engage in a new trust-relationship, the sense that a trustee is 
(directly or indirectly) investing something they would not wish to lose is a powerful means 
of creating a perception that they are more likely to be trustworthy. In CMC, two common 
indicators of trust investment are organisation size and reputation. 
Organisation size: In the commercial world, there is a strong positive correlation between 
the perceived size of a company and the degree to which people consider that company to 
be trustworthy (Doney & Cannon, 1997 [39])7 . Large commercial companies take time (and 
7Egger (2001) [41] has also suggested that the legal status (e.g. corporation or public limited company 
etc), the associations that company holds and / or the endorsements of high proﬁle customers are all similarly 
eﬀective in this regard. 
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resources) to build and develop, and their continued existence is often largely dependent 
upon the sustained goodwill of its customers. Perceptions of large company size has been 
found to be positively correlated to subsequent intention to trust by Koufaris & Hampton-
Sosa (2004) [79], whose participants noted that size conveys a sense of competence, as it 
creates an impression that they possess the capabilities necessary to provide the products 
and services expected of them. Further, a company of large size was perceived as being in a 
position to oﬀer increased levels of structural assurance, such as compensation in the event 
of failure to fulﬁll the service that they oﬀer. 
Reputation: Reputation is that human trait that helps to “manage the complexity of social 
life by singling out trustworthy people, in whose interests it is to meet promises” (Misztal, 
1998 [104]). As one’s reputation is a trait that takes time and energy to develop, it is 
generally perceived by a trustor to be something that a trustee would consider as worth 
protecting. Reputation-based trustworthiness eﬀects exist because, as Axelrod (1984) [8] 
describes, there then exists a ‘shadow of the future’ – i.e. the prospect of future retaliation 
or loss of reputation as result of behaving opportunistically. In the commercial world, a 
companies reputation is often deliberately conveyed to customers through use of a brand 
identity (Koufaris & Hampton Sosa, 2004 [79] Chen & Barnes, 2007 [24]), upon which 
considerable time and money will likely have been invested. 
In WWW based scenarios such e-commerce and e-banking, conveying evidence of investment 
has been found to be important to customer initial trust. Researchers, such as Fogg [47] 
have examined the use of such cues extensively, and a summary of the more salient ﬁndings 
are presented thus: 
Aesthetics: Investigations by Mcknight (2002) [99] and Koufaris & Hampton Sosa (2004) 
[79] have both found a positive relationship between site aesthetic quality / appeal and 
reported intentions to trust in initial-situational trust-based scenarios involving e-commerce. 
The speciﬁc mechanics of aesthetic appeal has been explored extensively by Fogg (e.g. Fogg 
et al, 2001 [47]), Riegelsberger and many others. A professional looking interface is thought 
to create a positive aﬀective reaction as it implicitly conveys to the user that time (and 
most likely money) must have been invested by the individual or organisation which that 
website represents. Though the speciﬁc mechanics of what constitutes ‘professionalism’ are 
rarely detailed, adherence to design principles such as the correct use of layout and space, 
alignment, typography, consistency and the quality of imagery used (and by extension the 
likely cost involved in sourcing it) could all form evidence that design expertise has been 
employed (and, by extension, paid for). Conversely, inconsistent visual design and technical 
failures are both highlighted by Riegelsberger & Sasse (2001) [117] as being a source of 
strong negative aﬀective reactions, with a corresponding reduction in reported initial-trust 
intention attitudes. 
Functionality: The usefulness or beneﬁts provided through use of the service have consis­
tently been found to positively aﬀect initial trust (Kim et al, 2009 [81], Koufaris & Hampton 
Sosa, 2004 [79], Chen & Barnes, 2007 [24]), as has the inclusion of functionality that allows 
users to customize or tailor products / services to individual taste (Koufaris & Hampton 
Sosa, 2004 [79], Chen & Barnes, 2007 [24]). 
Usability: Though the degree to which the usability of an interactive system is related 
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to initial trust is not clear (Koufaris & Hampton Sosa (2005) [59] for example found no 
link between initial trust and usability), failure to consider the ease-of-use of an interactive 
system has been highlighted by Riegelsberger & Sasse (2001) [117] as forming a potential 
‘trustbuster ’ with respect of initial-situational trust. 
Provision of structural assurance: Structural assurances oﬀer routes of risk mitigation 
such as auditing, contracts and insurances. The presence of such assurances have all been 
found as being very important in initial trust (Kim et al, 2009 [81], Riegelsberger, 2005 [120] 
Mcknight et al, 2002 [99], Kim et al, 2004 [71]), and particularly so with the relatively high 
risk services of e-commerce and e-banking. However, how such assurances are conveyed to 
users is important. Riegelsberger (2005) [120] found that the inclusion of a salient personal 
trust cues without associated trust functionality is poorly received by users, and in a study 
of e-commerce websites conducted by Mcknight (2004) [102], neither a noticeable TRUST-e 
privacy seal nor a noticeable professional association seal were found as having any signiﬁcant 
impact on initial trust in the websites tested. 
Indicators of trustee status 
In the socio-physical world, the presence of clear identiﬁers of social status, such as a uniform, 
ID card or rank insignia can serve as a highly useful visual indicator of trustworthiness in 
that they convey a sense of authority and, by extension, potentially other positive character 
traits such as integrity. Within computer-mediated communication scenarios such as the 
WWW, trust seals are a popular modulation of a salient status identiﬁer. Trust seals are 
a visual cue that are included in a website to provide evidence that that website has been 
checked and validated by an independent institution (two examples are Verisign and Trust-
e). By following the link that the seal provides, users of the website can further validate this 
information by checking corresponding information on the independent institution’s website. 
Status and authority key into a common heuristic sometimes referred to as the ‘white coat 
eﬀect’: i.e. if a person in authority says it is OK, then it is probably OK. However, whilst 
powerful, the use of status identiﬁers as cue to trustworthiness remain common cause of 
mistrust errors generated from their over-reliance. The ease with which graphically based 
design elements on the WWW can be faked, and the diﬃculty in attracting user attention 
to browser based cues (that are of course outside the main focus of the user’s attention) 
remains a continuing source of mistrust errors and a major contributing mechanism to 
conﬁdence-trickery based technology attacks such as ‘phishing8’. 
Reducing uncertainty through increasing a trustor’s control over the interaction 
A signiﬁcant contribution to a trustor’s reasoning about trust, particularly initial-situational 
trust is the degree to which they perceive the outcome of co-dependent action as being 
uncertain. Earlier in this chapter, the core source of uncertainty as it relates to trust was 
8Phishing describes an attack whereby a masquerade of an electronic communication, purporting to orig­
inate from a trustworthy person or institution, is used to fraudulently capture private / personal information 
through trickery. The use of the phishing attack is discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
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discussed as being directly attributed to the inability of the trustor to attain complete control 
over the trustee and the interaction. Perceptions of risk are generally higher in situations 
of low control (Corritore et al, 2003 [27]), thus by increasing the perceived level of control, 
the perception of risk involved in the interaction should be reduced (Egger, 2001 [41]). In 
human interpersonal trust, the term token control eﬀorts describe a type of micro behaviour 
that can used to probe a potential trustee to see how they react to the inﬂuence of the 
trustor (McKnight & Chervany, 1998 [101]). Such behaviours are useful to trust as they are 
able to covertly ‘test the waters’ of future interactions without the need for investment or 
the assumption of any actual risk. The objective of token control eﬀorts is to create, in the 
mind of the trustor, a perception of the degree to which the trustee is likely to be predictable 
and, in doing so, support an internal locus of control (Shapiro, Sheppard & Cheraskin, 1992 
[132]). Such probes are often extremely subtle. An example is attempting to make the 
trustee reciprocate on a simple gesture, such as a laugh or smile (McKnight & Chervany, 
1998 [101]). 
As Rutter (2001) [126] notes with regard to trust and technology, it is important to maintain 
a sense of ‘knowing what is going on’ in the mind of users who are entering a situation where 
risk is present. With regards to technology, this is especially true during times when a system 
makes demands of a user without oﬀering anything upfront or in return. Beneﬁts associated 
with the provision of predictability and the supporting of a user’s internal locus of control is 
a common occurrence in the user-interface design literature (e.g. Schneiderman’s ‘8 golden 
rules’ [136]) – particularly with regard to e-commerce website design. In such interfaces, 
typical recommendations include the inclusion of salient escape routes (allowing users a 
clear way out of a process at any time, without penalty), improved transparency of link 
action (so users are aware of the action that will be performed when a link is clicked), the 
permission of ‘dry runs’ and adequate feedback to actions that are performed by the user 
(Schneiderman, 1997 [136], Riegelsberger, 2001 [117]). 
2.6	 Initial situational trust in pervasive situated ser­
vices 
A number of large scale research projects have examined pervasive computing-based in­
frastructure and service usage across a range of scenarios and potential uses. Some of the 
research conducted within these projects explicitly examined the role of human trust with 
regard to pervasive computing service usage. 
Equator: As a six year long interdisciplinary research collaboration, the Equator project 
(2000-2006) examined a wealth of issues relating to ways in which the physical and digi­
tal worlds could be integrated. With a broad remit and with over 60 researchers actively 
engaged, Equator examined many uses of pervasive technology, including for learning / ed­
ucation (e.g. Rogers & Price, 2006 [123]), gaming / entertainment (e.g. Crabtree et al, 
2004 [29], 2007 [28]), assistive technology (e.g. Cheverst et al, 2003 [25]) and computer 
supported collaborative work (e.g. Rodden et al, 2003 [122]). Several projects conducted 
within Equator involved aspects of interpersonal and human-computer trust, with an excel­
lent example being the mixed-reality game “Uncle Roy All Around You” (Benford et al, 2004 
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[13]), that involved trust (speciﬁcally trust in strangers) as a central theme. In “Uncle Roy 
All Around You”, players were deliberately drawn into situations where their investment of 
‘well-placed’ trust (i.e. in the veracity of information presented to them from a number of 
diﬀerent sources) would be crucial to their progress in the game. 
Cooltown: The Hewlett Packard Labs Cooltown project (e.g. Kindberg et al, 2002 [72], 
Barton & Kindberg, 2001 [11], Spasojevic & Kindberg, 2001 [140]) developed a pervasive 
computing infrastructure that was able to oﬀer visitors to a purpose built laboratory a rich 
interaction experience based around what was described as a real-world wide web. Within 
Cooltown, the laboratory structure (walls etc), and a range of physical objects within the 
laboratory were aﬀorded web-presence by means of embedding web-server capabilities within 
them. In doing so, objects within the physical world were aﬀorded a link to corresponding 
information pertaining to them in the digital world. Using this infrastructure, researchers in­
volved in the Cooltown project were aﬀorded a large scale pervasive computing environment 
within which they could develop and test a range of new services and techniques. Output 
from the Cooltown project included a user evaluation of novel wireless payment mechanisms 
(Kindberg et al, 2004 [75]), to which user trust was found to be a strong inﬂuencing fac­
tor. Similarly, Mobile Bristol (also involving Hewlett Packard Labs) examined a number 
of diﬀerent ways that mobile technologies could be used for enhanced interaction with the 
physical environment, using mobile devices in conjunction with a range of deeply embedded 
sensor technologies. 
However, though some of these projects did seek to tackle the role of human trust with regard 
to pervasive computing service usage to varying degrees, only very few (e.g. “Uncle Roy 
All Around You”, Benford et al, 2004 [13]) directly examined the role of initial situational 
trust (though not explicitly). The characteristics of pervasive computing systems generate 
a number of new challenges for initial situational trust development that have not been 
reﬂected in the techniques thus far discussed. Two of these characteristics are especially 
important: 
Digital service discovery: In a pervasive computing world, the presence and availability of 
particular digital services in a given physical space may not be made immediately apparent. 
The user may ﬁrst need to ‘discover’ proximate digital services before they can be used. 
Digital service authentication: Before a digital pervasive service can be used safely and 
securely, it must be authenticated by the user as being genuine, or at the very least, veriﬁed 
as being the service to which the user had intended to connect. In an ideal situation, this 
process would be performed before a full connection is established between the user’s device 
and the host’s server. 
2.6.1 Digital service discovery 
Not unlike the WWW, within a pervasive computing environment a user will, within a given 
time and space, come to encounter a number of co-existing services from which they can 
choose. Less like the WWW however, the range of pervasive services that may be available 
in any given physical space (and perhaps time) is far more dynamic. Pervasive services are 
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dependent on an ever changing population of devices and the ad-hoc infrastructure they are 
able to provide. However, how pervasive services will come to be discovered and interacted 
with must ultimately be handled by the user’s device via some model of service discovery. 
Protocols that handle the discovery of pervasive computing services will need to perform 
many roles, including the eﬃcient management of data traﬃc within an environment where 
the availability of communication infrastructure is constantly changing, as well as the pro­
tection of devices, services and users (Zhu et al, 2005 [158]). At the technical level, the 
development of protocols to better support pervasive service discovery is subject to contin­
ued and sustained research eﬀort. Though protocols that oﬀer service discovery functionality 
appropriate to the pervasive domain have been oﬀered (e.g. Chakraborty et al, 2006 [23], 
see Zhu et al, 2005 [158] for a review), it will be some time before they ﬁnd large-scale 
commercial use. 
2.6.2 Spontaneous secure ad-hoc device association 
Pervasive systems, in their purest sense, are ‘everywhere’. Oftentimes, their discovery and 
usage is conducted via connections that are made wirelessly. However, the act of removing 
the physical cable that serves to ‘tie’ communicating devices together, while practically 
convenient, is also the source of a new set of problems. 
In “Security and trust in mobile interactions”, Kindberg et al (2004) [75] explored user 
perceptions of trust in an experimental setting using a simulated cafe as part of their research 
strategy. In their study, a number of diﬀerent ways of allowing ‘customers’ to make payments 
were evaluated. Several of the methods involved using wired connections, while several 
others used wireless connections. Analysis of participant reasoning indicated a concern with 
wireless connections; participants were concerned that they might feasibly connect to the 
wrong service. In this regard, wired services were often considered more secure. They also 
found that the relationship between user perception of risk and actual risk was somewhat 
loose; understanding and awareness was typically poor, and participants tended to trust 
what was visible, tangible & apparently human-free. 
As Kindberg (2003) [76] notes, the lack of a physical link between devices that are commu­
nicating on a wireless network removes any immediate physical indication as to which device 
is at the other end of a given connection. In a pervasive computing scenario, this problem 
is compounded somewhat further by the possibility that many independent digital services 
and many mobile devices can be co-present in any given space. How then, can the user of 
such services be sure that they are indeed connected to the service / device to which they 
had intended to connect? 
This particular use-case scenario, the creation of user-veriﬁable ad-hoc device associations 
(e.g Kindberg and Zhang, 2003 [76]) was initially discussed by Stajano & Anderson (1999) 
[141]. The solution to this problem is far from trivial. From the user’s perspective (in 
terms of the degree to which they trust the connection), the method by which connections 
are made must be both eﬃcient and intuitive yet, from a technical standpoint, solutions 
must also be secure. Catering for both is made diﬃcult because the technical requirements 
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that underpin the security of digital communications are often complex. For spontaneous 
device associations to be considered secure, they must be able to resist two general types 
of threat: The man-in-the-middle (MITM) and the evil-twin (ET). The man in the middle 
attack refers to communication eavesdropping, whereby communications from person ‘A’ are 
intercepted by the attacker en-route to the service ‘B’. Acting as the the man-in-the-middle, 
the attacker remains - undetected - as a relay, collecting data traveling both ways, before 
relaying that data on to its intended destination. Conversely, the evil-twin attack describes 
the creation of an entirely bogus digital service that masquerades as a similar bona-ﬁde 
service. An attacker can perform the evil-twin attack in two general ways: 
1. The attacker creates a shared wireless internet gateway service that spoofs / mirrors 
the bona-ﬁde service’s identity by copying its name9 exactly. He then attempts to 
overwhelm the radio signal of the bona-ﬁde service, perhaps through use of a more 
powerful signal generator. 
2. The attacker simply creates a competing service with a similar name / SSID to the 
bona-ﬁde service (e.g. Starbucks WiFi as opposed to the genuine Starbucks Wireless). 
Both types of threat described have signiﬁcant security implications attached to them. In 
either scenario, as the attacker is able to oﬀer a service with the same characteristics as the 
bona-ﬁde service (perhaps even including the same data encryption services), it is diﬃcult 
for a typical user to notice anything that is untoward. However, the mere act of connection 
may be enough for an attacker to compromise the personal / private data of the user and / 
or install malware on the users device. 
User-veriﬁable device association through use of ‘out of band’ auxiliary commu­
nication channels 
Since (and including) Stajano & Anderson (1999) [141], a number of protocols have been 
developed by researchers that seek to provide means of enabling ad-hoc device associations 
that are able to combat the threats posed by the MITM and ET attacks10 . Many such 
methods directly involve the user in the authentication process directly. 
A number of methods for secure spontaneous device association have explored the use of ‘out 
of band’ communication channels that enable user veriﬁcation without the need to expose 
or compromise the primary communication channel (and thus potentially compromise the 
data stored on the initiating device). Typically, the ultimate function of the ‘out of band’ 
channel is to swap a small amount of information between devices in a way that the human 
user can verify that it is the intended target device that is being communicated with. Upon 
veriﬁcation of this initial communication by the user, the information that was exchanged 
using the ‘out of band’ channel is subsequently used to create a full secure device pairing 
using the primary communication channel. 
9The ‘name’ of a wireless service is provided as its SSID (Service Set IDentiﬁer), which can be set by the 
service administrator. 
10A review of such techniques has recently been oﬀered by Kumar et al (2009) [80] and a comparative 
user study was conducted on a number of proposed pairing methods by Kobsa et al (2009) [78]. 
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Using the auxiliary channel approach, the side channel is ﬁrst used to perform the initial 
connection between the user’s device (the initiator) and the target device. Upon making this 
initial connection, the role of the user is then to verify that a connection has been performed 
with the intended target device. To do this, the auxiliary channel must oﬀer some form of 
human-perceptible evidence11 . Two general approaches have been taken in respect of the 
use of auxiliary channels as a means of conveying evidence of device association. In the ﬁrst 
class of approach, the auxiliary channel itself forms the evidence by limiting the ability for 
an attacker to intervene in the interaction through using channels that are location-limited 
or otherwise physically-constrained in some way. 
Location limited channels: Location-limited channels (e.g. Balfanz et al, 2002 [139]) are 
deliberately short-range communication channels. As such, they rely on the user’s intuitive 
belief that they are better able to eliminate the man-in-the-middle type attacker by sim­
ply oﬀering little in the way of physical room within the interaction for them to intervene. 
Several solutions, including Stajano & Anderson’s (1999) [141] ‘Resurrecting Duckling’ facil­
itate device pairing by simply placing the devices in direct physical contact with one another. 
Similarly, Riekki et al (2006) [121] and Balfanz et al (2002) [139] have used near physical 
contact, using short range communication technologies such as Radio Frequency Identiﬁca­
tion (RFID) tags. As a ﬁnal example, McCune, Perrig & Reiter (2005) [97] explored the 
use of 2D barcodes. In their protocol, the digital camera facilities of the initiating device (a 
mobile phone) were used to pair with a host by reading a 2D barcode that was displayed 
on the screen of the host device (also a phone) - again severely limiting the ability of an 
attacker to intervene. 
Other variations of location-limited device pairing have extended the security oﬀered by di­
rect device contact by further utilising information about some shared characteristic of the 
devices involved in the negotiation. Mayrhofer & Gellersen (2007) [93] expanded a direct 
contact protocol by combining the contact with an elegant key generation technique that 
used accelerometers embedded in both communicating devices. In their protocol, commu­
nication is ﬁrst established by placing the devices together, and a unique cryptographic key 
is then generated through the vigorous, random shaking of the devices in tandem (see also 
‘Smart-ITs’, Holmquist et al, 2001 [63]). This key is then used to secure subsequent commu­
nications between the devices. Other solutions by Mayrhofer, Gellersen & Hazas (2007) [94] 
and Kindberg & Zhang (2003) [77] have used measurements of the relative spatial location of 
each device, derived using ultrasound. As a ﬁnal recent example, Varshavsky et al’s (2009) 
[148] “Amigo” protocol used an even more sophisticated technique whereby communicating 
devices would derive and later compare a shared radio ﬁngerprint based on the immediate 
characteristics of their surrounding radio landscape. 
Physically constrained channels: In situations where direct, or near direct contact is 
either impractical or unavailable, several solutions have also been posited that do not re­
quire communicating devices to be immediately proximate. Typically, such solutions instead 
utilise communication channels that are physically-constrained in some way. Some physi­
cally constrained channels that have been explored include laser (Mayrhofer & Welch (2007) 
[95] and Kindberg & Zhang (2003) [76]) and infra-red light (Balfanz et al (2004) [9]). As 
the communications conducted over the auxiliary channel are insecure, it is the precision of 
11Balfanz (2002) [139] has described this process as the ‘demonstrative identiﬁcation of communicating 
devices’. 
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Figure 2.1: Visualising hash keys for easy comparison: In the examples shown, an original 
Md5 hashed key is compared with two others (one identical, one not). By modulating 
the raw key to an image, identifying the odd-one-out is made much easier for the human 
perceptual system to detect. 
the physically constrained channels that is the source of its evidential value. In both the 
laser and IR examples mentioned, communication between initiator and host devices must 
therefore be conducted line-of-sight. 
In the second class of approach, the auxiliary channel is instead used to facilitate user au­
thentication by presenting evidence that the user is able to compare between the initiating 
and host devices, so as to establish their direct association with one another. Underpinning 
this approach is the initial creation of a cryptographic key that is shared between the ini­
tiating and host devices. The keys that are held by each device are then presented back to 
the user for comparison using the auxiliary channel. 
Various modalities by which such veriﬁcation can be achieved by direct comparison have 
been explored, including the use of various forms of visual (see ﬁgure 2.1), auditory and 
tactile feedback. Through modulation into an image for example (e.g. Perrig & Song, 1999 
[112]), ‘visual hashes’ have been found to be highly eﬀective as a means of comparison as 
compared to their raw string state (e.g. Dhamija, 2000 [36]). 
2.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, a review of literature pertinent to human-computer trust was conducted, 
providing an initial means of addressing RQ1: How is human-human interpersonal trust 
understood to operate, and how has this been modulated for use in human-computing ap­
plications where some degree of trust (on the part of the human) is obligated? Through 
this investigation, the output of a number of research streams that have sought to under­
stand human trust and the ways in which cues that support it can be modulated for use in 
technologically-mediated communication were presented and discussed. 
Trust is a form of rationality that allows people to perform actions in situations of risk and 
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uncertainty. That a person comes to invest their trust in someone or something in a given 
situation is driven by a subjective measure of trustworthiness that is ascribed to a trustee 
from the trustor. The value of trustworthiness that is ascribed to a trustee is derived from 
a combination of cognitive and aﬀective reasoning about both the trustee and the situation 
within which trust is to be invested. 
Trust-based relationships typically develop over time and repeated interactions, with high 
degrees of interpersonal trust usually only occurring as repeated successful interactions re­
duce the degrees of risk and uncertainty that are inherent in such situations. However, the 
phenomenon of initial-situational trust, in which high degrees of trust are found to occur 
spontaneously in situations where the trustor has no prior experience with the trustee, can 
occur in certain circumstances, providing certain criteria are met. 
That interactive systems are considered as being trustworthy is an important factor in how 
users come to accept and use those systems. This is particularly important with regard 
to systems where the privacy and security of a user’s data might be compromised through 
their use. With the advent and continued advances of the services that are now available on 
technologies such as the WWW, various methods by which trustworthiness can be imbued 
into the designs of risk-relevant systems have been explored. Indeed, by utilising the full 
range of communication modalities that are now aﬀorded to the WWW, systems designers 
are able to modulate several well known human-human trustworthiness cues into the human-
computer domain with positive eﬀect. 
However, several new characteristics of pervasive computing mean that services deployed 
using such infrastructure are currently much less capable of oﬀering the same level of im­
mediate evidence as to their trustworthiness as might be found on systems deployed via the 
traditional desktop-metaphor. Such characteristics, include the need for users to both dis­
cover and authenticate the services that the pervasive computing infrastructure of a speciﬁc 
place and time can oﬀer. Though many novel methods have been presented to address trust 
issues related to these new characteristics, there is currently little research into how users 
might consider them in terms of their trust. 
In the next chapter, the focus of the investigation will turn toward gaining an insight into 
user attitudes and behaviours regarding current uses of technology within situations where 
the use of trust is particularly salient. 
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Chapter 3 
An examination of current user 
experience and behaviour with 
technologies that involve issues 
of personal privacy and security 
3.1 Chapter overview 
In terms of their impact into the public consciousness, pervasive computing services, such 
as public access WiFi are a relatively new phenomenon. As such, gaining insight into how 
people perceive them, particularly in terms of the issues of privacy and security that are 
associated with them is diﬃcult. In this chapter, an initial investigation sought to uncover 
the salient privacy and security concerns relating to traditional desktop-metaphor computing 
that would likely transfer into similar types of activity conducted in a pervasive computing 
scenario. 
In this chapter, the researcher conducted an investigation to begin developing a deeper un­
derstanding of the degree to which user behaviour with familiar ICT technologies might 
contribute to the development of initial-situational trusting attitudes with regard to more 
nascent pervasive technologies such as situated services. To aid the study, a questionnaire 
was developed to gather information about the degree to which people currently use inter­
active ICT (such as the WWW), and the degree to which they understood and considered 
threats to the privacy and security of their personal data as a result of their technology-
related behaviours. Further, the questionnaire also sought to gather information as to the 
measures that users currently took to protect their data as a result of their technology-related 
activities. In terms of the thesis as a whole, the results of this investigation will address 
RQ2: To what extent do people currently understand the threats and risks associated with 
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the use of ICT services such as the WWW? To what extent does this understanding translate 
to pervasive / situated computing services?, and will also be used to inform the design of 
the empirical component of the research discussed in later chapters. 
3.2 Introduction 
The private and / or personal data of technology users is a valuable commodity to those 
who are keen to exploit technology for malevolent purposes. When encountering a new 
technology, users should always consider the degree to which their personal / private infor­
mation is secured, and how their use of that technology might aﬀect that security. From 
the perspective of the system designer, the degree to which users of technology consider the 
potential risk of loss or misappropriation of their personal information is also important; it 
will likely be a contributing factor to their decision of whether (or indeed not) to use that 
technology, and thus directly aﬀect whether that system will be accepted. 
Despite the Internet remaining largely open and ultimately unregulated, many activities 
that involve risk - and particularly those activities that involve ﬁnancial risk - are now 
commonly and routinely performed by people using services that are made available on the 
WWW. The continued usage growth of risk-relevant web services (such as e-commerce and 
e-banking) alone provides us with evidence that people are, to the most part, comfortable 
with conducting activities that involve entrusting their personal / private data to others. 
However, as the ability to perform risk-relevant activities (such as the payment of goods) 
moves from the desktop at home and into public space, issues of security and privacy to 
which many people have become accustomed will need to be re-evaluated. In a pervasive 
computing-based world for example, users may be obliged to expose valuable personal infor­
mation on networks to which they have little personal control, possibly using communication 
devices that are not their own. While the eﬀects of this are not yet well understood, there is 
evidence to suggest that people consider such a move to be uncomfortable. Nilsson, Adams 
and Herd (2005) [109] for example have found that people using online banking services were 
generally only happy to use them in certain locations, usually their home, and not on other 
peoples / publicly accessible machines. Similarly, Kindberg et al (2004) [75] encountered 
signiﬁcant user concern relating to use of wireless connectivity as a means of facilitating 
customer payments. 
The Mcknight & Chervany model of initial-situational trust formation (Mcknight et al (1998) 
[101]) proposes that the degree to which a trustee (of which the trustor has no previous expe­
rience) is considered trustworthy is informed in part by their prior experience with trustees 
/ situations that they consider as being similar. It is this insight to which the investi­
gation discussed in this chapter is primarily based. As ICT services move closer towards 
pervasive-infrastructure deployment, the role that initial situational trust will play in their 
early acceptance will likely be critical, initially because of their novelty. Discussing technol­
ogy use in general, Rutter (2001) [126] found that when people approach a new experience, 
they often tend to apply rules that have governed similar experiences in a similar domain. 
Thus, while a person’s prior direct experience with pervasive technologies may be essen­
tially non-existent, some of their more familiar characteristics (use of wireless connectivity 
etc) may prove to be an important factor in how such technologies / services are initially 
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perceived and their risks understood by users. 
3.3	 The design of a questionnaire to investigate tech­
nology usage behaviour relating to user privacy and 
security 
User acceptance of risk-relevant ICT technologies and services is a highly dynamic process. 
Particularly with respect to the WWW, though the security measures that support and 
protect users from malicious behaviour continue to improve, so too do the counter-measures 
that aim to break or otherwise subvert that security. Nonetheless, as the beneﬁts that 
the WWW has been able to oﬀer have grown, so too has user acceptance as to the risks 
of its use. However, a consequence of this highly dynamic developmental process is that 
it is often diﬃcult for researchers to maintain an accurate picture of current user opinion 
and practice regarding technology use and acceptance. For example, while the practice of 
accessing personal ﬁnancial information through an Internet known to be populated with 
‘hackers’ and other technically superior undesirables might have been considered far too risky 
only ﬁve years ago, it is now widely accepted. Thus, in order to investigate current user 
concerns about privacy and security issues surrounding their current uses of technology, 
a questionnaire was developed. As an initial investigation into user behaviour related to 
technology use, an objective of the research presented in this chapter was to gain information 
from a large number of people across a wide demographic. The standardised and objective 
nature of questionnaires was considered to be more appropriate than interview at this stage 
of the research. Deeper explorations of user reasoning relating to privacy and security themes 
relating to speciﬁc instance of technology use will however be explored in later chapters. The 
design of the questionnaire was conducted using an iterative design process that was based 
around two core themes. Those themes were: 1) the extent to which people considered their 
privacy and security with respect to the technologies that they currently used and, 2) the ways 
in which people feel that systems of a pervasive nature might aﬀect their personal privacy and 
security. A set of core questions relating to these themes was ﬁrst generated using a focus 
group consisting of the researcher and several research colleagues. The resulting questions 
were then subsequently reﬁned using several short pilot sessions in which small groups of 
participants completed the questionnaire and provided feedback as to its comprehension and 
interpretation. 
3.3.1	 Activities and behaviour relating to current technology usage 
that involve issues of privacy and security 
In order to capture information about the degree to which people considered their privacy 
and security with respect to the technologies that they currently used, their actual technology 
usage behaviour would need to be examined, with particular attention paid to the extent 
to which technologies that carried a risk to the security and / or privacy of their personal 
data. To facilitate this, a group of questions were developed to capture information related 
to four general issues: 
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•	 The extent to which people had experience in using technology to perform activities 
that posed a potential risk to their security and / or privacy. 
•	 Where those activities had taken place, e.g. at home, within public space or both. 
•	 The measures taken by people in order to protect their security and privacy with 
respect to the technologies that they owned / used. 
•	 The extent to which people had personal experience, or been victims of, technology-
based malicious activity (e.g. phishing attacks / credit card fraud etc). 
3.3.2	 Technology user concerns about pervasive computing services 
in relation to personal privacy and security 
The relative novelty of pervasive services made the choice of questions in this section of the 
questionnaire diﬃcult. While needing to be reﬂective of core issues of security and privacy 
in relation to pervasive computing, they also needed to be familiar in some respect to the 
the respondents such that they could assess them relative to their current technology-based 
behaviour. To capture information as to the thoughts and concerns of people relating to 
technologies of a pervasive nature, a number of technologies were selected by the researcher 
as being reﬂective of issues that are pertinent to pervasive computing in general1 . The issues 
considered as being most directly pertinent were knowledge of user location and knowledge 
of user identity. Two technologies were selected as they related to systems that were, or 
would be reliant upon, knowledge of the location of people / users (i.e. location-based). 
These were: 
•	 The use of ﬁxed / mobile closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance in U.K. towns 
and cities. 
•	 UK government proposals for per-usage road pricing, as made possible by the sustained 
tracking of citizens individual vehicles. 
The remaining two technologies were selected as they referred to systems that would rely 
upon a knowledge of user identity. These were: 
•	 The UK Government’s proposal for individual citizen ID cards. 
•	 The UK Government’s proposal for biometric data to be included on UK citizen pass­
ports. 
1The technologies that were chosen were current at the time of the questionnaires deployment in the 
summer of 2007. 
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3.3.3	 Questionnaire deployment 
The questionnaire was deployed using an online survey system that was made publicly 
accessible via the WWW. Invitations to complete the questionnaire were distributed via 
online University noticeboards and the online social networking website Facebook. This 
questionnaire was self-administered, and thus completed by respondents of their own volition 
without the researcher present. As several questions were asked in respect of issues relating 
to the personal privacy and security practices of the respondents, responses to the survey 
were made anonymously. 
As the questionnaire was designed with current users of technology (and particularly the 
use of services that are made available via the WWW) in mind, deploying the questionnaire 
within an online environment was considered apt. However, a paper based version of the 
questionnaire was also made available for completion oﬄine if requested. A copy of the 
questionnaire as used in the study can be found in appendix A, section A.1. 
3.4 Results 
Responses to the questionnaire were collected from 229 participants (gender split: M=131 
(58%), F=97 (42%)) over a 12 month period between July 2007 and July 2008. Demographic 
measures were obtained for age, gender and the degree to which respondents considered 
themselves as being I.T. competent / literate. The modal age range of respondents was 27­
36. Self reported measures of perceived levels of personal I.T. literacy (using a 7-point Likert 
scale: 1 basic user to 7 highly accomplished user) indicated that 198 (86%) of respondents 
reported their personal level of I.T literacy as being 5 or above (mode = 7). 83 (36%) of 
respondents rated their personal I.T. literacy at the highest level (7). 
3.4.1	 Reports of personal experience of criminal / malicious be­
haviours through personal technology usage 
It is of course important to note that prior user experience with technology can be both 
positive and negative. Speciﬁcally with regard to their use of the WWW, respondents were 
asked whether they had personal experience of, or indeed fallen victim to three common 
types of malicious behaviours related to technology usage. These behaviours were: virus / 
malicious software infection, credit card / other banking fraud and / or a ‘phishing’ attack2 . 
Frequencies were calculated for each of these three types of attack were calculated and are 
presented as a table in ﬁgure 3.1. 
All respondents reported as having had personal experience of at least one form of the 
malicious online behaviours described, and very few respondents stated as being unsure as 
2Phishing describes an attack whereby a masquerade of an electronic communication, purporting to orig­
inate from a trustworthy person or institution, is used to fraudulently capture private / personal information 
through trickery. 
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Attack type Yes No Don’t Know 
Phishing attack 172 (75.1%) 48 (21%) 6 (2.6%) 
Credit card / banking fraud 41 (17.9%) 182 (79.5%) 6 (2.6%) 
Virus / malware infection 132 (57.6%) 93 (40.6%) 4 (1.7%) 
Table 3.1: Respondent reports of personal experience of malicious activity through their use 
of technology 
to whether they had fallen victim to any one of the behaviours described or not. ‘Phishing’ 
attacks appeared most commonly, with three quarters (172, 75.1%) of respondents indicating 
that they had, at some point, encountered such an attack. Over half of the respondents (132, 
57.6%) reported as having had their technology infected with some form of virus or malware. 
Reported instances of credit card fraud, though low relative to the other types of behaviours 
examined, still approached one-in-ﬁve (41, 17.9%). However, it was not clear as to whether 
the fraud was merely attempted, or was actually successful. 
3.4.2	 Considerations of privacy and security in relation to pervasive 
technology 
The results presented in this section were collated from open-ended responses to questions 
relating to forms of technology that involved aspects of user privacy / security that were 
considered as being relevant to themes of pervasive computing in general. One question 
related to a currently used technology (CCTV), while the remaining three questions were 
about technologies that were (at the time the questionnaire was available) being proposed 
by the U.K. Government. These technologies were per-usage road pricing, as made possible 
by the sustained tracking of citizens individual vehicles, individual citizen ID cards and the 
use of personal biometric data on the U.K. passport. Though open-ended, responses to the 
four questions were found to be typically short. As such, the use of a formal methodology to 
analyse the data generated by each question was not considered appropriate. To present and 
discuss the responses to each of the questions posed, responses were ﬁrst assigned to one of 
four general categories mostly positive, mostly negative, mixed (i.e. containing both positive 
& negative points) and ambivalent (i.e. stated as ‘don’t care’ or similar). Responses in each 
category were then examined individually, with the most common / frequently occurring 
themes noted by the researcher as they emerged. 
Respondent consideration of privacy / security issues related to technologies 
that would utilise knowledge about user location 
CCTV: In response to the question How do you feel about the use of CCTV ﬁxed / mobile 
surveillance in U.K towns and cities?, roughly a third (48, 28.9%) of respondents considered 
CCTV in as a broadly positive technology, with a further 35.5% (59) considering it in 
largely negative terms and the remaining third (59, 35.6%) being either ambivalent or of 
mixed feelings. Positive aspects of CCTV were most often discussed in terms of its use for 
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the detection and prevention of crime and anti-social behaviour. The beneﬁts of CCTV 
as a deterrent from criminal activity was also frequently mentioned, with corresponding 
comments about general feelings of increased personal safety as a result of this perceived 
eﬀect. 
Respondents who reacted with strong negative opinions about CCTV however frequently 
mentioned that its presence and use was an invasion of their personal privacy. Several 
Orwellian references (“1984 ”, “Big Brother [is watching you]”) appeared to be used to 
accentuate this perception. Many respondents referred to CCTV surveillance as being ex­
cessive, intrusive and unnecessary. Its usefulness as a legally enforceable deterrent was also 
questioned, often with reference to the quality of the evidence it is able to provide: “I have 
little conﬁdence in them as to the quality of the output and as to the coverage. They never 
seem to be on at the right time and/or place”. In terms of trust, concerns about the owner­
ship, access, regulation and control of CCTV data were frequently mentioned, but only by 
respondents who were otherwise broadly negative about its use. 
Car tracking: In response to the question How do you feel about the possibility of UK 
road pricing, as charged by the continual tracking of your vehicle? 84 (60%) of respondents 
reacted negatively, with 23 (16%) considering such a technology to be positive and 23 (16%) 
of mixed opinion. The potential for reducing congestion, car dependence and costs (e.g. 
for light road users) were considered as positive aspects. The use of such a system as a 
deterrent for criminal acts such as car theft was occasionally oﬀered. However, more than 
half of the respondents mentioned that such a system was would be unnecessarily expensive 
and an unwelcome addition to a culture of surveillance that they already considered as being 
excessive. Comments often made direct reference to invasions of privacy and civil liberty. 
Trust in the institutions that would manage such a system seemed low. Many respondents 
appeared skeptical that such a system would be used only for road pricing and many reserved 
their judgment accordingly: “If this can be done with suitable anonymity guarantees (which 
is technically feasible), and it is *only* used for pricing and not policing, I am ok with 
it.”. Several respondents also indicated a fear that the system could be used to criminalise 
road users through the assumption that such a system would be able to directly monitor 
individual vehicle speed. 
Respondent consideration of privacy / security issues related to technologies 
that would utilise knowledge about personal identity 
ID Cards: In response to the question How do you feel about the U.K. Government’s 
proposed ID card scheme?, around a third (29, 28.9%) of respondents were generally positive. 
However, over half (84, 58.7%) of the respondents reacted negatively to the proposal. Of 
the positive comments about ID cards, most were related to their potential as a means 
of protection against crime (speciﬁcally terrorism), though the convenience of centralising 
multiple forms of ID into one was also occasionally mentioned. However, ID cards were 
much more frequently considered of as being expensive, unnecessary and ineﬀective as a 
means of reducing crime. Of the negative remarks made, ID cards were frequently described 
in strong terms as a gross invasion of privacy and civil liberty: “Strongly against. Worried 
about personal freedoms, data security, general expansion of surveillance”. 
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Aspects of trust related to the proposed centralising of multiple personal data sources onto 
one card were oft-remarked upon, as were security risks associated with the potential for data 
loss / leakage consequent of such activity. Trust in the competence of the U.K. governments 
ability to protect stored data against abuse and loss was frequently questioned: “I have very 
little faith in the government being able to manage all the personal data. Their track record is 
poor. This data has a potentially high value and will thus be a target for criminals and others 
who gain value from it”. The cloning of ID cards appeared as being considered inevitable as 
much as potentially possible, and frequent references were made to several highly publicised 
media stories in which the U.K. government had apparently lost large quantities of personal 
data: “Too much information will be stored and given the Governments recent spate of losing 
data I would not be entirely trusting of any data protection systems in place”. 
Biometric passports: In response to the question What are your thoughts about the use of 
Biometric data on U.K. passports, positive / negative respondent comments were found to 
be roughly equal (40, 30% positive, 48, 35% negative). Though considered as expensive and 
diﬃcult to deploy, respondents considered biometrics to oﬀer increased personal security as 
they were “hard to fake” and thus useful for reducing identity theft and the monitoring of 
migration. However, the vulnerability of data to abuse was also highlighted, with terms 
such as “cloning” and “hacking” used to describe such abuse: “Anything can be copied so 
it will just be a matter of time until biometric data will be copied too”. 
Though issues of privacy invasion and the infringement of civil liberties were mentioned 
in regard to passport biometrics, the frequency of such comments was markedly less than 
in the other questions posed: “Biometric data, in my opinion, is mostly used in terms of 
identiﬁcation and not really related to privacy. I am in favour of this as it would help reduce 
identity theft and other issues regarding identiﬁcation”. Issues of trust, such as they were 
commented upon at all, were considered only in terms of security risks related to perceptions 
of Government ineptitude: “in light of the number of data cock-ups recently I am not too 
happy the government will be trusted with this”. 
3.4.3 General experience of risk-relevant online service usage 
Two speciﬁc online activities were considered by the researcher as being of substantial po­
tential risk to the personal privacy and security of their users data. Both activities were 
chosen based upon the value of such data to criminals and were directly related to ﬁnan­
cial transactions. These activities were: 1) electronic ‘e-commerce’ transactions made using 
credit cards and 2) the accessing of personal banking information through an online service 
(i.e. e-banking). 
The vast majority (202, 88%) of respondents reported as having used the WWW to access 
their personal bank account through an online e-banking service at least once, and almost 
all (220, 96%) of the respondents reported as having personally made a purchase from a 
supplier using an online e-commerce website using their own credit / debit card. 
Almost all (222, 97%) reported as having made a purchase from a retailer that was previously 
known to them (e.g. Amazon). Two thirds of respondents (151, 66%) had made a purchase 
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from a retailer to whom they had no prior knowledge or experience, and 28% (64) had made 
a purchase directly from an individual who was previously unknown to them (presumably 
through eBay or a similar ‘free ad’ type service). The majority (174, 76%) of respondents 
had however mitigated the risk of their e-commerce transactions failing through use of an 
online payment gateway service (e.g. ‘Paypal’) that oﬀered some protection against fraud. 
3.4.4	 Experience of risk-relevant online service usage in places other 
than the home 
In addition to collecting information about their experiences of e-commerce and e-banking, 
respondents were also asked where and under what circumstances those activities had taken 
place. For each activity, respondents were invited to select 1) whether they had used their 
own computing equipment (mobile or otherwise), or equipment to which others had access, 
2) whether they had used an access point to the Internet that was private (i.e. their home 
network), or one that was publicly accessible (e.g. at a Library or Cafe) and 3) whether 
connection to the Internet was facilitated through a wired or wireless (WiFi) connection. 
Respondents were able to select as many of the options as they considered appropriate. 
General internet browsing 
Total counts of the respondents’ experience of using the Internet for general web browsing 
were calculated across the six conﬁgurations of wired / wireless connection, public / private 
network and personal / non-personal browsing device. Percentage distributions of experience 
for each condition are presented as a graph in ﬁgure 3.1. 
Given that all 229 respondents completed the questionnaire online, all respondents can be 
assumed as having experience of using the Internet for general web browsing within at 
least one of the conﬁgurations examined. Within the home environment, the use of wired 
and wireless Internet connections was found to be roughly equal (192, 83.8% and 191, 83.4% 
respectively). When using personal browsing devices (e.g. a laptop computer) outside of the 
home, reports of respondent experience approached the levels seen at home with wireless 
network connection usage (141, 61.6%), and the use of wireless connections appeared to 
be much more common than experience with wired connections (86, 37.6%). However, in 
scenarios where non-personal browsing devices were used, the reverse was found (154, 67.2% 
wired, 57, 24.9% wireless). This ﬁnding was considered as occurring due to respondents 
considering the browsing devices that were made available to them in their workplace (which 
were conceivably more likely as using a wired network connection associated Internet access) 
as falling under the category of ‘non-personal’ devices. 
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Figure 3.1: Count of respondents (n = 229) with experience of general Internet browsing 
using a personal / non-personal browsing device on a public / private wired or public / 
private wireless Internet connection. 
E-Commerce 
Total counts of the respondents’ experience of using the Internet to make a purchase from 
an e-commerce website were calculated across the six conditions of wired / wireless con­
nection, public / private network and personal / non-personal browsing device. Percentage 
distributions of experience for each condition are presented as a graph in ﬁgure 3.2. 
Within the home environment, the use of wired and wireless Internet connections was found 
to be roughly equal (180, 78.6% and 167, 72.9% respectively), and of levels that were compa­
rable to the results found for general Internet browsing. Outside of the home, and when using 
personal equipment, e-commerce purchases were found to be more common to have been 
made whilst using a wireless Internet connection (61, 26.6%) than wired (37, 16.2%). How­
ever, as seen with general Internet browsing, this ﬁnding reversed when using non-personal 
equipment (39, 17% wired, 10, 4.4% wireless), probably for the same reasons described 
previously. 
E-Banking 
Total counts of the respondents’ experience of using the Internet to access their personal 
bank accounts using an e-banking service were calculated across the six conditions of wired / 
wireless connection, public / private network and personal / non-personal browsing device. 
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Figure 3.2: Count of respondents (n = 229) with experience of making purchases from e-
commerce websites using a personal / non-personal browsing device on a public / private 
wired or public / private wireless Internet connection. 
Percentage proportions of experience for each condition are presented as a graph in ﬁgure 
3.2. 
Within the home environment, the use of wired and wireless Internet connections was again 
found to be roughly equal (165, 72.1% and 153, 66.8% respectively), and of levels that were 
comparable to the results found for e-commerce and general Internet browsing. Outside 
of the home, and when using personal equipment, personal bank account access was found 
to be more commonly made whilst using a wireless Internet connection (52, 22.7%) than 
wired (32, 14%). Again, as seen with general Internet browsing and e-commerce, this ﬁnding 
reversed when using non-personal equipment (32, 14% wired, 9, 3.9% wireless). 
3.4.5	 Risk mitigation behaviours in respect of personal technology 
usage 
The results presented in this section were derived from responses to questions that examined 
the degree to which the respondents made eﬀorts to combat the potential for unauthorized 
access to their computers as a result of maintaining a connection to the Internet. In terms of 
how respondents maintained their personal security / privacy on the technologies they used 
at home, questions were asked in respect of two types of security practice behaviour: Home 
network security practises, including the usage of network communication encryption 
protocols, particularly with respect to wireless networking (WiFi) and network communi­
cation security practises, including the monitoring of incoming network communication 
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Figure 3.3: Count of respondents (n = 229) with experience of accessing personal bank 
accounts using a personal / non-personal browsing device on a public / private wired or 
public / private wireless Internet connection. 
traﬃc using security software such as a network ‘ﬁrewall’, and the use of anti-virus / anti­
malware software. 
Wireless network usage and associated wireless network security practises 
In response to questioning about the ways in which they connected to the Internet at home, 
the vast majority (188, 82%) of respondents reported that they currently maintained a wire­
less internet connection in their home. 151 (66%) described their wireless networks as being 
secured from unauthorised usage, either through the use of an end to end communication 
encryption protocol (e.g. WEP 3 / WPA 4), or through limiting access to their networks 
to speciﬁc machines only (e.g. by ﬁltering MAC addresses 5). Only a small minority (25, 
11%) of respondents reported as not securing their wireless network, but a further 14 (6%) 
did not know whether their wireless network was secured or not. 
3WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy.

4WPA: WiFi Protected Access.

5MAC address: Media Access Control address.
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Usage and understanding of network ‘ﬁrewalls’ as a means of monitoring unau­
thorised network communications 
The degree to which respondents understood the function of a network ‘ﬁrewall’ was captured 
using an open-ended question: “What do you understand by the term ﬁrewall? ” Almost all 
respondents stated as understanding the term “ﬁrewall” as being referrent to a type of 
software that was involved with networks and speciﬁcally the Internet. When describing 
the role of ﬁrewalls, responses were dominated by terms relating to the provision of two 
aspects of functionality: 1) security / protection against digitally mounted attack and 2) 
the provision of network access control. 
Security / protection against attack was discussed in terms of the potential that con­
nection to the Internet made the respondents computer vulnerable to the malicious intrusion 
by unauthorised others. ‘Others’ were referred to both in terms of people: “hackers” and au­
tonomous code: “Viruses, malware”. “[A ﬁrewall is] a program that maintains the integrity 
of your system by preventing the invasion or intrusion of malicious or unwanted programs 
or persons”. 
Access control was most frequently referred to in terms of a ﬁrewall having the ability 
to control incoming / outcoming data channels (“ports”). The speciﬁc abilities of ﬁrewalls 
were discussed in terms of development and enforcement rules, restrictions and permissions: 
e.g. “[a ﬁrewall] protects computers/networks from unwanted connections based on a set of 
pre-deﬁned rules”. 
Over two thirds of (153, 67%) respondents reported as using ﬁrewall software to protect their 
computers from unauthorised communications made through their Internet connections, of 
which almost all (142, 62%) could identify the speciﬁc brand / type of ﬁrewall that they 
used. However, a third (76, 33%) of respondents did not know whether a ﬁrewall was present 
on their home computer(s) or not. 
Personal device operating system and installed software maintenance behaviours 
The degree to which respondents made eﬀorts to monitor and maintain the integrity of 
their personal computer software and operating systems (OS) as a response to sustained 
exposure to the Internet were examined across a range of items. Such activities included 
the degree to which explicit eﬀorts were made to monitor and evaluate changes that have 
been made to their operating system, how Internet ‘cookies’ / other temporary internet ﬁles 
were managed, and the frequency by which respondents checked their systems for virus / 
malware infections. Around half (105, 46%) of respondents reported making eﬀorts ‘every 
so often’ to maintain their personal computers using dedicated software to assist them in 
this process. 41 (18%) did so at least once per month, and 30 (13%) reported as doing so 
at least once per week. 
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Protection of personal identity online 
Data as to how respondents considered the protection of personal identity online as being 
important to them was ﬁrst examined by looking at the degree to which respondents chose 
to use their real names during their online activities (as opposed to a nickname or other 
pseudonym). The degree to which respondents used their real name whilst using the Internet 
was measured using scaled response (5-point Likert, [1] never - [5] all the time). Examination 
of the results yielding an average rating of 3.4, indicating that respondents used their real 
name on the web only slightly more often than they did not. However, the majority of 
respondents (192, 84%) also reported as maintaining at least one online pseudonym, with 
around half (124, 54%) maintaining several. 
Further the degree to which respondents engaged with social networking websites, where 
divulgence of personal information is expected (and in many case, at least for practical 
purposes, necessitated) was also examined. The vast majority (195, 85%) of respondents 
reported as maintaining a proﬁle on at least one such website (e.g. MySpace, Facebook, 
LinkedIn). More than half (142, 62%) maintained proﬁles on two such websites, and roughly 
one quarter (53, 23%) maintained more than three. 
Password behaviour and the protection of personal access credentials on the 
WWW 
To maintain high degrees of user privacy and information security, many online services 
require their users to generate some form of unique knowledge-based identiﬁer such as a 
username and / or password. The purpose of such an identiﬁer is to allow the service 
vendor to validate their identity so as to protect their data from unauthorised use. How 
knowledge-based identiﬁers, particularly passwords are generated is crucial to their actual 
security value. Most security guidelines (including the oft-cited federal information pro­
cessing guidelines (1985) [108]) recommend that, to maximise their actual security value, 
passwords should be both long and constructed of a pseudo-random combination of letters 
and numbers. Furthermore, passwords are recommended to be changed regularly (and in­
deed many systems enforce this behaviour), and users are strongly recommended to maintain 
a diﬀerent password for each system that they use. 
The proliferation of online services in recent years, particularly with regard to e-commerce 
has led to a substantial increase in the number of passwords that an average Internet user 
has to maintain. In studies of password usage behaviour, an active Internet user has been 
found to maintain an average of 25 diﬀerent passwords at any given time (Florencio & 
Herley, 2007 [45]), of which some 15 will be required for daily use (Ives et al, 2004 [65]). The 
requirement to maintain and recall large numbers of passwords however incurs a substantive 
cognitive burden, and this issue has attracted signiﬁcant research attention (e.g Adams & 
Sasse, 1999 [2], Florencio & Herley, 2007 [45]). It is argued for instance that, despite the 
ideal development of large numbers of unique passwords, the average person will (without 
training) struggle to maintain more than ﬁve passwords at a given time (Adams & Sasse 
(1999) [2]. 
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Partly as a consequence of this problem, there is a known tendency for users to generate 
a small number of passwords that are then circulated and / or reused across a range of 
online services. As variances in the actual security of systems that purport to be ‘secure’ 
are huge, from a security perspective, such user practice is far from ideal. Further, and 
as Ives et al (2004) [65] discuss, exposure of a widely used password on a service that is 
perceived to be secure but is in fact not (and is subsequently compromised) can incur a 
domino eﬀect whereby that password is subsequently used to access services with much 
higher actual security measures in place. While suggestions for improvements to password 
generation that take into account human factors have been oﬀered (e.g. Grawemeyer & 
Johnson, 2009 [56], Sasse et al, 2001 [128]), despite several decades of research, progress in 
this area remains slow. 
Respondents to the questionnaire were asked whether the number of passwords they main­
tain in regular use was low or high, and the degree to which they attempted to maximise the 
entropy or ‘strength’ of their passwords (e.g. through increased length and / or the combi­
nation of numbers and letters). 174 (76%) of respondents reported as actively making eﬀorts 
to maximise the strength of the passwords that they did generate (e.g. through increasing 
their length and / or complexity). However, some two thirds (151, 66%) of the respondents 
also reported as maintaining only a small number of passwords that were repeatedly used 
across a number of online services. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, a questionnaire was designed to capture current user concerns about privacy 
and security issues surrounding their current uses of technology. Further, the questionnaire 
sought to examine the extent to which users of technologies such as the WWW currently 
manage their personal / private data in response to these concerns. the results of this 
investigation sought to address RQ2: To what extent do people currently understand the 
threats and risks associated with the use of ICT services such as the WWW? To what extent 
does this understanding translate to pervasive / situated computing services? 
From the results of the questionnaire, respondents were found to be far from naive to the 
potential risks involved in their use of the WWW. Many had personal experience of threats 
that are commonly associated with use of the Web. Over half (132, 57.6%) of respondents 
had fallen victim to a virus / malware infection, three quarters 172, 75.1% had personal 
experience of a ‘phishing’ type attack, and almost one in ﬁve (41, 17.9%) had been the 
victim of a credit card fraud. On the whole, respondents to the questionnaire presented 
themselves as being security conscious, and this was reﬂected in a number of reported 
behaviours regarding the protection of their personal / private data at home. A substantial 
number (105, 46%) of respondents made eﬀorts to maintain the integrity of their data and 
the software that they used on their own computers, even if they did so irregularly. Most 
(188, 82%) respondents used WiFi to connect to the Internet in their own homes, and 
two thirds (151, 66%) took steps to secure it against unauthorised usage. Though around 
a third (76, 33%) of respondents did not use a ﬁrewall, the vast majority of respondents 
understood the types of threat that ﬁrewall software is designed to protect them against. 
However, their security practises regarding password protection was worrying. Despite 174 
62 
respondents (76%) reporting as making eﬀorts to strengthen their passwords, 151 (66%) also 
admitted to maintaining only a small number that were circulated widely. 
Personal privacy and identity were considered as being an important factor to respondents, 
and technologies that involved a perceived invasion of that privacy were carefully weighed 
up in terms of how they were perceived in terms of their relative cost / beneﬁt. Where 
a clear beneﬁt could be seen, respondents appeared willing to compromise their privacy 
in order for that technology to be used. However, respondents were also concerned about 
who owned, or had access to such data, what could be done with it and how / by whom 
it was stored. In terms of personal identity, though the use of pseudonyms as a means of 
protecting personal identity whilst online was common, respondents appeared comfortable 
with exposing their real names online. Most also appeared comfortable with the use of social 
networking websites and maintained an account with at least one such service. 
3.5.1	 Experience of risk-relevant technology / service usage at home 
and away 
The vast majority of respondents to the questionnaire had experience of using technology to 
conduct activities of ﬁnancial risk, with some 206 (90%) respondents stating as having used 
e-banking to conduct their ﬁnancial aﬀairs online. All respondents (who were old enough to 
do so) had used the WWW to conduct an e-commerce-based ﬁnancial transaction using their 
own credit card. Two-thirds (151, 66%) had done so to make a purchase from a company 
with whom they had no previous knowledge or experience (with the increased risk that 
might entail), and potentially riskier still, around one third (64, 28%) had made a purchase 
from a previously unknown individual. 
When using Internet connections outside of the home, network connections tended to be 
more often wireless than wired when using own equipment, but this appears to reverse when 
using shared access equipment. Outside of the home, the use of public Internet connections 
for the purposes of general Internet browsing was found to drop by 26% (191, 83.4% to 
141, 61.6%). However, when using public Internet connections for e-commerce and and e-
banking, experience levels fell sharply for both: e-commerce (-64%) and e-banking (-66%) 
(167 [72.9%] to 61 [26.6%], 153 [66.8%] to 52 [22.7%] respectively). Finally, when using 
non-personal equipment on a public access Internet connection, though 57 (24.9%) stated as 
having had experience of such a conﬁguration for the purposes of general Internet browsing, 
only a fraction (10, 4.4%) had used it for an e-commerce transaction and less still (9, 3.9%) 
for e-banking related activities. Generally speaking, though respondents appeared to be 
comfortable and experienced in using risk-relevant services using their own equipment and 
Internet connections at home, these behaviours did not transfer particularly well to their 
Internet usage outside of the home. On public / shared access Internet connections, though 
apparently content to use such services for the less risky general browsing, respondents 
appeared less likely to conduct their e-commerce and e-banking activities. However, it is 
important to note that the survey did not probe respondents as to why they might be 
reticent to perform such activities. 
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3.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, a questionnaire was developed to investigate the degree to which people 
currently use technologies that pose a potential risk to the privacy and security of their 
personal data. In terms of the thesis as a whole, the investigation conducted in this chapter 
formed the ﬁrst step towards addressing the extent to which people currently understood 
the threats and risks associated with the use of ICT services to which they were familiar, 
such as the WWW (RQ2). The questionnaire was designed to probe, covering a broad 
range of topics that were considered as being relevant to aspects of the less familiar concept 
of pervasive situated services. 
In terms of the degree to which users understanding of privacy / security threats in their 
current technology use might translate to pervasive / situated computing service usage 
behaviours, the results of the questionnaire do not yet create a particularly clear picture of 
the deeper reasoning behind some of the respondents’ stated behaviours. However, results 
did indicate that aspects of trust, privacy and security are important to people, and this 
appears to be particularly the case with respect to ICT services that are made available 
outside the more familiar home environment. 
From the results of the questionnaire it was found that users are, by and large, highly 
security conscious and experienced in a wide range of common technology based threats. 
Further, they were experienced with a number of risk-relevant online activities such as e-
commerce and e-banking, but tended to conduct such activities on their home-based Internet 
connections rather than on public access connections, leaving their use of public access 
connections for less risky activities such as general Internet browsing. 
A question remains as to whether the respondents reticence to engage in riskier ICT usage 
outside of their home was due to a simple lack of opportunity or to more substantial concerns. 
In the next chapter, the contributions of the questionnaire in addressing RQ 2 will be 
developed further through the design of an empirical research programme that will expose 
participants in an experimental setting to a common example of a pervasive situated service: 
a public access WiFi ‘hotspot’. The empirical programme will seek to create a type of 
situation that is pertinent to a known problem associated with pervasive situated services: 
the need for user-veriﬁable secure ad-hoc device connection in situations of potential risk. 
Thus, within the programme, a technology setup that is currently available in the real world 
(free wiﬁ provision) will be extended to reﬂect this problem by instantiating several such 
services in the same physical space. In doing so, participants will need to consider which 
of several services could be trusted, and which should not be trusted (a situation directly 
pertinent to addressing RQs3 & 4). 
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Chapter 4 
Goals and Methods 
4.1 Chapter overview 
In chapter one, a number of characteristics of pervasive situated services were presented 
as being relevant to issues relating to human-computer trust. Those characteristics were: 
1) the wireless / invisible nature of pervasive systems constrain user ability to ascertain 
the source and intention of the services they provide and 2) user trust is often obligated by 
the requirement to surrender personal information prior to engagement with such systems. 
Further, chapter one identiﬁed two well-known problems within pervasive computing. These 
are: digital service discovery, i.e. how people come to locate wireless services and spontaneous 
secure ad-hoc device association, i.e. how people come to verify the authenticity of a service 
and invest their trust in it. Finally, an example of a pervasive situated service that is 
potentially vulnerable to attacks based upon these two problems has been selected for further 
investigation: wireless Internet gateway services, or ‘WiFi hotspots’. 
In chapter two, a questionnaire was developed to probe the degree to which people currently 
use technologies such as the WWW to conduct activities that pose a potential risk to the 
security of personal / private information. The results of this questionnaire indicated that 
people are highly security conscious and careful in the way they conduct their Internet-
based activities. Many had experienced instances where their personal data was, or could 
conceivably been compromised. However, the vast majority of respondents also reported 
as having had personal experience of using WWW-based services, such as eCommerce and 
eBanking, to conduct activities that have signiﬁcant risks attached to them. Importantly 
however, most only conducted such activities on their home-based networks and equipment. 
Experience of using public access networks and equipment was found to be low. 
In this chapter, the empirical component of the thesis will be presented. The empirical 
programme will seek to build upon the results of the questionnaire and address the remaining 
research questions. It will seek to achieve this by creating scenarios whereby participants 
would be exposed to (and asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of) multiple instances of 
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wireless pervasive situated services in public space. In doing so, participants will be forced 
to consider the degree to which they are conﬁdent that the services they encounter are truly 
what they purport to be and, by extension, worthy of their trust. 
4.2 Introduction 
The ﬁrst goal of the empirical programme is to draw out and identify those aspects of 
a person’s interaction with a pervasive situated service that are relevant to whether they 
consider that service to be trustworthy. To address this goal will involve the generation of a 
deeper understanding about how people currently engage with technologies, and in particular 
those technologies that require the use of personal and / or sensitive user information. 
This process will contribute further to RQ2, building upon what was learned from the 
questionnaire reported in the previous chapter. The second goal of the empirical programme 
is to identify and leverage artefacts in the immediate physical environment that might serve 
as good evidence that a given wireless service is more likely to be genuine than other similar 
co-present services that do not utilise that evidence. The overarching goals of the programme 
are summarised thus: 
1.	 Explore current user practises, and identify the context / point at which a persons 
trust in a service begins to aﬀect their decision as to whether (or not) to accept that 
service. 
2.	 Identify evidential cues in the immediate physical environment that might help 
or hinder a user to reach a degree of conﬁdence about the trustworthiness of a given 
service. 
3.	 Evaluate practical methods by which that evidence can be leveraged such 
that the user can make an informed decision about the trustworthiness of a given 
service. 
4.2.1 Design constraints 
It is important to reiterate at this point the fact that the research reported in this thesis was 
conducted within a larger research project (Cityware) that involved a number of diﬀerent 
stakeholders. A consequence of the author’s role as a member of a team working within the 
Cityware project was that certain constraints would be placed upon the way in which the 
empirical studies reported in this thesis were designed. As such, a number of compromises 
were made throughout the research process to facilitate the addressing of research goals that 
were not necessarily directly those of the present thesis. 
The most speciﬁc instance of this compromise was made manifest in the study reported in 
chapter ﬁve. Within the work package to which the researcher was directly associated, it 
was considered critical that the work of this thesis would eventually be incorporated into 
a set of protocols that would speciﬁcally seek to solve the problem of secure ad-hoc device 
66 
connection within an urban pervasive computing scenario. The design and development 
of these protocols would (for reasons of timescale) occur concurrently with the research 
investigations of the author. While some aspects of these protocols would be based upon 
previous work conducted by Kindberg (as leader of the author’s work package), the author 
would be expected to contribute his ﬁndings to as they developed - for instance following 
the review of literature reported in chapter two. 
As a ﬁnal constraint, it was also considered critical to the wider Cityware research group 
that any protocols that were developed during the project would undergo evaluation by 
participants within an experimental setting. With limited time available, it was considered 
preferable to roll together parts of this evaluation into the experiments devised by the au­
thor. The knock-on eﬀect of this requirement was that the inclusion of certain experimental 
materials and data collection strategies would be informed to some degree by other members 
of the Cityware team. 
4.2.2 Sampling methods 
For the most part, the empirical programme will seek to source a number of its partici­
pants through an opportunity-based sampling method. Opportunity based sampling selects 
participants based upon factors of convenience rather than for their demographic / repre­
sentative qualities. This sampling method has often been criticised for reducing the degree 
to which the results that it generates can be generalised to larger populations. The conve­
nience that such sampling oﬀered was considered useful to the researcher for the purposes 
of increasing participant numbers for subsequent statistical analysis. However, in all of the 
studies reported, substantial eﬀorts will be made to minimise reliance upon opportunity-
based sampling. Wherever possible, a substantial number of the participant pool will be 
drawn from a cohort of individuals that were speciﬁcally employed by Cityware. Members 
of the cohort were selected for their speciﬁc demographic qualities (age, gender, occupation 
etc) to provide for an excellent population sample. For an in depth discussion about the 
selection and role of the Cityware cohort, see Jay & Stanton Fraser, 2008 [68]. 
4.3 Roadmap for the programme of research 
Revisiting chapter one, the primary prediction of this thesis states: with no a-priori knowl­
edge of the identity or origin of a given situated service, the decision on whether or not to 
trust (and thus elect to use) that service will be informed in substantial part by the context 
and environment in which the situation occurs. At this juncture it is worthwhile to revisit 
the research questions that are most directly pertinent to the goals of the empirical research 
programme: 
•	 RQ3: Which aspects of the situational context are considered important to users 
when they attempt to evaluate the trustworthiness of a pervasive situated service? 
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•	 RQ4: How do people utilize the aspects identiﬁed in RQ3 to make decisions about 
whether or not to invest their trust in a given situated service? 
Each experiment that the author would devise would seek to present a range of diﬀerent 
scenarios to participants. Within each scenario, an instance of a pervasive situated service 
would be presented. The participant would then be required to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of that service relative to other co-present services that oﬀered the same potential beneﬁt. 
The evaluation to be made would be the degree to which the participant felt that the 
service presented was either genuine (and by extension trustworthy) or potentially bogus / 
untrustworthy. 
Studying trust empirically is not a trivial task to undertake. The development and deploy­
ment of research investigations into trust pose a number of challenges for researchers. The 
creation of methodology that could capture both trust-investment behaviour and the reason­
ing behind that behaviour meant that, from the outset, the programme reported here would 
beneﬁt from collection of both quantitative and qualitative measures to support the au­
thor’s conclusions. Hence, as far as possible, quantitative measures will be used to compare 
the eﬀects of particular interventions, while qualitative measures will seek to make targeted 
inquiries into the nature of the mental models underpinning particular choices made by 
participants. 
4.3.1 Study one 
Aims and objectives 
The ﬁrst aim of study one is to create an experimental environment within which a number 
of co-present wireless digital services could be made available for participants to engage 
with. As previously mentioned, the form of these services would be wireless Internet gate­
way services (‘WiFi hotspots’). Each WiFi hotspot would, by means of a web-based user 
interface, require that the participant conduct some form of authentication procedure in 
order that the service be used. Each individual authentication procedure would be unique, 
inviting the participant to utilise some aspect of the immediate physical environment to aid 
them to successfully start using the service. 
Unlike typical authentication procedures, whereby the primary role of the process is for the 
system to authenticate the user, in this scenario, the roles are reversed. Participants will be 
instructed that at least one of the services that they would come to encounter would have 
potentially malevolent intentions (and should thus be avoided). During the experiment, 
each participant will be asked to evaluate each service that they encounter in terms of its 
trustworthiness, based upon what is involved / presented to them during each authentication 
process. 
At this point, the researcher is concerned more with developing a deeper understanding of 
the factors that invoke participant discussion related to the potential trustworthiness of the 
services presented. To this end, the study would not seek to invoke actual trust investment 
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behaviour from its participants (which would involve some form of simulated risk), but 
instead concentrate on probing the extent to which a participant states their intention to 
trust, based upon what they encounter. A study involving intention to trust will come later 
in the programme, based upon further analysis of participant reasoning captured here. 
The second aim of the study will be to identify those aspects of the physical environment 
that might be useful to the participant to engage with the various authentication procedures 
presented. To achieve this aim will involve a process whereby the research would identify 
and categorise a number of artefacts in the physical environment, leading ultimately to a 
conceptual model of how these artefacts might be leveraged to form evidence that a given 
wireless service is indeed worthy of trust. 
Design constraints 
In order that the research complement the larger goals of the Cityware research project 
(within which the researcher is based), the design of the experiment would be subject to the 
following constraints: 
1. The experiment must include an example of a novel solution to the problem of spon­
taneous secure ad-hoc device association as an experimental condition. This protocol 
would be developed by other members of Cityware, but involve the author closely ­
particuarly with respect to the nature of the evidential cue(s) involved. 
2. Extending upon the requirement of the ﬁrst constraint, the experiment must also cap­
ture participant reasoning as to the degree to which they perceive each authentication 
procedure to be secure. The term secure here refers to the degree to which partic­
ipants felt conﬁdent that an authentication procedure protected them from typical 
ICT communications threats, such as eavesdropping (e.g. the man-in-the-middle type 
attack). 
3. To provide the ability for the Cityware team to compare the perceived security value 
of any novel protocols used, the study would need to include a condition that involved 
a form of authentication to which the participants would be familiar (e.g. password-
based authentication). 
4.3.2 Study two 
Aims and objectives 
Consequent of the ﬁndings of study one, study two will seek to develop further a conceptual 
model of the types of evidence that participants were found to ﬁnd useful in their reasoning 
about trust. Dependent upon the degree to which the model develops from analysis of data 
from study one, this study will seek to either: 1) revisit and potentially rework the evidential 
cues identiﬁed in study one to maximise their eﬀectiveness as a trust-building device, or 2) 
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investigate other types of evidential cue that were not identiﬁed previously by the author, 
but that emerged through the data collection / analysis conducted in study one. 
Design constraints 
That the design of this study would be directed by study one, and that participant reasoning 
about the value of one form of evidence over another might still be unclear demands that 
this study (again) be limited to measuring intention to trust. 
4.3.3 Study three 
Aims and objectives 
By study three, the forms of evidence identiﬁed and evaluated in the previous two studies 
will have coalesced into a conceptual model of evidential cues that can be leveraged to 
increase the perceived trustworthiness of a given situated service. 
Unlike the ﬁrst two studies therefore, the main objective of study three will be to examine 
the ultimate eﬀectiveness of one (or more) of these evidential cues in a scenario that involves 
a real sense of risk to the participants. To achieve this, the design of study three would seek 
to create a scenario whereby participants would be given the opportunity to choose to invest 
their trust willingly in a novel situated service that is made available within a public space. 
Design constraints 
Such that true, voluntary trust investment behaviour be allowed to manifest itself, the 
design of study three would require that participants believe that their decision to engage 
with the service presented has certain risks attached to its use. To this end, the design of 
the study would be such that the researcher would not be present during data capture, and 
participants would be unaware that they were engaging in an experiment. Such a design has 
immediate consequences to the amount of reasoning data that the researcher can capture. 
A discussion of this issue can be found in chapters seven and eight. 
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Figure 4.1: Found stuck to the wall of a bar in the city of Bristol, U.K. To which which 




The eﬀect of physical/digital 
world linkage evidence as a 
means of increasing user 
perceptions of situated service 
trustworthiness 
5.1 Chapter overview 
Alice is enjoying a coﬀee in a local cafe. She has her laptop with her and 
would like to use it to access the Internet if she is able to ﬁnd a free local wireless 
Internet service. 
Scanning for available wireless Internet services, her laptop discovers several 
networks whose names are all plausible variants on the cafe in which she is 
sitting. Alice is aware that care should be taken with public unsecured WiFi 
networks; she might inadvertently connect her computer to a fake network that 
has been made available by someone who is sitting nearby, or her communications 
over a bona-ﬁde network may be open to eavesdropping. Either way, information 
that she considers to be private could be at risk... 
From the scenario described above, and assuming that the management of the cafe do in fact 
run just one wireless Internet service, the fundamental question asked by this chapter can 
be considered as thus: How can Alice be conﬁdent that the service to which she chooses to 
connect is really the one that is oﬀered by the cafe? This problem, the provision of evidence 
of a device association is a characteristic of pervasive computing that remains a topic of 
much research (see section 2.6). 
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In this chapter, an experiment was designed to investigate how certain location-based arte­
facts in the physical and virtual worlds might be leveraged in order to oﬀer Alice evidence 
that one wireless situated service - made available amongst a plethora of others - was gen­
uinely provided by the owners of the cafe. In conducting this investigation, the chapter 
will most directly address RQ3: Which aspects of the situational context are considered 
important to users when they attempt to evaluate the trustworthiness of a pervasive situated 
service? and RQ4: How do people utilize the aspects identiﬁed (in RQ3) to make decisions 
about whether or not to invest their trust in a given situated service?. However, through 
providing a means by which the reasoning processes of participants could be captured in a 
controlled experimental setting, the chapter will also serve to build upon addressing RQs 1 
& 2 as was initiated by the previous chapters. 
5.2	 How can I be sure this service is genuine? Increas­
ing user perceptions of the trustworthiness of a sit­
uated service using location-based evidence 
Returning to the introduction to the thesis as presented in chapter one, the principle pre­
diction upon which this thesis is based is that people will seek to utilise evidence that is 
gleaned from their immediate environment in order to make decisions about whether or not 
to invest their trust in a given wireless situated service. Situated services refer to computing 
services that are embedded within particular places and contexts. Thus, while the use of 
such services is achieved without the need for a physical connection such as a cable, the 
service itself usually bears at least some relevance to the speciﬁc place in which it is found. 
In the most basic sense, the name that is given to the service might be based on the name 
of the hosting establishment (e.g. ‘Starbucks WiFi ’). 
However, an attacker can create their own situated service with the same (or similarly 
plausible) name with ease. Thus, as evidence of the degree to which a situated service can be 
considered genuine, its name alone is of little practical use; it oﬀers little, if indeed nothing 
at all, in the way of facilitating its discrimination from potentially malevolent services. 
Moreover, users cannot aﬀord to simply sample each service and see. The act of establishing a 
full communication connection to a malevolent wireless service may be enough to compromise 
the security of a user’s device and data. This issue, the problem of ‘evidently secure device 
association’ (e.g. Kindberg and Zhang, 2003 [76]) is discussed in detail in section 2.6. 
5.2.1	 Providing links between a digital-world situated service and 
the physical world to increase user perceptions of trustwor­
thiness 
In research conducted into the mechanisms by which e-commerce websites can present them­
selves as being credible, Fogg (2003) [47] has suggested that a useful cue to the trustwor­
thiness of an e-commerce vendor is the explicit linking of their digital-world website service 
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to the physical-world company that it represents (see also, Egger, 2001 [41]). The mani­
festation of such a link can be made very simply through the inclusion of a postal address, 
land-line phone number or the email address of a company representative within the website. 
The positive eﬀect that such a simple act invokes is thought to occur because the digital 
world (the website) is shown as being attached to something in the physical world (e.g. 
the company headquarters). In providing a sense that the company with whom the user is 
dealing exists in a tangible physical sense (e.g. in a building), the user is aﬀorded a sense 
that they are able to mediate the potential risks involved with dealing with their website. 
Moreover, they are also now equipped with an explicit route of recourse should a transaction 
with that website fail. With regard to the situated services described in this thesis, if the 
creation of explicit links between a service deployed on the WWW and the physical world 
can increase feelings of trustworthiness in risky situations such as e-commerce, might linking 
a situated service with the immediate physical surroundings of the user provide the same 
positive eﬀect? 
5.3	 The design of an experiment to examine the eﬀect of 
digital-physical world linkage upon user perceptions 
of situated service trustworthiness 
5.3.1	 Decomposing the concept of linkage: Physical and virtual 
linkage 
As researchers such as Schilit et al (1994) [130] have observed, a user’s context at any given 
time can be understood as being composed to where [they] are, who [they] are with, and what 
resources are nearby. In the experiment described in this chapter, nearby resources were 
leveraged to create contextual links between the wireless digital service and the immediate 
physical world to which that service was made available. Means by which such links could 
be created have been discussed in the HCI literature, most directly by Barton & Kindberg 
(2001) [11]. In the experiment presented in this chapter linkages were formed using two 
methods: physical linkage and virtual linkage: 
Physical linkage: The linking of a digital service to the physical surrounding of the user 
by using artefacts that are more tightly attached to the immediate physical world (in 
a simple physical sense) than an intruder could contrive. 
Virtual	 linkage: The linking of a digital service to the physical surroundings of the user 
by using more interaction between physical artefacts and the digital service than an 
intruder could contrive. 
To evaluate the eﬀect that physical and virtual linkage might have upon user perceptions of 
the trustworthiness of a given situated service, the experiment described in this chapter was 
designed based upon a common example of such a service: a public access WiFi ‘hotspot’. 
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WiFi ‘hotspots’1 are short range wireless ICT services that typically serve as a means of 
providing a means of connecting mobile devices to the Internet / WWW. Public access WiFi 
‘hotspots’ are often found in cafes and similar establishments, and are usually oﬀered as a 
value added service to paying customers. Sometimes a small charge is levied for their use, 
but frequently the service is oﬀered for free. 
5.3.2 Research questions and hypotheses 
The experiment sought to evaluate a range of methods that could be used to provide evidence 
as to the point of origin (and by extension likely ‘genuineness’) of a wireless situated service 
(a WiFi ‘hotspot’). In doing so, the primary intent of the experiment was to uncover the 
reasoning processes involved in the ascertaining of situated service ‘genuineness’ (and by 
extension trustworthiness), speciﬁcally in terms of: 
1. How convincing people found the diﬀerent types of evidence that were provided as 
they decided whether or not a given service was genuine (addressing RQ4). 
2. What people thought about the types of evidence that were used with respect to other 
factors of concern to them, such as convenience and ease of use (addressing RQ3). 
The principle hypothesis (H1) of the experiment was that user perceptions of the trustwor­
thiness of a given wireless service will be increased by providing a link between that service 
and the physical surroundings of that user. Further, with respect to the contribution of 
physical and virtual forms of linkage, a secondary hypothesis (H2) was also formed: As 
the strength of the link (measured by the degree to which users perceive that a given link 
could be plausibly contrived by an attacker) increases, so too will their perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of that system. 
5.3.3 Experiment environment and materials 
To conduct the experiment, a number of independent-yet-copresent WiFi ‘hotspots’ were 
created by the researcher (see section 5.4.1) and deployed within a real-world cafe at the 
campus of the University of Bath, U.K. Though it was acknowledged that the eﬀect of such 
an environment upon participants responses to the study would be negligible, it was felt 
that to use a real-world cafe venue would provide some degree of ecological validity, at least 
above what might be achieved through the use of a more typical laboratory setting. The 
experiment was conducted while the cafe was closed to the public. To help control for any 
potential eﬀects relating to prior experience with the existing cafe brand, all visible branding 
on the walls and tables were replaced with branding of the researcher’s own design (ﬁgure 
5.1), based around a ﬁctional cafe called Bertorelli’s. 
1For reference, home-based wireless Internet setups are essentially the same as WiFi ‘hotspots’. 
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Figure 5.1: Examples of Bertorelli’s cafe branding (leaﬂet and poster). 
5.4 Experimental design 
The experiment was a within-subject design that was conducted with the researcher present 
at all times (i.e. the experiment was an attended experiment). Within the experiment, 
types of evidence as to the genuineness of one service over another were formed from a 
combination of a web page that was presented to the user (via a laptop supplied) and some 
physical artefact that was placed within the room. 
5.4.1	 The independent variable and the creation of experimental 
materials 
Within the experiment, participants were exposed to, and asked to evaluate the genuineness 
of six independent WiFi services that all purported to oﬀer free access to the Internet. 
The term genuine referred to the degree to which participants felt that the service that 
they were evaluating was bona-ﬁde and provided by the management of Bertorelli’s. All 
six services purported to be genuine, and each of the services would use some form of 
evidence to authenticate itself to the user as being a genuine service oﬀered by the Bertorelli’s 
management. The independent variable (IV) was thus authentication method, with six levels. 
Six conditions of authentication method were created by the researcher that systematically 
manipulated the strength (ﬁxedness) of several artefacts that could conceivably oﬀer char­
acteristics of physical and virtual linkage as an evidential cue to their genuineness. To 
manipulate physical-linkage, three artefacts were chosen as having characteristics of ﬁxed­
ness that were considered as being suﬃciently diﬀerentiated from one another. These were: 
Low physical ﬁxedness: Artefacts considered as being of low physical ﬁxedness are mobile 
artefacts that are accessible by both staﬀ and patrons. Leaﬂets were considered as oﬀering 
low ﬁxedness in that they are both loose and of small / less visible physical size. 
Medium physical ﬁxedness: Artefacts considered as being of medium physical ﬁxedness 
are highly visible yet static, accessible by staﬀ but less so by ordinary patrons. A wall 
mounted poster was selected for this role as it would be clearly visible to both patrons and 
staﬀ, but less mobile than a leaﬂet as it would be aﬃxed to the wall. 
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High physical ﬁxedness: Highly physically-ﬁxed artefacts are highly visible but only fully 
accessible by staﬀ. A wall-mounted, large form-factor LCD screen was selected for this role 
as its physical bulk (and wall-securing mechanisms such as drilled-brackets) would make it 
diﬃcult to access by non-staﬀ. 
To manipulate virtual-linkage, where ﬁxedness is measured by the degree to which a user 
considers the possibility that the interaction it provides could be contrived, three levels were 
considered. These were: 
Low virtual ﬁxedness: Interactions that are considered as being of low virtual ﬁxedness 
are those that require no actual evidence of end-to-end device association. For this role, a 
simple authentication protocol was developed, whereby a user simply entered a password 
that is made publicly available somewhere in their immediate physical environment (the 
acceptance of a password by some unidentiﬁed device oﬀering no evidence of the source of 
that device / communication). 
Medium virtual ﬁxedness: Interactions that were considered as being of medium virtual 
ﬁxedness would involve some evidence of end-to-end device association. Medium virtual 
ﬁxedness interactions would oﬀer user-veriﬁable evidence that a connection was being made 
with the intended service (thus protecting against an evil-twin attack), but not necessarily 
that the connection was secure from eavesdroppers / man-in-the-middle based attacks. For 
this role, Synchronisation, a dynamic variant of a visual hash (see section 2.6.2) type pro­
tocol was developed. In the Synchronisation protocol, a simple visual interaction is created 
between the screen of the user’s device and a (highly physically-ﬁxed) public LCD screen in 
which both screens display a series of protocol-generated images. By comparing the degree 
to which the images on both screens agree (both in terms of their appearance and the de­
gree to which both screens display the images in sync with one another), users are oﬀered 
visually-veriﬁable evidence that the two devices are communicating with one another. 
High virtual ﬁxedness: Interactions that were considered as being of high virtual ﬁxed­
ness would involve user-veriﬁable evidence both of end-to-end device association and com­
munication security (thus oﬀering actual security value against both evil-twin and man-in­
the-middle type attacks). For this role, a multi-stage protocol Interlock was developed by 
the Cityware research group2 . Within the Interlock protocol, a user-veriﬁable out-of-band 
communication channel was used to facilitate the comparison of multiple items of user-
generated veriﬁcation information. The multi-part nature of the veriﬁcation process allowed 
for a means of detecting devices that were acting as a relay (i.e. a man-in-the-middle) 
through requiring the relay to submit secret information it could not generate, thus expos­
ing itself when the information is ﬁnally compared visually by the user. Speciﬁc details 
of the interlock protocol interaction are presented in later in section 5.4.1. Details of the 
underlying cryptographic technique used in this interaction can also be found in Kindberg, 
Mitchell, Grimmett, Bevan, and O’Neill (2009)’s: Authenticating Public Wireless Networks 
with Physical Evidence [73]. 
The relationship between the levels of physical and virtual linkage for the six conditions 
generated for authentication type are presented as a matrix in table 5.1 below: 
2While the author was not involved in the speciﬁc cryptographic mechanisms that underpin the Interlock 
protocol, he was directly involved in the development of the user experience aspect of the protocol’s design. 
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Physical-linkage ﬁxedness 
Low Medium High 
Virtual-linkage 
ﬁxedness 
Low Password on leaﬂet Password on poster Password on screen 
Medium N/A N/A Synchronisation 
High N/A N/A Interlock 
Table 5.1: Conditions of the independent variable authentication type. N.B. The sixth con­
dition, a control condition that did not utilise physical or virtual linkage, is not represented 
in the table. 
A total of six independent WiFi ‘hotspots’ were created, each of which was named (via 
the SSID that is broadcast by each service) using a plausible variant of the Bertorelli’s 
brand name. For each service, an associated authentication methods was designed, and the 
speciﬁcs of each authentication process are presented in turn: 
Direct Connection (SSID: ‘Bertorelli1’) 
The direct connection condition (ﬁgure 5.2) had no authentication protocol assigned to it 
and was used in the experiment as a control condition. 
(a) Direct connection: Authentication 
screen (displayed on participant’s laptop 
screen) 
(b) Direct connection: Connection com­
plete (displayed on participant’s laptop 
screen) 
Figure 5.2: Direct connection: Authentication procedure (connect to Internet service) 
Password on leaﬂet (SSID: ‘Bertorelli2’) 
In the password on leaﬂet condition (ﬁgure 5.3), participants were required to enter a pass­
word that could be found on any of a number of leaﬂets littered on tables throughout the 
cafe space. Upon locating and entering the password, the participant was instructed to click 
a button labelled ‘continue’. 
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(a) Password on leaﬂet : Authentication (b) Password on leaﬂet : Connection com­
screen (displayed on participant’s laptop plete (displayed on participant’s laptop 
screen) screen) 
Figure 5.3: Password on leaﬂet : Authentication procedure (connect to Internet service) 
Password on poster (SSID: ‘Bertorelli3’) 
In the password on poster condition (ﬁgure 5.4), participants were required to enter a pass­
word that could be found on a large poster aﬃxed to the cafe wall. Upon locating and 
entering the password, the participant was instructed to click a button labelled ‘continue’. 
(a) Password on poster : Authentication 
screen (displayed on participant’s laptop 
screen) 
(b) Password on poster : Connection com­
plete (displayed on participant’s laptop 
screen) 
Figure 5.4: Password on Poster : Authentication procedure (connect to Internet service) 
Password on screen (SSID: ‘Bertorelli4’) 
In the password on screen condition (ﬁgure 5.5), participants were required to enter a pass­
word that could be found on a large LCD screen that was aﬃxed to the cafe wall. Upon 
locating and entering the password, the participant was instructed to click a button labelled 
‘continue’. 
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(a) Password on screen: Authentication (b) Password on screen: Connection com­
screen (displayed on participant’s laptop plete (displayed on participant’s laptop 
screen) screen) 
Figure 5.5: Password on Screen: Authentication procedure (connect to Internet service) 
Synchronisation (SSID: ‘Bertorelli5’) 
In the synchronisation condition (ﬁgure 5.6), participants were required to observe and judge 
the synchronicity of a dynamic sequence that appeared on both the large LCD screen (as used 
in the password on screen condition) and their laptop screen. An apparently random array 
of ‘coﬀee cups’ was used to form the sequence, and the conﬁguration of the array changed 
at a rate of once per second. Upon satisfaction that the two displays were synchronised, the 
participant was instructed to click a button labelled ‘continue’. 
(a) Synchronisation: Authentication screen 
(displayed on participant’s laptop screen) 
(b) Synchronisation: Synchronised display 
(displayed on public LCD screen) 
Figure 5.6: Synchronisation: Authentication procedure (connect to Internet service) 
Interlock (SSID: ‘Bertorelli6’) 
In the Interlock condition, participants were required to engage in a multi-part authentica­
tion procedure conducted between the participant’s laptop and the large LCD screen. At the 
core of the Interlock protocol is the selection (by the participant) of two items of information 
that are sent wirelessly to the system that controls the LCD screen. A successful authenti­
cation is achieved when the participant judges both items of information, as subsequently 
displayed on the LCD screen, are the same as the items they originally chose. 
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Stage 1 - Choose a face: The participant is invited to create their own unique avatar (a 
face) through the manipulation of a number of parameters including the eyes, mouth and 
nose (ﬁgure 5.7). At this stage, the large LCD screen remains largely blank. Upon selection 
of a unique avatar, the participant is instructed to click a button labelled ‘continue’. 
(a) Choose a face: Laptop screen) (b) Choose a face: Public LCD screen) 
Figure 5.7: Interlock procedure stage 1: Choose a face 
Stage 2 - Choose a phrase: Having chosen their ‘face’, the participant is then invited to 
choose a short phrase, as made available by a drop-down list (ﬁgure 5.8). At this stage, the 
large LCD screen remains blank. Upon selection of a phrase, the participant is instructed 
to click a button labelled ‘continue’. 
(a) Choose a phrase: Laptop screen) (b) Choose a phrase: Public LCD screen) 
Figure 5.8: Interlock procedure stage 2: Choose a phrase 
Stage 3 - Send the ﬁrst part of the phrase to the system: Having now chosen both 
‘face’ and ‘phrase’, the participant is told that the system will now attempt to check their 
connection. In order that this be achieved, the following explanation is given: “to check the 
connection, the message you chose will be split into two parts which will be sent securely to 
our system”. The participant is then instructed to look at the large LCD screen, whereupon 
the ‘face’ that they chose would ask them to “send the ﬁrst half of the message” by clicking 
the similarly labelled button on their laptop screen (ﬁgure 5.9). 
Stage 4 - Send the second part of the phrase to the system: Upon the sending of 
the ﬁrst half of the message, the LCD screen acknowledges receipt of the message to the 
user, and the participant is then instructed to send the ﬁnal part of the message. 
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(a) Check the connection, step 1: Laptop (b) Check the connection, step 1: Public 
screen) LCD screen) 
Figure 5.9: Interlock procedure stage 3: Check the connection 
Figure 5.10: Interlock procedure stage 3.1: Message received 
(a) Check the connection, step 2: Laptop 
screen) 
(b) Check the connection, step 2: Public 
LCD screen) 
Figure 5.11: Interlock procedure stage 4: Check the connection 
Stage 5 - Is it the right message? Upon receipt of the ﬁnal part of the phrase, the 
avatar on the large LCD screen displays the complete phrase. At this point, the display on 
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the laptop asks the participant whether the phrase shown on the LCD screen is the same as 
the phrase that they originally chose. The participant is instructed to select ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as 
appropriate (ﬁgure 5.12), upon which the authentication process is concluded. 
(a) Do the phrases match?: Laptop screen)	 (b) Do the phrases match?: Public LCD 
screen) 
Figure 5.12: Interlock procedure stage 5: Compare phrase sent from laptop with phrase 
displayed on public LCD screen 
5.4.2 Dependent variables / experimental measures 
The Bertorelli’s experiment consisted of two phases. Each participant completed both 
phases consecutively. In the ﬁrst phase (evaluation phase), each participant was exposed 
to each of the six WiFi hotspot services one-by-one and, through completion of the au­
thentication mechanism provided by each service, were asked to evaluate them in terms 
of their ‘genuineness’. In the second phase (post-evaluation interview), participants were 
invited to discuss their experiences with all of the services that they had encountered in a 
semi-structured interview. 
As a precautionary measure inspired by Kindberg et al, 2004 [75], explicit mention of the 
terms trustworthiness and trust were not made either at the outset of the experiment, nor 
during the evaluation phase of the study. The rationale of this was to avoid potentially 
leading participants into speciﬁc concerns about the role of trust, and instead to allow the 
concerns of the users to be elicited “naturally”. Speciﬁc questions about the degree to which 
the participants considered the services as being trustworthy were posed to them only during 
the post-evaluation interview. 
During the evaluation of each service encountered, how the participants considered each 
system that they encountered as being trustworthy was instead indirectly measured during 
the experiment through measure of conﬁdence: i.e. ‘how conﬁdent were the participants in 
each of the access points they had encountered’? The measure of conﬁdence in any of the 
systems had two components (not independent): 1) whether the participants thought that 
each particular service was being provided by Bertorelli’s and 2) Whether they thought 
that that service was vulnerable to attack by a third party. The primary experimental mea­
sure was therefore conﬁdence, and this was broken down to form three dependent variables 
(DV’s). These were: 1) conﬁdence in the genuineness of the service, 2) conﬁdence in the 
trustworthiness of the service and 3) conﬁdence in the security of the service. 
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In both phases of the experiment, measures for each DV were collected through a combina­
tion of quantitative (direct question) and qualitative (free-form verbal reasoning) response. 
Measures for DV1 were obtained in both evaluation phase and the post-evaluation inter­
view, whereas direct measures for DVs 2 & 3 were obtained only during the post-evaluation 
interview. 
5.4.3 Experimental procedure 
Prior to each trial, the experimental space was set up with several interaction props placed 
within the cafe. These were: 
1 large form-factor LCD Screen (42”) The screen was ﬁxed to the wall of the cafe 
using brackets. The screen displayed content only during times when a particular 
experimental condition required it to do so. At all other times, the screen was blank. 
One large paper poster (A1 Size, landscape) The poster was printed at the same di­
mensions as the LCD screen and was aﬃxed to the wall adjacent to the screen. 
8-10 Leaﬂets (A5 size) Leaﬂets were littered across tabletops throughout the space. 
A WiFi enabled laptop computer A Toshiba laptop (operating system: Microsoft Win­
dows XP, Internet browser: Mozilla Firefox) was set up on a table in the cafe for the 
participants use during the evaluation phase and post-evaluation interview. 
Hardware to support six independent wireless networks / WiFi ‘hotspots’ The six 
wireless access points and their associated web-servers were concealed behind the cafe 
bar away from view. Access to the LCD screen was supplied through VGA cable 
running behind the bar. 
As previously discussed, each experimental trial was conducted in two phases. Phase one was 
the main evaluation phase (duration 20-30 mins) during which participants were exposed to 
each of the six WiFi ‘hotspot’ services and their corresponding authentication procedure. 
Phase two was a post-evaluation semi-structured interview (duration 20-30mins). The du­
ration of each complete experimental trial was thus between 40 minutes and one hour. 
Experimental phase 
Participants performed the tasks set out by the experiment as individuals. Each participant 
was ﬁrst met by the researcher outside of the cafe space, and their written consent and 
demographic details were obtained (see appendix B, section B.1). The participant was 
then invited to read an instruction sheet that explained the nature of the experiment and 
activities that it would entail (see appendix B, section B.2). The instructions also provided 
a short scenario that served to inform the participant as to the potential threats involved 
in un-secured / public access WiFi use, and to explain the degree of help they could expect 
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to receive from the researcher during the study. The scenario presented in the instructions 
was as follows: 
Imagine you are visiting a cafe to try to get an Internet connection. You have 
your laptop computer with you, and you know that Bertorelli’s cafe happens to 
have a wireless Internet access point that you can use during your visit. 
When you sit down at a table and try to connect to the wireless network 
you see that there are six diﬀerent wireless networks that appear to be provided 
by Bertorelli’s cafe. You know that at least one of these is genuinely provided 
by Bertorelli’s cafe, but one or more may be from another source pretending 
to be Bertorelli’s cafe. There are two ways in which wireless connections are 
susceptible to attack: 
1. Somebody might ‘listen-in’ to the wireless communications made between 
your laptop and a genuine access point to the Internet such as the one 
provided by Bertorelli’s cafe. 
2. Somebody might have created an entirely fake network to which you can 
still connect, potentially giving away passwords or other information and 
inadvertently giving the faker access to your computer. 
That the participants were primed as to the speciﬁc threats involved in public access WiFi 
usage was considered important to their eventual evaluation of the protocols they would 
encounter in terms of their security value. Participants were informed that the primary task 
of the study was to evaluate each of six WiFi ‘hotspot’ services that they would encounter 
during the study, based upon the knowledge that only one service was deﬁnitely genuinely 
provided and sanctioned by the Bertorelli’s cafe venue (i.e. the other ﬁve may, or may not be 
genuine). The participant was then guided into the cafe space and was invited to take a seat 
at a table with a laptop computer. The laptop was powered up and ready for immediate 
use though not connected to any service. The researcher demonstrated the procedure of 
searching for, connecting to and disconnecting from a wireless networking service using the 
Windows XP operating system (an existing University of Bath wireless network facility was 
used for this exercise). Only after the participant was happy with managing this procedure 
on his or her own was the experiment allowed to start. 
The six methods of connecting to WiFi services that were supposedly provided by Bertorelli’s 
were then completed at the participant’s own pace. Connection was achieved in each in­
stance using a corresponding web-based user interface displayed on the user’s laptop. Each 
connection attempt was initiated with the participant being presented with the introductory 
splash screen presented in ﬁgure 5.13. 
The order that the six services were encountered was supplied in pseudo-random order by 
the researcher. Each trial was completed when the participant had successfully negotiated 
the authentication process presented by the service, at which point a webpage informed the 
participant that the trial was complete. Throughout the evaluation phase, two researchers 
were seated with the participant. One researcher encouraged the participant to discuss their 
thoughts regarding the genuineness of each of the wireless services that they encountered 
(i.e. to “think aloud”). The other researcher took notes. An audio-visual record of the 
entire session was taken using camcorder. 
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Figure 5.13: Bertorelli‘s cafe WiFi service ‘splash’ screen. 
After the authentication mechanism of each service had been completed, participants were 
asked to assign a score to that service, based on responses to the following two questions 
(both 6-point Likert scale): 
1. Was	 this wireless network provided by Bertorelli’s Cafe? ([1] fake – [6] genuinely 
provided by Bertorelli’s). 
2. How easy was it to connect to this wireless network ([1] very easy – [6] very diﬃcult). 
Post-experimental interview 
It was expected that the reasoning underlying each participant’s decision as to their con­
ﬁdence with one service over another would be multi-faceted, including aspects of each 
participant’s existing mental model of computer / WiFi security and the impact (if any) 
that the inclusion of physically-linked artefacts / virtual-linked interactions had upon that 
model. As it was considered likely that other factors that could not be identiﬁed and / 
or anticipated in advance could form some of this reasoning, the post-evaluation interview 
strategy allowed for such reasoning to be elicited both spontaneously by the participant and 
by direct probe by the experimenter. 
Thus, immediately after completion of the evaluation phase, a semi-structured interview was 
conducted with each participant, based around a set of 10 questions that were presented in 
random order. Five of the questions involved rank ordering the six WiFi ‘hotspot’ services 
that they had encountered against some range of criteria (e.g. “fake” to “genuine”) and the 
other ﬁve involved assigning each of the six services to a simple binary choice of yes / no 
(e.g. “I would use this network to check my email”). A summary of the questions posed / 
response type used is presented in table 5.2: 
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# Question Values 
1 Using the terms insecure to secure, how 
would you rank the access points you 
Insecure - Secure 
have tried today? 
2 Using the terms easy and diﬃcult, how 
would you rank the access points you 
Diﬃcult to complete - Easy to complete 
have tried today? 
3 Using the terms confusing and 
straightforward, how would you rank 
Confusing – Straightforward 
4 
the access points you have tried today? 
Using the terms genuine and fake, how Fake (not provided by Bertorelli’s -
would you rank the access points you Genuine (provided by Bertorelli’s) 
5 
have tried today? 
Using the terms untrustworthy and Not Trustworthy – Trustworthy 
trustworthy, how would you rank the 
6 
access points you have tried today? 
I would use this wireless connection to Yes / No 
7 
read an online newspaper 
I would use this wireless connection to Yes / No 
check a train time 
8 I would use this wireless connection to 
check my online email account 
Yes / No 
9 I would use this wireless connection to Yes / No 
buy something from an online shop 
using my credit card 
10 I would use this wireless connection to 
access my bank account online 
Yes / No 
Table 5.2: Post-evaluation interview questions. Each question was preﬁxed with the instruc­
tion: “For each system, please drag the appropriate card to answer the question...”. 
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Figure 5.14: Interview question interface. 
Collection of quantitative measures for each question were collected using a graphical web-
based system that was developed by the researcher (ﬁgure 5.14). The system allowed par­
ticipants to make their response selections by clicking and dragging icons that represented 
each of the six services around the screen. 
The ﬁve binary choice questions related to the degree to which our participants understood 
and considered the authentication methods presented to them by each system as being suﬃ­
cient in terms of risk investment over a number of diﬀerent real-world transaction scenarios. 
Five general transaction types were explored, ranked in order of their actual risk to personal 
information (low to high) in table 5.3: 
Internet activity / Required personal data Actual threat potential 
behaviour involvement 
Read an online newspaper None Limited, though connection 
could facilitate malware. 
Check a train time None Limited, but could indicate 
user travel plans. 
Access a personal email Username / password Potentially signiﬁcant, 
account dependent upon value of 
email account. 
Make a transaction using Username / password / Signiﬁcant, though 
own credit card credit card details compensation for online 
fraud is well established 
and losses are limited by 
credit limit of card. 
Access personal bank Username / password / Signiﬁcant. Potential for 
account online additional security signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss if 
information account is compromised. 
Table 5.3: Summary of online risk behaviour scenarios examined. Risk levels associated 
with each scenario increases low-high. 
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During the interview, participants were encouraged to ‘think aloud’ as they answered each 
of the 10 questions posed and the researcher probed the participant for more information 
on points raised during this process. At the end of the interview, the researcher asked the 
participant to explicitly choose one of the six networks as being the one they considered to 
be the genuine Bertorelli’s WiFi ‘hotspot’ service. 
5.4.4 Participants 
The participants were 28 individuals (M=20 [71%], F=8 [29%], modal age range = 26-30) 
recruited by email invitation and general opportunity sampling. 17 (61%) of the participant 
pool were sourced from staﬀ and students within the University of Bath, with the remaining 
11 (39%) sourced from the Cityware project cohort. The Cityware cohort was a diverse 
group of non-student residents of the City of Bath, U.K. who were employed as part of 
the University of Bath led Cityware research project to assist in studies carried out by its 
researchers (e.g. Jay & Stanton Fraser, 2008 [68]). Participants were rewarded for their 
time with a small treat (a hot drink and some biscuits). Ethical approval for the study was 
applied for and granted by the University of Bath department of Psychology and consent to 
participate was obtained from each participant in writing (see appendix B, section B.1). 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Trust measures in response to speciﬁc use-case scenarios 
Categorical (yes / no) response data was collected for each of the six services evaluated based 
on whether participants would consider trusting using those services to perform a set of ﬁve 
speciﬁc online behaviours (see section 5.4.3). Mean acceptance rates (% count of positive 
‘yes’ ratings) were calculated for each service / behaviour examined and are presented as a 
table in ﬁgure 5.4. 
On ﬁrst examination, the risk acceptance rates across the ﬁve scenarios examined tended 
to conﬁrm that the author’s rankings of the risks associated with those scenarios mirrored 
those of the participants. As the risk associated with the scenario increased, there was a 
corresponding decrease in acceptance rates and this was found to be largely independent of 
the service / authentication methods evaluated. 
Reading a newspaper and checking a train time 
“With an online newspaper there’s no risk ...It’s less risk, I wouldn’t be that scared”. Low 
risk activities such as the reading of an online newspaper and the checking of a train time 
were considered as being a largely acceptable activity to perform on a public WiFi service, 
independent of the speciﬁc service that was used. In the newspaper / train time scenarios, 
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Direct Leaﬂet Poster Screen Syncn I/lock 
Read an online newspaper 19 22 26 24 26 24 
(67.90%) (78.60%) (92.90%) (85.70%) (92.90%) (85.70%) 
Check a train time 20 23 26 27 27 25 
(71.40%) (82.10%) (92.90%) (96.40%) (96.40%) (89.30%) 
Access an email account 7 11 13 15 20 20 
(25.00%) (39.30%) (46.40%) (53.60%) (60.70%) (71.40%) 
Make a credit card transaction 0 0 0 0 9 9 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (32.10%) (32.10%) 
Access an online bank account 0 0 1 1 6 5 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (3.60%) (3.60%) (21.40%) (17.90%) 
Table 5.4: Risk acceptance rates for ﬁve online activities, listed in ascending degrees of 
risk. The conditions are listed in ascending degrees of ﬁxedness (left to right), starting with 
physical linkage and followed by virtual linkage. 
only the idea of performing such activities with the direct connection protocol reduced 
the acceptance rate to below 70%. Participants generally perceived little to no risk to be 
associated with either activity as no personal information was understood by them as being 
required to use such a service: “I haven’t given out any personal information. If someone 
goes to a lot of trouble ﬁnding out who I am to ﬁnd out which paper I read, they can have 
that [information]”. 
Accessing a personal email account 
The accessing of a personal email account was considered acceptable by around half (46.4%) 
of the participants if using a service that employed a minimum of medium physical ﬁxedness 
as an authentication measure. Acceptance rates were however found to increase with the 
virtual-ﬁxed services, peaking at 71.4% for the highly-virtually ﬁxed Interlock protocol. 
That the accessing of an email account would require the use of personal information, specif­
ically a username and / or password, was frequently mentioned. Participants were reticent 
to expose such information without some assurance as to the security of the network service 
they were using: “Anything that I have which has a password on, I wouldn’t do it on a 
network where I wasn’t conﬁdent of the conﬁguration.” With regards to the physically-ﬁxed 
protocols examined, some participants would trust them enough to use them to access their 
email account, but only in times of real need: “Depends on how urgent it was. If it was 
urgent I’d probably use any of them - if it wasn’t urgent, I probably wouldn’t”. With the 
virtually-ﬁxed protocols however, this consideration was relaxed for those participants who 
considered them as oﬀering assurances as to their security: “I think that they are secure, 
they are trustworthy because the level of diﬃculty for being hacked is high. . . high enough to 
be secure and trustworthy.” 
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Credit card usage and the accessing of personal bank accounts 
The use of personal credit cards and the accessing of personal bank accounts was universally 
rejected by the participants in all authentication methods that did not utilise some form 
of virtual-ﬁxedness based evidence in their design. However, even with the virtually-ﬁxed 
protocols, there appeared to be little diﬀerence between acceptance rates for the medium and 
high virtual-ﬁxedness, and no scenario / service conﬁguration ever exceeded 33% acceptance. 
Regarding the use of credit cards, participants were generally opposed to the idea of using 
any public network connection: “I wouldn’t. I’d only use my connection at home”, though 
some would do so if there was some necessity to do so: “It depends how badly I need to 
buy something right now. I would avoid using it unless I had to”. As with the accessing 
of email accounts, the lack of perceived control and assurance with regards to the security 
of the network was oft-mentioned: “I wouldn’t be sitting there keying in my credit card. I 
would feel all the security aspects are locked down to me”. One participant also mentioned 
discomfort about the nature of wireless connectivity: “Because the wireless [signal] goes 
everywhere, it feels less secure”. 
E-banking was generally considered as being more risky than credit card usage, and the lack 
of explicit risk-mediating devices that e-banking services oﬀer relative to Internet credit 
card use (such as payment protection) were occassionally mentioned as an explanation for 
this diﬀerence: “I guess this would be [more risk] than credit cards. I probably wouldn’t do 
either if there wasn’t a secure connection. At least with credit cards you’ve got some kind 
of protection”. However, the rejection of using a network service outside of the home to 
conduct e-banking activities was, like credit card usage, generally couched in a perceived 
lack of control over communication security: “I would never use a wireless network for 
on-line banking. Or a wired network in an internet cafe, because I haven’t conﬁgured the 
network myself ”. 
5.5.2 Participant conﬁdence in service authenticity 
The main quantitative measure of DV1, conﬁdence in the authenticity of the service was 
participant response to the question “was this wireless network provided by Bertorelli’s 
Cafe?”, which was obtained through a six point Likert scale ([1] fake – [6] genuinely provided 
by Bertorelli’s). This question was posed on two separate occasions: immediately after 
exposure to each individual service / condition (single-condition score), and additionally at 
the end of the main evaluation phase, where each participant was asked to rank order all 
of the six conditions (cross-condition score). Examination of both sets of results allowed 
for a measure of participant consistency: i.e. whether they had changed their opinion of a 
particular condition later, having been exposed to all six conditions. Results for each set of 
responses are examined in turn. 
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Conﬁdence scores for service genuineness: Single-condition and cross-condition 
scores 
Whereas the single-condition scores were on a six-point Likert scale, the cross-condition 
scores were generated using the interactive tool described in section 5.4.3. Using the tool, 
participants manipulated icons that represented the six networks to obtain their desired 
ranking along a horizontal axis, resulting in a range of values from 0 to 1300 (see ﬁgure 
5.14). Prior to analysis, any two icons that overlapped with one another were adjusted to 
be equal at their mid-point. 
The single-condition and cross-condition scores were independently analysed across all six 
conditions using a one-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). For the single-
condition scores, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect was observed of authentication method [Wilks’ 
Lambda = .25, F(5,23) = 13.619, p<0.01], and a multivariate partial eta squared value of 
.75 suggested a large eﬀect size. Similarly, for the Cross-condition scores, ANOVA showed 
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for authentication method [Wilks’ Lambda = .27, F(5,23) = 12.70, 
p ¡ 0.01]. A multivariate partial eta squared value of .79 suggested a large eﬀect size. 
Pairwise comparisons (repeated measures t-tests) were then performed on both single- and 
cross-condition scores between successive condition pairs (in which ﬁrst physical linkage 
and then virtual linkage increased). The resulting signiﬁcant pairings and mean scores are 
presented as a graph in ﬁgure 5.15. To enable better comparison, both sets of scores have 
been normalised. 
5.5.3 Participant conﬁdence in service trustworthiness 
The main quantitative measure of DV2 conﬁdence in the trustworthiness of the service were 
responses to the question “Using the terms untrustworthy and trustworthy, how would you 
rank the access points you have tried today?”. Conﬁdence scores for service trustworthiness 
were obtained only in the post-evaluation phase of the experiment, thus the ﬁgures reported 
here are the cross-condition scores. 
Repeated measures ANOVA indicated a signiﬁcant eﬀect for authentication method across 
scores for trustworthiness [Wilks’ Lambda = .21, F(5,23) = 17.77, p<0.01]. Multivariate 
partial eta squared values of .79 suggests a large eﬀect size. Pairwise comparisons (repeated 
measures t-tests) were performed on the scores between successive condition pairs in which 
ﬁrst physical linkage and then virtual linkage increased. The resulting signiﬁcant pairings 
and normalised mean scores are presented as a graph in ﬁgure 5.16. 
5.5.4 Participant conﬁdence in service security 
The main quantitative measure of DV3 conﬁdence in the security of the service were re­
sponses to the question “Using the terms insecure to secure, how would you rank the access 
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Figure 5.15: Conﬁdence in service ‘genuineness’ across the six conditions of authentication 
method. Raw scores converted to log values for comparison. None signiﬁcant pairwise 
comparisons (t-test) are highlighted with a dashed line. 
Figure 5.16: Conﬁdence in service ‘trustworthiness’ across the six conditions of authentica­
tion method. None signiﬁcant pairwise comparisons (t-test) are highlighted with a dashed 
line. 
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Figure 5.17: Conﬁdence in service as being ‘secure’ across the six conditions of authentication 
method. None signiﬁcant pairwise comparisons (t-test) are highlighted. 
points you have tried today?”. As with DV2, conﬁdence scores for service security were 
obtained only in the post-evaluation phase of the experiment, thus the ﬁgures reported here 
are cross-condition scores. 
Repeated measures ANOVA indicated a signiﬁcant eﬀect for authentication method across 
scores for secure [Wilks’ Lambda = .24, F(5,23) = 14.61, p<0.01]. A multivariate partial eta 
squared value of .76 suggested a large eﬀect size. Pairwise comparisons (repeated measures t-
tests) were performed on the scores between successive condition pairs in which ﬁrst physical 
linkage and then virtual linkage increased. The resulting signiﬁcant pairings and normalised 
mean scores are presented as a graph in ﬁgure 5.17. 
5.5.5	 Participant reasoning about the impact of physical and vir­
tual linkage upon perceptions of service genuineness, trust­
worthiness and security 
During both evaluation and post-evaluation interview phases, participants were encouraged 
to ‘think-aloud’ and to vocalise their thoughts and reasoning freely as they completed the 
experimental exercise. The audio records of the ‘think-aloud’ protocols for 27 participants3 
were transcribed and analysed using a form of protocol analysis. The speciﬁc protocol anal­
ysis technique used in the experiment was a variation of the Grounded Theory methodology. 
3(28 participants were involved in the experiment, but 1 video recording was mislaid). 
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Grounded Theory is a systematic methodology for the analysis of complex written content 
without a prior set of assumptions or hypotheses. Using this approach, common themes 
emerge through a process of open coding; that is to say that the coding scheme was de­
veloped in response to the data itself, as opposed to being generated prior to examination 
of the data. As it was expected that the reasoning underlying each participant’s decision 
as to their conﬁdence with one service over another would be multi-faceted, the ﬂexibility 
of analytical method aﬀorded by the type of protocol analysis used was considered most 
appropriate. 
A subset of eight complete participant transcripts were initially divided amongst four indi­
vidual researchers. Each researcher then used those transcripts to create an individual coding 
scheme that they felt eﬀectively represented recurrent themes as they emerged within each 
transcript. The resulting four coding schemes were then collated to form a single coding 
scheme that was then applied to all 27 transcripts by two independent researchers. Finally, 
the resulting codings were collated once more, with any disagreements between the two 
ﬁnal coders highlighted and discussed. While particular focus was aﬀorded to themes / 
issues relating to genuineness, trustworthiness and security, coding was also completed for 
other factors of possible signiﬁcance to the understanding the participants’ backgrounds, 
perceptions and rationales. 
Eﬀects of physical linkage 
Terms considered as being referent to physical linkage were frequently mentioned by the 
participants, and the majority of the participants felt that some aspect of the physical cir­
cumstances of the association between the artefact and the cafe was relevant to genuineness, 
security and trustworthiness for at least one of the conditions tested. These aspects fell into 
four general categories: physical attachment, legitimacy, visibility and accessibility. Each 
category is examined in turn. 
Physical attachment referred to the degree to which an artefact was physically attached 
to some part of the cafe. This was frequently noted by participants. High degrees of 
physical attachment were often associated with the LCD screen: “The screen looks bolted to 
the wall, physically bolted to the fabric of the building”, but less so with the leaﬂet, which 
was considered as just “ﬂoating around”. Several participants observed that the poster, 
like the display, was physically ﬁxed, although the lack of a securing frame (the poster was 
simply tacked to the wall) was commented on as something that could make the poster more 
susceptible to replacement or attack. 
Legitimacy referred to the degree to which participants considered an artefact to be pro­
vided by the cafe. Terms used included “legal”, “oﬃcial” and “branded”: “once again it’s 
branded and kinda looks consistent with everything else in the cafe” and “yeah . . . that looks 
oﬃcial, that looks right”. However, the potential for forgery was also recognised: “Well, if 
it wasn’t the genuine one, it still could have said it was Bertorelli’s couldn’t it”? 
Visibility referred to the degree to which an artefact was in public view, and thus potentially 
less susceptible to an attacker being able to subvert that artefact undetected. The large LCD 
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display was rated highly in this respect: “any kind of place wouldn’t have screens and stuﬀ 
that were interacting with computers and things without staﬀ and management being very 
aware of it . . . you couldn’t scam that”. With regard to the poster, its relative lack of 
physical ﬁxedness appeared as being made up for by its large physical size: “The poster was 
more noticeable than the ﬂyers because it’s on the wall, and it’s quite large, which makes it 
similar to the screen”. However, with the smaller leaﬂet, this eﬀect was lost: “[they] could 
be surreptitiously slipped in”. 
Accessibility referred the to the degree to which participants considered the position of 
the artefact as being accessible by patrons. The leaﬂet was rated quite low in this respect, 
with comments such as “anyone can go round and put in stuﬀ ” frequently encountered. 
Eﬀects of virtual linkage 
Every participant mentioned some aspect of the interaction between the laptop and the 
LCD screen that they encountered in the synchronisation and interlock conditions. Terms 
frequently encountered included “interaction”, “information exchange”, “transaction” and 
“dialogue”. The mere presence of a degree of interactivity alone appeared to provide evidence 
for genuineness and trustworthiness: “Because [the poster] doesn’t provide any interactivity, I 
wouldn’t trust it as much as the screen method”, and by increasing degrees of the complexity 
of interactivity, this eﬀect was also increased: “because it’s a pretty complex interaction, you 
tend to think it was the real network”. 
The speciﬁcs of the interactions encountered by the participant were however considered 
in diﬀerent ways. The eﬀect of synchronicity (agreement in time and content between the 
display and the laptop) for example was mentioned often as providing evidence of genuine­
ness: “cos it’s changing quite quickly and it’s staying exactly in sync... I think it shows that 
you are directly connected to the thing”. Conversely, with regard to the Interlock condition, 
comments more often made about causality (i.e. cause and eﬀect within the interactivity). 
Sometimes participants referred to feedback from the display: “I knew I was connected [to 
the right network] when I saw the results”, and one made speciﬁc mention of the security 
that they felt this provided “[display-based protocols] feel more secure because there’s more 
feedback”. 
Finally, whether the data involved in the dialogue was personal to the participant was also 
an important factor for some: “The message I chose was displayed [on the display], so I’m 
deﬁnitely connected to the right router”. And conversely: “but [password on display] didn’t 
even give me a chance to contribute myself ... so I’m not liking this one”. 
Reasoning for the ‘plateau’ eﬀect observed for measures of ‘genuine’, ‘secure’ 
and ‘trustworthy’ 
The results of the experiment indicated that two sets of conditions were considered by 
participants as being equivalent in terms of genuineness, trustworthiness and security. These 
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were: Password-on-poster / password-on-LCD display (both password-based protocols), and 
Synchronisation / Interlock (both interactive protocols). Participant reasoning allowed for 
some means of describing how these eﬀects came to occur. The password-based interactions 
and Synchronisation/Interlock protocols are discussed separately. 
Password-based protocols: Only a small minority of participants made any attempt to 
directly compare the two forms of password-based protocols that were used in the experi­
ment. In all cases they said that they were the same, but did not provide any clear reason 
why this was considered so. Many participants did however remark that the way passwords 
were used in the experiment was the opposite of how they normally expect to use passwords: 
in both cases the password was made public rather than private, and some (mis)interpreted 
the password as providing authentication of customers to the system, not the other way 
around (as was intended): “so you’ve got to authenticate yourself to the machine”. 
In terms of the previously discussed aspects of physical linkage, it is apparent that the 
diﬀerences between the forms of password-based protocol were considered as more similar 
than was expected. By deliberate design, the content of both poster and LCD display were 
made identical (i.e. equally legitimate), with the same orientations and of roughly equivalent 
physical size (thus equivalent in other aspects of physical linkage so far discussed - visibility 
and accessibility). However, in a purely physical sense, The LCD display was more ﬁrmly 
attached (physically ﬁxed) to the wall than the poster and this was also deliberate (i.e., 
while a lockable frame for the poster could have been used, it was not). 
Finally, it also seemed to some of the participants that the arrangement would be more 
secure in some sense if the password changed frequently. Some preferred the display to 
the poster for that reason: “The beauty of the one on the screen is that they could change 
the password every 24/48 hours”. One theory was that this would make life harder for an 
individual attacker, who would, they reasoned, have to change the attack to accommodate 
new passwords. 
Synchronisation and Interlock protocols: Both protocols were considered highly novel, 
and there was a strong sense that the two protocols were unlike anything the participants had 
experienced before. Words such as “strange”, “novel” and “weird” occurred frequently when 
participants described them. However, in terms of their value for genuineness, trustworthi­
ness and security, participants appeared to be either unable or unwilling to discriminate 
between these two protocols. About half the participants made statements to the eﬀect that 
the two protocols were similar in some sense. Reasoning for these statements fell into two 
general classes: Intuitive response and comments about complexity. 
Intuitive response: Intuitive responses were vague on detail, reﬂected in comments such 
as “I’m going back to these two... dunno why ... I just like them”, “[these two conditions] 
make it harder to break in” and “[these two conditions] are ok, the rest no...”. 
Complexity: Respondents frequently mentioned that both the Synchronisation and Inter­
lock conditions were too complex to fake, but again were unable to discriminate between 
the two: “[Interlock and Synchronisation] are the ones I completely trust.”, “It would take a 
lot of resources to fake them.” and “They are diﬀerent. They look like they are trying hard 
to make it secure. That’s my impression”. However, in term of their security, the two pro­
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tocols were considered as equivalent: “I suppose [Interlock is] similar to [Synchronisation]. 
I don’t think it’s any more secure for being able to list a number of questions and a number 
of answers”. 
Perception of risks relating to open-access wiﬁ: Reasoning about the security 
value of the protocols 
Some participants indicated that the use of public WiFi networks involves a trade-oﬀ, where 
the convenience of such a service is balanced against the activities for which it can be 
used. Others felt that it would be worthwhile trusting a public WiFi network for activities 
that they otherwise considered too great if other options were not available. For example, 
though some participants would not generally consider the use of open public WiFi to read 
their email, they indicated that they might if say, they were abroad and unable to access 
email any other way. The participants perceptions about security generally concerned the 
protection of their data: “I think security is . . . degrees of security to my vulnerability to 
some kind of crime really... access to my data . . . [my] address book at one end to my debit 
card details at the other”. Eavesdropping relating to wireless communication was commonly 
mentioned as the most likely potential attack, and the need for encryption to protect their 
communications against such activity was frequently mentioned: “The fact that data I’m 
inputting into my computer that’s going to their WiFi connection might potentially be being 
accessed by someone. I don’t know enough about the technology to know more.” and “It feels 
less secure than if it was a wired Ethernet connection. I might be using their actual system, 
but it doesn’t mean it’s secure”. 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
5.6.1	 The eﬀect of physical / virtual linkage evidence upon user 
perceptions of situated service genuineness, trustworthiness 
and security 
The primary hypothesis of the experiment was that user conﬁdence in the genuineness of a 
service would be seen to increase if suﬃcient evidence was provided that linked that service 
to the immediate physical environment of the user. Within the experiment, two forms of 
linkage were considered and their eﬀectiveness evaluated: 
Physical linkage: The linking of a digital service to the physical surrounding of the user 
by using artefacts that are more tightly attached to the immediate physical world (in 
a simple physical sense) than an intruder could contrive. 
Virtual	 linkage: The linking of a digital service to the physical surroundings of the user 
by using more interaction between physical artefacts and the digital service than an 
intruder could contrive. 
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The experimental results suggested that this hypothesis held initially for both forms of 
linkage. Participants rated a situated service as being more genuine, trustworthy and secure 
the stronger they were perceived as being physically or virtually linked to the cafe where 
the experiment was conducted. 
However, the participants considered physical and virtual linkage as relative rather than 
absolute evidence for trustworthiness, and it was also clear that the participants thought 
about the roles of physical and virtual linkage in a variety of ways. The perceived diﬃculty 
of faking each physical / virtual artefact was a key factor in this regard, but in very few 
cases were the participants estimating the feasibility of fakery in a technical sense; rather, 
they appealed to factors that were familiar to them. For example, the creation of leaﬂets 
was taken to be easier and less expensive than the printing and mounting a poster. 
Within the more technical protocols examined (Synchronisation and Interlock) participant 
reasoning about the potential for fakery invoked similarly interesting ideas. With the Syn­
chronisation protocol, the diﬃculty in subverting the system was based upon the diﬃculty 
of getting the timing just right, whereas in the interlock protocol it was the the diﬃculty 
involved in the attacker guessing the chosen phrase. 
5.6.2	 The provision of a secure and usable protocol to support se­
cure device association in a situated-service usage scenario 
Within the experiment, a number of simple password-based protocols were compared with 
two substantially more complex and interactive methods of authentication. In reality, none 
of the password-based protocols had any actual value for authenticating the network as 
being truly secure. However, only a few participants made note of this fact: “you’re just 
typing in something, it could be another access point that accepts the exact same password... 
It doesn’t mean that it’s Bertorelli’s”. 
Of the remaining two protocols examined, while the Synchronisation protocol was able to 
oﬀer some protection against an evil-twin attack, it oﬀered little to no protection against 
the man-in-the-middle attack. Thus, in actuality, only the remaining protocol, Interlock, 
could be considered truly secure as it was the only protocol to oﬀer actual security value 
against the threats of both man-in-the-middle and evil-twin. However, participants tended 
to consider the security and trustworthiness value of both protocols to be equivalent. 
Finally, the usability of both protocols was a frequent topic of discussion, with the most 
common themes being the time and eﬀort required to complete the authentication process 
and concerns about the use of publicly visible screens. 
Time and eﬀort: Both Synchronisation and Interlock protocols took substantially more 
time and eﬀort to complete than did the password based protocols. This was particularly the 
case with Interlock, where a multiple stage interaction was involved in order to complete the 
authentication process. While several participants found the Synchronisation and Interlock 
protocols to be engaging, and even fun, the procedure involved in the Interlock protocol 
was hard to explain to the non-technical. Consequently, it was frequently described by 
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participants as being complicated and confusing. Broadly speaking however, ease was taken 
to be indicative of dubiousness, and diﬃculty was taken to be evidence for genuineness. 
Thus while future revisions to the design of the Interlock protocol could easily address the 
concerns raised, designers should be mindful of the degree to which they make their solutions 
simple to use! 
Use of publicly visible screens: The use of a publicly visible display was considered less 
than ideal, and participants were concerned with the ease by which they could be observed 
by others as they interacted with it. Further usability issues also derived from the use of a 
public display which may not be clearly visible at a distance (making comparisons between 
near and far screens - i.e. the user’s laptop and the cafe’s display - potentially diﬃcult), 
or well suited to a real-life situation where multiple users may need to interact with it 
simultaneously. 
5.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, a scenario was created whereby several co-present situated services were 
made simultaneously available in a real-world cafe environment, thus more closely reﬂecting 
how real-world pervasive computing services might come to be encountered. Within this 
scenario, a semi-laboratory experiment was conducted in which participants were invited 
to assess a number of wireless Internet provision services (WiFi ‘hotspots’), in terms of the 
degree to which they considered them as being trustworthy, genuine and secure. 
To assist participants in this process, the experiment sought to utilise and investigate how 
certain location-based artefacts in the physical and virtual worlds could be leveraged in 
order to oﬀer the participants evidence that one wireless situated service - made available 
amongst a plethora of others - was genuinely provided by the owners of the cafe. Further, 
the experiment sought to oﬀer methods and protocols whereby connections to trustworthy 
services could be established securely, thus addressing a speciﬁc characteristic and problem 
of pervasive computing usage: the need for secure ad-hoc device association. 
While the experiment did not measure actual trust investment behaviour, it did provide some 
means of understanding the conditions in which a real user of a typical situated service might 
come to invest their trust. In performing this investigation therefore, the thesis was able to 
develop further the ﬁndings of the previous chapter and contribute a deeper understanding 
of RQ’s 2, 3 & 4. Participants were found to be security conscious and wary of public 
wireless services, and this wariness was only increased by having multiple wireless services in 
the same physical place. Most participants, as was observed in the questionnaire deployed 
in the previous chapter, had little in the way of past experience with public access ICT 
services. 
Participants in the study demanded substantial reassurances that the services they chose to 
use were genuine, secure and trustworthy and this was reﬂected in their reticence to engage 
in risky activities (checking email, making a payment etc) using wireless services that did not 
oﬀer such assurances. That their conﬁdence in the trustworthiness and security of a wireless 
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service was however found to increase with the strength of both physical- and virtually based 
linkage evidence provided some evidence that the use of linkage as an evidential cue was 
an eﬀective technique. Supporting this eﬀect further, in the case of services that included 
virtually-linked evidence, though participants found it hard to compare two unfamiliar and 
relatively complex protocols, overall, they did ﬁnd them trustworthy enough to suggest that 
they might use such services for more risky activities, including ﬁnancial transactions. 
In the next chapter, the concept of digital- to physical-world linkage as means of providing 
evidence of service trustworthiness would be explored further with an appreciation of the 
eﬀect of a ﬁnal type of artefact: Other people. 
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Chapter 6 
The eﬀect of other people: 
Social linkage evidence as a 
means of increasing user 
perceptions of situated service 
trustworthiness 
6.1 Chapter overview 
The physical world, as Kindberg et al (2002) [72] observed, can be considered as being made 
up of three general categories of entity: people, places and things. In the previous chapter, 
an experiment was conducted whereby various artefacts (things) were made available in the 
physical world (place) that were then leveraged to provide evidence as to the genuineness 
(and by extension) trustworthiness of a wireless situated service (a WiFi ‘hotspot’). As 
constituting that evidence, two forms of linkage, by which the wireless situated service could 
be linked with the physical world in which it was encountered, were investigated: physical 
and virtual linkage. The results of that experiment showed that, by increasing the degree to 
which people consider evidence as being physically linked, there was a corresponding eﬀect 
of increasing their perceptions of the genuineness, trustworthiness and security of the service 
to which that evidence was associated. Further, through the introduction of evidence that 
was virtually linked, this eﬀect was increased further than physically linked evidence alone. 
In this chapter, an experiment was developed to examine the use of a possible third linkage 
mechanism that is based upon the remaining category of entity as observed by Kindberg et 
al: people. This ﬁnal form of linkage is termed ‘social linkage’, and evidence of its existence 




Urban pervasive computing describes a world where digital and physical worlds co-exist 
within the same space. Within such an environment, numerous digital services and physical 
people are able to encounter, associate and interact with one another freely and wirelessly. 
The wireless digital world is, however, not directly perceptible to humans. Thus, to become 
aware of the digital world around them, it is necessary for people to use some form of 
computing device (such as a mobile computer with wireless networking capabilities) that 
has the ability to both detect and communicate with wirelessly delivered digital services. 
Thorough the use of such devices, physical people are able to ‘see’ and communicate on an 
ad-hoc basis with digital services and vice-versa. 
Within both worlds, many individual entities can co-exist within a given shared space. 
However, communication between the two worlds is (by and large) performed one-to-one; 
that is to say that a given digital service present in a particular physical place does not 
typically share its knowledge of the physical world with other digital services within the 
same space. Likewise, a given physical person does not generally share their knowledge of 
the digital world with other physical people (unless questioned directly). As discussed in 
previous chapters, this poses a problem from the perspective of a person uncertain over 
which of a number of potential digital services it is safe to connect to. Should a person wish 
to take advantage of one particular wireless situated service that is available alongside a 
plethora of others, they must accept a degree of risk that the service that they choose may 
not be bona-ﬁde. Further, they must also accept that the act of merely making a connection 
to any service may be enough to compromise the security of their data. 
This particular problem, that users are not aﬀorded information as to the potential trust­
worthiness of a given wireless situated service prior to connection with that service, forms 
the primary focus of this chapter. Current wireless service discovery protocols, such as those 
bundled as part of the two most used commercial computer operating systems (Windows 7, 
Mac OS X 10.61) are a case in point. Typically (i.e. without additionally installed software 
or substantial technical knowledge), the service discovery tools oﬀered by the major oper­
ating systems oﬀer users only a limited amount of information about the services that they 
detect. Generally, this information is limited to the name of a detected service, whether or 
not that service oﬀers encrypted communication and perhaps an approximated measure of 
its radio signal strength. Little, if any of this information is able to provide evidence to the 
user that any detected service can be considered as being trustworthy. Service names can 
be copied or otherwise subverted, signal strength is subject to various uncontrollable phys­
ical phenomena and communicating with a bogus service via an encrypted communication 
channel is perfectly feasible, if not entirely straightforward for an attacker to arrange. 
1Current as of writing in late 2010. 
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6.2.1 People as evidential cues to digital service trustworthiness: 
Social Linkage 
Social linkage is deﬁned here as “the utilization of physical people present within a bounded 
space to create a link between a wireless digital service and the physical space in which that 
service is made available”. Within this deﬁnition, the use of the term bounded has been 
used to illustrate the point that that the digital and physical worlds share some common 
features that are important. Physical people are often contained within particular areas of 
physical space by structures through which they cannot pass (e.g. walls). Similarly, if to 
a lesser extent, digital radio signals are limited in terms of their range by measure of their 
signal generating power and the eﬀect of signal attenuation caused by surrounding physical 
structures. To a degree therefore, in a given space, both physical people and wireless digital 
services are bounded somewhat by the physical conﬁguration of that space; a wireless digital 
service is of limited range, and potential users of such a service must themselves be physically 
present within that range. Indeed, it is the speciﬁc type of digital services that exist within 
these parameters (‘situated ’ services) that this thesis is primarily interested (see section 1.3). 
Regarding the use of situated services such as public access WiFi ‘hotspots’, as such a 
service is typically oﬀered as a value-added service to paying customers of the host venue, 
the range of that hotspot is assumed and generally intended to be limited to the walls of 
the host venue (though various radio transmission phenomena will often expand this range 
somewhat further than might be intended). As the range of the service of a WiFi ‘hotspot’ 
is limited, it could be considered reasonable to assume that the source of the signal is to 
be found somewhere within the conﬁnes of the venue. Thus, the assumption might easily 
be made that the infrastructure required to provide an encountered WiFi ‘hotspot’ is likely 
to be owned and administered by the proprietors of the venue in which it is found. In any 
given space however, several independent WiFi ‘hotspots’ can, and often do co-exist. As 
demonstrated in the previous experiment (chapter 4), the creation of such services can be 
achieved through little more than a WiFi-capable laptop computer and basic knowledge of 
networking. 
In the social world, people often seek and make use of social information that is embed­
ded in their social networks in order to reduce uncertainty about their choices and actions 
(Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003 [105]). This eﬀect is made particularly salient in situations that 
contain aspects of ambiguity, such as might be found in a situation where a number of situ­
ated services - all purporting as being genuine - are presented to a naive user from which to 
choose. In the absence of prior interaction history, that others are seen to have used, or are 
using a service has been found to increase an individual’s personal trust in that service (e.g. 
Boyd, 2002 [16]). Creating a sense of user community, i.e. that others have, and continue 
to use a particular service is a technique used widely on risk-relevant services that are made 
available on the WWW. User-generated and publicly visible vendor / product reviews are, 
for example, a common feature of e-commerce websites such as eBay and Amazon. 
In the pervasive computing world, individual people are linked to the digital services that 
they are using by extension of the individual networkable devices that they carry on their 
person. Thus, if information could be provided to the user that indicates the number of 
digital devices that are connected to each wireless digital service that is detectable in a 
given physical space, we might reasonably conclude that they could relate that ﬁgure to 
104 
the number of physical people present within that space. This potential is the basis for the 
proposed social linkage channel. Social linkage is a bond created between physical people 
in a physical space and a wireless digital service in digital space. The strength of this bond 
can be measured as a product of the proportion of total possible physical service users (i.e. 
the number of physical persons present who could conceivably be using that service) relative 
to each of the digital services locally present (as is detected by a user’s laptop). Through 
providing information about this relationship to naive users via the network connection 
software of their electronic device, we suggest that their perception as to the trustworthiness 
of one service over another would be positively aﬀected. 
6.3	 The design of an experiment to examine the eﬀect 
social linkage upon user perceptions of situated ser­
vice trustworthiness 
6.3.1	 Research questions and hypotheses 
The experiment sought to develop and evaluate methods by which a basic service discovery 
protocol (WiFi network service detection) could be extended to include information as to 
the current usage of each service that it currently detected as being within range. The 
additional information that the protocol would provide to users would be a representation 
of the number of people currently using any speciﬁc local wireless service. As WiFi range 
is relatively short, users would be feasibly be able to validate this information further by 
comparing the system generated information with the numbers of physical people (who could 
plausibly be using such a service) who were nearby. 
We predicted that, within a situation where multiple services were detected as being avail­
able, and in the knowledge that only one of those services was deﬁnitely genuine, users would 
utilise information as to the current usage levels of the services detected to assist them in 
their choice of service with which to connect. 
Thus, the ﬁrst hypothesis (H1) of the experiment was: As the proportion of virtual users 
shown as being connected to one wireless network increases relative to other networks that 
are available, user conﬁdence in the genuineness of that network will increase. 
The term virtual users refers to the number of people (asserted by the protocol) that are 
actively connected to a particular wireless digital / situated service at that time. Conversely, 
physical users refers to the number of people in a space that are observable as using digital 
devices that could plausibly be using any wireless digital service. That these two ﬁgures 
could be compared, and thus potentially aﬀect a sense of social-linkage, a second hypothesis 
(H2) was also formed: For a given network, as the number of users reported by the system 
increases or decreases relative to the number of plausible physical users (i.e. that the user 
can physically see in their immediate environment), conﬁdence in the genuineness of that 
network will reduce. 
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Figure 6.1: Social Linkage Wireless service connection UI (right). Look and feel mirrors 
Macintosh OSX 10.5 operating system. Actual Mac OS wireless service connection software 
(left) is shown alongside for comparison. 
6.3.2	 The design of a service-discovery protocol to support social 
linkage 
As with the experiment conducted in the previous chapter, a new protocol would need to be 
developed that would be used at the point at which the user, having ascertained the pres­
ence of more than one situated service, is in the process of deciding which of them is most 
likely to be genuine. Genuine in this sense can be understood as meaning ‘made available 
/ administered by the management of the host venue and of benevolent intention’. Typi­
cally, wireless digital service discovery and connection is facilitated using software embedded 
within the user’s operating system (OS). To create a protocol that would support evidence 
for social linkage, a new wireless service discovery procedure and user-interface was devel­
oped by the researcher to replace the one that was provided by the operating system (ﬁgure 
6.1). OS wireless network connection software typically oﬀer some combination of the fol­
lowing information for any service that it encounters: service name (SSID2), levels of access 
restriction if present (password required etc) and a measurement of radio signal strength. 
The social linkage protocol that was devised simply extended this information by making 
available socially derived information about current user activity – i.e. a representation of 
the number of devices currently connected to each detectable service. 
The interface designed for the experiment was carefully created such that it would appear 
to function as an integrated part of the OS. Thus, substantial attention was paid to the 
aesthetics and functioning of the UI so as to closely match the look-and-feel of the host OS 
(Apple OS X, v10.5). However, while purporting to be able to both locate and communicate 
with actual wireless networks, this process was in truth simulated and thus a deceit. 
2SSID: Service Set IDentiﬁer. 
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Figure 6.2: Evaluation venue: University of Bath Library social space. 
6.4 Experimental design 
6.4.1 Method 
As with the experiment reported in the previous chapter, evaluation of the social linkage 
protocol was conducted within a semi-ﬁeld setting. Semi-ﬁeld referred to the fact that 
the study was conducted in a public place, but that the experimenter was present and 
the participant aware that they were undertaking a controlled experiment. As a semi-ﬁeld 
experiment, the choice of venue used in the experiment required careful consideration. The 
experiment involved the use of real people as an experimental device, and thus needed to 
be both publicly accessible yet to also have a number of persons (who would not know that 
they were involved in the experiment) to be both visible and using Internet-capable mobile 
devices (e.g. laptop computers). 
The choice of venue used for the experiment was the ground ﬂoor social space within the 
University of Bath Library (ﬁgure 6.2). This space was chosen as it attracted a large con­
gregation of people who would use the space to work and socialise throughout any given 
day. As the space oﬀered its own wireless Internet service3, a good proportion of visitors to 
the space were generally to be found using laptop computers. 
The use of deception required by the instantiation of the protocol, and the utilisation of 
members of the public as an experimental device were considered in terms of their ethical 
impact on participants. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the University of 
Bath department of Psychology. 
3To reduce possible confounds relating to previous experience with the existing wireless network service 
(‘BUCS Wireless’), this service name was not used in the experiment. 
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6.4.2	 The independent variables and the creation of experimental 
materials 
The experiment was a within-subjects design with two independent variables (IVs): distri­
bution of users associated with each service, which related to H1 and accuracy of numbers 
reported which related to H2. 
To support IV1, distribution of users associated with each service, two situated services 
(both WiFi hotspots) were created, with the names (SSID’s) Librarynet and LibraryNET 
respectively. Participants were informed that the names of the services were not to be 
considered in their reasoning, save for the consideration that the two names used were 
plausible variants of one actual genuine service. Both networks were reported by the system 
as being encrypted using WPA-PSK4 
IV2, accuracy of numbers reported, referred to the manipulation of the true number of 
physical people present who could plausibly be using wireless services. The purpose of 
this manipulation was to encourage the participant to consider the number of people who 
were actually present in the experimental venue (i.e. the strength of social linkage). To 
support IV2, two ﬁgures were obtained prior to each evaluation trial through the researcher 
conducting a headcount of people present in the venue. These were: 1) total persons present 
and 2) total number of those persons currently using laptop computers. For the purposes 
of the experiment, it was assumed that all laptops that were in use within the venue were 
capable of connecting to the Internet wirelessly. 
To form the social linkage based evidential cue, two simulated WiFi services were presented 
to participants via the social linkage UI, each with an associated ﬁgure that represented the 
number of devices that were currently connected to them. The form of the representation 
was a simple pie chart (ﬁgure 6.3). 
Two sets of conditions were created to evaluate the two hypotheses / IVs of the experiment. 
To test hypothesis / IV one, only the relative proportions of users associated with each of 
the two services was shown. To achieve this, the total number of laptop users present (as 
ascertained by the researcher prior to each evaluation) were divided across the two bogus 
networks to form eight conﬁgurations / conditions, shown below in table 6.1. 
Hypothesis two stated that reducing the accuracy of numbers reported in the system would 
have a corresponding reduction eﬀect upon user conﬁdence. To evaluate hypothesis / IV 
two, the proportional distribution of laptop users was ﬁxed at the level to which participants 
were most conﬁdent that the service they chose was genuine (i.e. from the IV1 trials). For 
the conditions presented for hypothesis two, the actual number of users connected to each 
of the two services was made available on the pie chart shown by the social linkage UI. 
Seven conditions for hypothesis two were generated by manipulating the range between the 
numbers of users reported by the UI and the true number of plausible users present (as 
ascertained by the headcount of actual laptop users). The resulting conditions are presented 
in table 6.2. 
4WPA-PSK: WiFi Protect Access - Pre-Shared Key. This variation of WiFi communication encryption 
is typically found on home wireless networking services and is often enabled by default. 
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Figure 6.3: Social Linkage Wireless service connection UI showing two discovered services.

Representation of proportion of users currently associated with each service is highlighted.

Condition % Virtual users assigned to % Virtual users assigned to 
librarynet libraryNET 
1 10.0% 90.0% 
2 20.0% 80.0% 
3 30.0% 70.0% 
4 40.0% 60.0% 
5 60.0% 40.0% 
6 70.0% 30.0% 
7 80.0% 20.0% 
8 90.0% 10.0% 
Table 6.1: Conditions for IV1: distribution of users associated with each service 
6.4.3 Dependent variables and experimental measures 
Two dependent variables (DVs) formed the experiment measures. These were conﬁdence in 
the genuineness of the service chosen and conﬁdence in the genuineness of the service not 
chosen. Quantitative measures of both forms of conﬁdence were obtained using an interactive 
slider mechanism that provided a 500-point scale from 0 [not at all conﬁdent] to 500 [very 
conﬁdent]. To gain additional qualitative data relating to participant reasoning as to the 
two DV’s, participants were also encouraged to “think-aloud” as they performed the tasks 
set. Participant vocalisations were captured using a dictaphone and were supplemented by 
notes taken by the researcher. Finally, as the number of people present in the space varied 
substantially across diﬀerent times of the day and diﬀerent days of the week, records for 
both visitor numbers and laptop users were recorded prior to each experimental trial and 
were included for use in subsequent analysis as co-variates. 
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Condition Accuracy of numbers reported (as 
derived as a % of the true total no. of 








Table 6.2: Conditions for IV2: accuracy of numbers reported 
6.4.4 Experimental procedure 
Prior to commencement of each trial, the experimenter obtained the total number of 1) 
people present in the experimental venue and 2) the number of those people who were 
currently using laptop computers. If the total number of people present was less than 30, 
or the number of laptop users was less than half the total number of people present, the 
trial was abandoned. Both numbers were entered into the system that supported the social 
linkage UI. 
Each experimental trial was conducted in two phases. Phase one was the evaluation of condi­
tions relating to H1, during which participants were exposed to eight diﬀerent conﬁgurations 
of active user distribution across the two WiFi services. Phase two was the evaluation of 
conditions relating to H2, during which participants were exposed to seven variations of 
the actual numbers of users associated with each service. The duration of each complete 
experimental trial was between 25-30 minutes. 
Each participant was recruited outside of the study venue, where consent was obtained in 
writing and brief instructions as to the nature of the study given (see appendix C, sections 
C.1 and C.2). The introduction provided to the participants is presented thus: 
Imagine you are visiting a public library to try to get an Internet connection. 
You have your laptop computer with you, and you know that this library happens 
to have a wireless Internet access point that you can use during your visit. 
When you sit down at a table and try to connect to the wireless network you 
see that there are in fact two diﬀerent wireless networks that both appear to be 
provided by the library. You know that the library genuinely provides one 
of these networks. The other network may be from another source 
pretending to be the library and should be considered as potentially 
fake. You are aware that wireless networks are vulnerable to attack; somebody 
might have created an entirely fake network to which you can still connect, poten­
tially giving away passwords or other information and inadvertently giving the 
faker access to your computer. 
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Figure 6.4: Social Linkage UI: Default state, prior to discovering available wireless network 
services. 
The participant was then guided through the venue and seated at a table that had a laptop 
computer made available for their use. Instructions for discovering and connecting to cur­
rently available wireless networks using the social linkage UI were oﬀered by the researcher. 
Each participant was told to assume that all of the data that they would encounter during 
the experiment was to be considered as having been collected in real-time. 
When the participant felt ready to begin, they were instructed the use the social Linkage 
UI5 to ‘scan for wireless networks’ (ﬁgure 6.4). 
Throughout the experiment, the researcher remained seated next to the participant. The 
participant completed all experimental trials at their own pace, with eight trials presented 
for H1 (in randomised order), followed by seven trials for H2 (also randomised). As the 
data required for the generation of the conditions in H2 were dependent upon the results 
gathered for H1, counterbalancing those two phases of the evaluation was not possible. 
For each of the 15 trials, the participant was presented with the proportion and / or num­
ber of users currently associated with the two ﬁctitious wireless services librarynet and 
libraryNET (ﬁgure 6.5). To complete each trial, participants were asked to select which of 
the two services they considered to be most genuine, and then to connect to that services 
through clicking a button labelled ‘connect’. 
Upon choosing the service that they considered as being most likely to be genuine, each 
participant was then asked to rate each of the two services (i.e. the service that they chose, 
and the service that they did not choose) in terms of the question ‘how conﬁdent are you 
that the network you have chosen is [not] a genuine wireless hotspot oﬀered by this venue? ’. 
Participant measures of conﬁdence were collected using a sliding scale of not at all conﬁdent 
to very conﬁdent that could be manipulated using a mouse connected to the laptop (ﬁgure 
6.6). 
5The name of the UI as seen by the participants was given simply as ‘Wireless Internet Connection’. 
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Figure 6.5: Social linkage UI: Two available wireless network services found. The distribu­
tion of users associated with each service is presented to the participant as a pie chart. 
Figure 6.6: Social linkage UI: Data collection, conﬁdence scores for the network services 
chosen and not-chosen. 
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Figure 6.7: Evaluation UI: Separation of conditions relating to hypothesis one and two. 
Conditions for hypothesis one (only proportional distributions of users shown) and hypoth­
esis two (both proportions and actual numbers shown) were separated with the screen pre­
sented in ﬁgure 6.7. 
Upon completion of all 15 experimental trials, the participant was ﬁnally asked to answer 
two questions: 
•	 How many people did they think were actively using [any] wireless Internet service in 
this space? 
•	 How did they come to obtain that number? 
The participant was then debriefed and any questions raised during the experiment were 
answered. 
6.4.5 Participants 
The participants were 24 individuals (Gender split: M=13 (54%), F=11 (46%)), recruited by 
email invitation and general opportunity sampling. 20 participants (83%) were current Uni­
versity students (undergraduate / postgraduate) and the remaining 4 (17%) were members 
of University staﬀ. The modal age range of participants was 18-25. 
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6.5 Results 
6.5.1	 Eﬀects of proportional distribution of users associated with 
librarynet and libraryNET 
Mean conﬁdence scores for the service chosen as being the genuine service, and the service 
not chosen as being the genuine service were calculated across the eight conditions of IV1 
(distribution of users associated with each service) and are presented as a table (table 6.3). 
Condition % Virtual % chose Mean Mean 
users using librarynet as conﬁdence conﬁdence 
librarynet genuine score for score for 
service chosen non-chosen 
service service 
1 10.0% 1 (4.2%) 362.21 310.04 
2 20.0% 1 (4.2%) 273.71 192.25 
3 30.0% 1 (4.2%) 193.21 146.83 
4 40.0% 7 (29.2%) 106.96 93.25 
5 50.0% 21 (87.5%) 90.54 79.71 
6 60.0% 24 (100.0%) 189.08 139.67 
7 70.0% 23 (95.8%) 236.00 188.46 
8 80.0% 24 (100.0%) 352.25 282.08 
Table 6.3: Mean conﬁdence rating scores for the service chosen / not-chosen for the eight 
conditions of IV1 (distribution of users associated with each service). 
Conﬁdence scores for the service chosen as being the genuine service 
Mean conﬁdence scores (range 0-500) for the service that was chosen as being genuine 
were analysed across all eight conditions of IV1 distribution of users associated with each 
service using a one-way repeated-measures Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA). To control 
for possible eﬀects due to variance in numbers of people / laptop users between participants, 
the values for total number of people present and total number of laptop users were included 
in the analysis as co-variates. 
A signiﬁcant main eﬀect of distribution of users associated with each service [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .35, F(7,15) = 3.930, p=0.01] was observed, and a multivariate partial eta squared value 
of .64 suggested a large eﬀect size. No signiﬁcant co-variate eﬀect was found for total number 
of people present [Wilks’ Lambda = .81, F(7,15) = 0.487, p=0.83 n.s] or total number of 
laptop users [Wilks’ Lambda = .76, F(7,15) = 0.693, p=0.68 n.s] indicating that the main 
eﬀect was not inﬂuenced by variances in the number of people / laptop users that were 
present in each trial. 
Pairwise comparisons (repeated measures t-tests) were then performed on the scores between 
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successive condition pairs in which the distribution of users associated with each of the two 
services is skewed ﬁrst towards service one (librarynet) and then to service two (libraryNET). 
Six of the seven paired comparisons were found to be signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, indicating 
that, as the proportion of virtual users assigned to a network fell (in intervals of 10%), 
participant conﬁdence in their eventual choice of that service (i.e. as being genuine) also 
dropped signiﬁcantly. However, as no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in conﬁdence score was observed 
between conditions 4 & 5 [t(23) = 1.01, p=0.32 n.s], it also appeared that this eﬀect had a 
threshold. When the proportional split approached 60/40, participants considered both the 
librarynet and libraryNET services to be equally (un)likely as being genuine. 
Conﬁdence scores for the service chosen as not being the genuine service 
Mean conﬁdence scores for the service that was chosen as being not genuine were analysed 
across all eight conditions of IV1 distribution of users associated with each service using a 
one-way repeated-measures Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), with the same co-variates 
values: total number of people present and total number of laptop users. 
No signiﬁcant main eﬀect was observed for distribution of users associated with each service 
[Wilks’ Lambda = .49, F(7,15) = 2.194, p=0.09 n.s], and no signiﬁcant co-variate eﬀect 
was found for either total number of people present [Wilks’ Lambda = .66, F(7,15) = 1.129, 
p=0.40 n.s] or total number of laptop users [Wilks’ Lambda = .77, F(7,15) = 0.639, p=0.72 
n.s]. Though the ANCOVA analysis approached signiﬁcance for the main eﬀect, it appeared 
that participants did not consider the diﬀerences in proportional distribution in terms of 
their conﬁdence about the service that they rejected. Examination of the percentage mean 
conﬁdence scores showed that conﬁdence in the service not chosen was 36% and no score 
rose above 65%. 
6.5.2	 Eﬀects of the accuracy of numbers reported by the social 
linkage UI 
Mean conﬁdence scores for the service chosen as being the genuine service, and the service 
not chosen as being the genuine service were calculated across the seven conditions of IV2 
(accuracy of numbers reported) and are presented below as a table (table 6.4). 
Conﬁdence scores for the service chosen as being the genuine service 
Mean conﬁdence scores for the service that was chosen as being genuine were analysed across 
all conditions for IV2 accuracy of numbers reported using a one-way repeated-measures 
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA). As with previous analyses, values for total number of 
people present and total number of laptop users were included in the analysis as co-variates. 
No signiﬁcant main eﬀect was found for accuracy of numbers reported [Wilks’ Lambda = .65, 
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Condition System % chose Mean Mean 
reported librarynet as conﬁdence conﬁdence for 
accuracy (as genuine score for non-chosen 
% of actual service chosen service 
count of service 
laptop users) 
1 20.0% 24 (100.0%) 363.96 381.79 
2 50.0% 24 (100.0%) 349.21 336.33 
3 75.0% 24 (100.0%) 396.38 375.21 
4 100.0% 24 (100.0%) 394.21 351.33 
5 125.0% 24 (100.0%) 398.58 375.83 
6 150.0% 24 (100.0%) 399.67 354.25 
7 175.0% 24 (100.0%) 409.75 357.54 
Table 6.4: Mean conﬁdence rating scores for the seven conditions of IV2 (accuracy of numbers 
reported). 
F(6,16) = 1.443, p=0.26 n.s], and no signiﬁcant eﬀect was observed for either co-variate. 
Both results indicated that participants did not consider the accuracy of the numbers of 
virtual users (as presented to them by the social linkage UI ) as being relevant to their 
conﬁdence about the genuineness of the service they chose. 
Conﬁdence scores for the service chosen as not being the genuine service 
Analysis of the mean conﬁdence scores for the service chosen as being not genuine using 
ANCOVA found no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of accuracy of numbers reported [Wilks’ Lambda 
= .68, F(6,16) = 1.242, p=0.34 n.s]. No signiﬁcant eﬀect was observed for either co-variate. 
Again, both results indicated that participants did not consider the accuracy of the numbers 
of virtual users (as presented to them by the social linkage UI ) as being relevant to their 
conﬁdence about the genuineness of the service they rejected. 
6.5.3	 Participant estimates of the numbers of people actively using 
a wireless Internet connection 
Mean counts of laptops (actual) and laptops (as perceived by the participants) were calcu­
lated and are presented as a table in ﬁgure 6.5 below. 
On average, participants underestimated the true number of laptop users by around 15%. 
When probed as to the method by what means this ﬁgure was obtained, 71% of participants 
stated as basing their estimate on guesswork “more than 20, probably more like 30 ”, “I’d 
guess about 30 in this room”. While several participants used the simple strategy of counting 
laptop users in some proportion of the room and then multiplying it up: “at least 25 in 
sight, times by two for the rest”, most reported their ﬁgure as being based on an immediate 
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Mean no. of Mean no. of % Diﬀ 
laptop users laptop users 
(actual) (perceived) 
41 35 -14.60% 
Table 6.5: Comparison of (mean) numbers of laptop users as ascertained by the researcher 
vs. (mean) numbers of laptop users as reported by participants. 
appraisal and / or intuition. Only seven participants (29%) actually made direct eﬀorts to 
take an accurate count of the actual number of laptop users in the room. 
6.5.4	 Participant reasoning about the impact of social linkage upon 
perceptions of service genuineness and trustworthiness 
IV1 conditions (distribution of users associated with each service) 
Within the eight IV1 conditions, only the relative proportions of virtual users assigned to 
librarynet and libraryNET were displayed. Participants - while generally appreciating its 
purpose - were confused as to why the system did not display the actual numbers of users 
that were associated with each service: “If [the system] knows the proportions, it must know 
how many people are using librarynet” and “it’s not much use if [the interface] doesn’t show 
numbers”. Despite these reservations however, in conditions where the relative proportion of 
virtual users assigned to one service over another was high (i.e. more than 60% in favour), 
participants did use the pie-chart visualisation as guidance in their decision making. To 
do this, they typically many stated as favouring a ‘herd mentality’ type heuristic: “I’ll 
go with that..Cos More people are using that one”. though conﬁdence in their selection 
appeared somewhat vague: [Researcher] “Does having more people make it more genuine? ” 
[participant:] “I dunno, I guess so”. However, as the relative proportion of virtual users 
assigned to each service approached equal (60% or less), participant conﬁdence scoring 
bottomed out. Several participants stated that, had the experimental design permitted 
them to do so, they would have rejected both services: “They’re both pretty much the same. 
If I knew one was deﬁnitely fake I wouldn’t want to connect to either... Because I have to 
pick one, i’ll pick this one at random” and “I would be suspicious of both [librarynet and 
libraryNET]”. 
IV2 conditions (accuracy of numbers reported by the social linkage UI ) 
The display of numbers alongside the proportional distribution was positively received by 
the vast majority of participants, many of whom which had previously made comment that 
they should have been included in the ﬁrst place. Though no data exists to validate it, 
there was a general sense that the decision making process was shortened substantially by 
their inclusion. This was certainly the case in some trials, where only one virtual user was 
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assigned to one of the services: “That’s deﬁnitely the fake one.. well, there’s only one person 
on it”. 
When the numbers of virtual users connected to the minority service were less than ﬁve, 
participants considered the service to be similarly likely to be fraudulent. However, when 
numbers advanced above ﬁve, a small number of participants remarked that their conﬁdence 
in the majority service was compromised: “I don’t know about this now. I’m beginning to 
wonder if the one with most people on it is the wrong one... There’s too many people on the 
other one, if it were fake they would know”. The instructions supplied to the participants 
advised them to consider that the numbers reported to them by the social linkage UI were 
to be considered as being ‘live’. As the numbers reported changed between trials, partici­
pants rationalised this change in a number of interesting ways. Generally, the participants 
considered the change as either being due to people coming or going that they could not see, 
or as connections to the two services being linked to the use (or disuse) of Internet browsing 
software. 
Use of laptop / browser as being indicative of connection to Internet: Within 
the design of the experiment, an assumption was made that all laptops present within the 
experimental space were connected to a wireless Internet service. Of course, in reality this is 
not necessarily the case. A small number of participants stated this as part of their reasoning: 
“Just because they are using a laptop doesn’t mean they are on the Internet”. However several 
participants made the incorrect assumption that sustained connection to a WiFi service was 
dependent upon the activation of a computers Internet browsing software: “If they’re not 
using [their Internet browser], they’re not connected to the Internet”. Thus, when the 
numbers reported by the social linkage UI changed between trials, their reasoning reﬂected 
this: “They must not be using the Internet...Maybe they shut [their Internet browser] down”. 
One participant was particularly convinced by this, stating their own experience: “On my 
laptop I have to reconnect to wireless when I turn Internet Explorer oﬀ ”. 
No single participant made mention of the fact that the relative proportion of virtual users 
assigned to librarynet and libraryNET did not change, despite the actual numbers being 
assigned to them changing with every trial. While it is true that the distribution of numbers 
shown did reﬂect the correct proportional distribution shown, it is surprising that no-one 
seemed to ﬁnd the situation unusual. 
Visibility of people: Most participants stated as having experience of wireless internet 
connection, both at home and elsewhere. As such, though rarely discussing the phenomenon 
on any technical basis, they appeared aware that the radio signals used by WiFi could fea­
sibly be detectable outside of their immediate physical location. This was reﬂected directly 
in several comments: “I can’t see all the people the computer can see” and “[the system] 
must be detecting other people... [people] upstairs maybe”. When asked how this judgement 
came to be, the accuracy of the social linkage UI was never questioned. Instead, partici­
pants made reference to the physical laptop users that they could see: “no-one has moved, 
so [the system] must be picking up people somewhere else”. Generally speaking however, 
participants appeared to be following the same ‘herd mentality’ logic as observed in the IV1 
trials. 
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6.6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this experiment, the presentation of socially-derived social linkage evidence was considered 
in terms of its eﬀect upon user perceptions of situated service genuineness. The results 
of the social linkage experiment gave rise to two general ﬁndings: 1) evidence that the 
inclusion of socially-linked evidence was considered as being useful in a situated service 
usage scenario where several similar services were found to be co-present, but 2) that the 
evidence provided, though considered in terms of the number of plausible service users 
physically present was (for a number of good reasons) not considered as being convincing 
enough to warrant evaluation above a superﬁcial level. 
The primary hypothesis of the experiment was that, as the proportion of virtual users 
apparently connected to one wireless network increased relative to other networks available, 
user conﬁdence in the genuineness of that network would also increase. The results of 
the experiment tended to support this hypothesis, providing that, given the two-potential­
network scenario examined, the proportion of users assigned to one network was more than 
60%. Most participants considered the additional information oﬀered by the social linkage UI 
as being beneﬁcial to their selection of which network service to use. However, participants 
tended to evaluate this extra information only at a shallow level. Even in cases where the 
distribution of users associated with one service was as high as 90%, average user conﬁdence 
in the genuineness of that service never exceeded 75%. 
The second hypothesis of the experiment, that for a given network, as the number of users 
reported by the system increases or decreases relative to the number of plausible physical 
users (i.e. that the user can physically see in their immediate environment), conﬁdence in the 
genuineness of that network will reduce was not supported. Despite participants considering 
the additional information presented by the H2 conditions (the actual numbers of nearby 
people that were connected to each of the two services examined) as being more useful than 
the proportional distribution presented in the H1 conditions, this had no signiﬁcant eﬀect 
upon the degree to which they considered either service as being more genuine than the 
other. Examination of participant reasoning suggested a number of reasons why this was so. 
A substantial number of participants clearly understood aspects of radio phenomena relating 
to wireless communication, particularly with respect to its ability to permeate outside their 
immediate physical surroundings. This understanding was subsequently used to present 
good reasons why the numbers presented by the system might not entirely tally with the 
numbers of plausible wireless service users that they could directly observe (e.g. the system 
was able to detect devices outside of the participants ﬁeld of view). 
In terms of the role that social-linkage based evidence was hoped to play, that participants 
felt that they could not rely upon the number of plausible wireless service users that they 
could see in order to validate the numbers as reported by the system was disappointing. This 
eﬀect was compounded somewhat by the substantial disparity (an average of -15%) between 
the actual number of plausible users physically present (as calculated by the researcher) and 
the same number as calculated by the participants. However, that participants considered 
the less directly veriﬁable presentation of the proportional distribution of users associated 
with each network service (i.e. the H1 conditions) as being relevant to their conﬁdence in the 
genuineness of one service over another is in itself a promising ﬁnding. Further reﬁning of the 
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social linkage protocol would seek to expand on this ﬁnding, reducing reliance upon directly 
veriﬁable accuracy and instead exploring ways of supporting socially-derived evidence of 
service usage through other means. Suggestions for future work include the ability for users 
of a particular service to rate / comment upon that service for the beneﬁt of future users, 
and / or the ability for the system to derive historical usage patterns associated with a given 
service (thus providing evidence of how well established that service is within a particular 
physical location). 
6.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the role of a third potential linkage channel social linkage was examined in 
terms of its eﬀect upon perceptions of situated service trustworthiness. To facilitate this 
investigation, a typical wireless network service discovery protocol was extended to provide 
information about the numbers of users that were associated with each detected service. 
In doing so, the experiment sought to address one of the two characteristics of pervasive 
computing usage as identiﬁed in the introduction to the thesis: a need for improved methods 
of service discovery. 
In a semi-laboratory based experiment, the social-linkage enhanced service discovery proto­
col was evaluated by a number of participants in a scenario whereby two essentially identical 
services were made available, with only one known to be actually genuine. The results of 
the experiment suggested that, while providing information that people found to be useful 
in aiding their decisions as to which service to choose, the role of social-linkage as a user-
veriﬁable evidential cue was found to be somewhat less eﬀective than the other forms of 
linkage examined thus far. 
This experiment concludes the exploration of the linkage concept. In the next chapter, a ﬁnal 
experiment is described in which the eﬀectiveness of using linkage as a means of increasing 
the trustworthiness of a situated service was tested in a scenario whereby participants would 
actually have to invest their trust in a service, as opposed to merely stating their intention 
to trust a service. 
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Chapter 7 
Measuring trust investment in 
an experimental setting: WiFi 
Phishing 
“Risk, or meaningful personal investment is a prerequisite of trust. The need 
for trust only arises in risky situations, and the trustor must be cognizant of the 
risks involved”. 
- Morton Deutsch, The resolution of conﬂict: constructive and destructive pro­
cesses, 1973 [35]. 
7.1 Chapter overview 
In the previous two experiments, situated service use-case scenarios were simulated in a 
semi-laboratory setting. Each experiment focussed on a particular characteristic of pervasive 
computing that was considered as requiring some degree of human-computer trust. These 
characteristics were secure ad-hoc device association (chapter four) and service discovery 
(chapter ﬁve). In both experiments, various artefacts in the physical world were leveraged to 
oﬀer evidence that a given service could be considered as being trustworthy. This eﬀect was 
achieved through using those artefacts to show that a given service was linked in some way 
to the establishment in which it was found. Thus far however, the experiments conducted 
have all measured the eﬀectiveness of linkage-based evidential cues through measurements 
of participant stated intention to trust. 
As many researchers, including Malhotra (2004) [88] have noted, trusting intention (a psy­
chological state) and trusting acts (the actual behaviour of investing trust) are two diﬀerent 
things. Thus, an apparent / stated willingness to invest trust in a situated service might 
not necessarily translate to an actual investment of trust. To truly investigate the degree 
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to which linkage could form a useful means of enabling well-placed user trust in situated 
services, measurements of actual trust-investment behaviour as a result of their presence 
would be ideal. However, for a number of reasons that will discussed in this chapter, ob­
serving and recording the true investiture of trust in a controlled experimental setting is 
methodologically challenging. 
In this chapter, an experiment was designed that sought to investigate actual trust invest­
ment behaviour in a real-life situated service usage scenario. To achieve this, a spoofed 
situated service (a WiFi ‘hotspot’) was deployed as an experimental device in a number of 
real-world cafes, and data collection was undertaken without the experimenter being phys­
ically present (i.e. as an ‘unattended’ study). Participants who engaged with the situated 
service were not made aware that they were participating in a controlled experiment. In 
order for the WiFi ‘hotspot’ service to be used, participants in the experiment were required 
to engage in a user-veriﬁcation process whereby they were obliged to supply the service with 
some personal information (their mobile phone number). As the situated service developed 
for the experiment involved this potentially risky investment in order that it be used (and as 
the participant would have no prior experience with the service), users would need to trust 
the system in order to obtain the beneﬁts that it purported to oﬀer. As an experimental 
device, the researcher would be able to capture and log instances of user trust-investment 
behaviour though observing those instances where users chose to complete the veriﬁcation 
process. 
7.2 Introduction 
‘Phishing’, a relatively novel variation on established methods of conﬁdence trickery, is the 
practice of attempting to acquire personal or sensitive information fraudulently through 
the use of electronic communications. ‘Phishing’ communications, commonly email based, 
are often engineered to appear trustworthy by closely resembling real communications from 
trusted people or institutions. ‘Phishing’ attacks often involve mimicking the on-line com­
munications of the banking/ﬁnancial services, whereby access credentials are captured and 
subsequently used for monetary fraud. Such attacks have been shown by experimental re­
search to be worryingly eﬀective (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2000 [57], Dhamija et al, 2006 [38], 
Downs et al, 2006 [40], Sheng et al, 2007 [134]). 
A common component of phishing attacks that are deployed via email is a hyperlink to 
a corresponding website. The website (like the email itself) will purport to be a familiar 
bona-ﬁde service, but will in fact be a masquerade. With regard to systems deployed us­
ing the WWW, fully functional but completely bogus websites can easily be deployed. In 
urban spaces, with the continued growth of cellular phone and WiFi service provision (e.g. 
Wiﬁ ‘hotspots’) in populated areas, the potential for their fraudulent abuse by ‘phishers’ is 
increased for a number of reasons. As the source of a novel wireless service is often neither 
easily ascertained nor easily veriﬁable, by using a laptop running as a standalone web-server, 
the resourceful ‘phisher’ can easily deploy a fully functional digital service to which people 
can connect while he himself remains undetected. 
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7.2.1 Why phishing works 
The art of ‘phishing’ relies on convincing people that a communication is genuine when it 
is not. As such, the success of any phishing attempt is largely dependent on its victims 
failing to detect the deception. Within ‘phishing’ type communications there are likely to 
be subtle cues as to its deceptive nature. Increasing the eﬀectiveness of methods by which 
user attention can be drawn to such cues is often considered key to the prevention of such 
attacks. 
That user attention can and often should be more eﬀectively directed is an issue of interest 
to technology researchers and designers of user interfaces in general. Rutter (2001) [126], 
discussing technology use in general, found that when people approach a new experience, 
they often tend to automatically apply rules that have governed similar experiences in a 
similar domain. This phenomenon is discussed elsewhere in the social sciences, including the 
set eﬀect (A.K.A. Einstellung), a tendency to initially and automatically deploy well-tested 
strategies in situations of ambiguity (Good, 2000 [54]). The set eﬀect can be considered 
as a type of ‘cognitive inertia’ – an autonomic response designed to short-cut the cognitive 
eﬀort required in closely evaluating every situation that a person comes to face. The use 
of a masquerade to perform a phishing attack can be thought of as taking advantage of 
this eﬀect as it relies upon the user failing to pay close attention to something due to its 
familiarity. 
Designers of e-commerce and other web-based service providers that rely on the use of 
sensitive information have sought to reduce the vulnerability of their systems to phishing 
attacks in a variety of ways. Many of their eﬀorts have sought to increase the number 
of cues that are made available, and particularly how those cues can be made salient to 
the user such that their attention is drawn upon more eﬀectively. However, there remains 
much inconsistency between the techniques used by the most popular Internet browsers, 
and the general eﬀectiveness of many of the solutions presented thus far have been found to 
be less than ideal. Browser-based security indicators provide one such example. Browser-
based security indicators are typically made manifest within the ‘chrome’ of the browser. 
The ‘chrome’ refers to the space surrounding the content of the website being viewed, and 
as such is part of the browser software rather than the website itself. In many modern 
browsers, information relevant to the security of the website that is currently loaded are 
displayed prominently, alongside the address and / or status bar of the browser’s chrome. 
However, as Dhamija et al found when examining how and why phishing works (Dhamija, 
2006) [38], a signiﬁcant proportion of people (23%) do not pay close enough attention (if 
indeed any attention at all) to chrome-based indicators of website security. When assessing 
a website on initial encounter, 23% of Dhamjia et al’s participants determined the legitimacy 
by the content of the site only. 36% did so by a combination of the website content and 
its domain name. The better engineered spoof websites that were designed for the study 
successfully fooled 90% of the people that were tested. Alternative eﬀorts to increase the 
salience of chrome based security mechanisms have been reviewed in Dhamija et al (2005) 
[37]. 
Within the website content itself, graphically-based trust seals are commonly used to oﬀer 
a visual cue that that website has been checked and validated by an independent institu­
tion. Two examples are Verisign and Trust-e). By following a hyperlink that is embedded 
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within the trust seal, users of the website can further validate this information by checking 
corresponding information on the independent institution’s website. However, a casual ex­
amination of a number of websites that contain such a seal found only a few examples of 
where this additional veriﬁcation function was actually present (ﬁgure 7.1). 
(a) Verisign trust seal without correspond­
ing link to supporting evidence 
(b) Verisign trust seal with corresponding 
link to Verisign (link target shown as over­
lying window) 
Figure 7.1: Two examples of the use of ‘trust seal’ graphical cues in e-commerce websites. 
In the ﬁrst example, the seal exists only as a graphic, with no immediate means for the user 
to verify it via Verisign. 
7.3	 The design of an experiment to deliberately ‘phish’ 
situated service users 
In this experiment, a bogus Wiﬁ ‘hotspot’ service was installed in a number of real-world 
cafes that were open to the public. Though the management of the venues used would be 
aware of the existence of the service, no information about the service would be oﬀered to 
customers. The service would be free to discover and use. 
As has been observed in the experiments described thus far, whether a person considers a 
situated service as being worthy of their trust involves a complex mix of both cognitive and 
aﬀective reasoning. Informing this reasoning are evidential cues, of which the oﬀering of 
links (linkage) between the physical and digital world appears to be one such cue. Thus 
far, through evaluating three forms of linkage (physical, virtual and social), a number of 
mechanisms have been identiﬁed that appear to increase the trustworthiness of a situated 
service, with a corresponding increase in stated intentions to trust. 
Trust is a complex and multi-faceted concept that poses a signiﬁcant challenge to researchers 
keen to isolate the phenomenon in a controlled experimental setting. A substantial contri­
bution to this problem is due to the fact that, as researchers including Deriaz (2006) [33] 
have noted, notions of trust and risk are dissociable. To invoke a sense of risk in a con­
trolled environment, experimental trust research, particularly in economics have generally 
relied upon the use of laboratory based trust games. Typically, trust games are variances of 
the prisoner’s dilemma protocol, of which one example is the investment game (see section 
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2.4.3). To further engender risk, several trust-game research programmes have used real 
money and thus created the potential for true participant loss. However, as trust game ex­
periments are typically laboratory based, they are inherently susceptible to contamination 
by the white coat eﬀect, i.e. the (unintentional) authority ascribed to the experimenter by 
the participant. In the experiment presented in this chapter, possible white coat eﬀects were 
removed by conducting the experiment ‘unattended’ - i.e. without the experimenter being 
physically present. In the experiment, risk would be simulated by requiring participants to 
volunteer personal information in order to use a situated service. Ideally, the form of that 
personal information would be highly sensitive, such as a participant’s credit card details. 
However, for reasons of security and the potential for participant discomfort, pursuit of this 
option was abandoned. Instead, the experiment would require the entering of a personal 
mobile phone number. A personal mobile phone number was thought to oﬀer a suitable 
alternative example of personal information that still carried a real potential risk of abuse. 
7.3.1 Research questions and hypotheses 
The practicalities of installing an essentially rogue wireless situated service in a real-world 
working cafe meant that, unlike in the previous experiments, the potential use of additional 
physical artefacts (such as wall posters, leaﬂets and screens) was severely constrained. In­
stead, a physical linkage cue was created though means of an image embedded in the website 
that was presented to users as they attempted to connect to the service. 
The primary prediction of the experiment was that the presence (within the website) of 
a highly salient photograph that uniquely represented the user’s current location would 
increase the likelihood of the user ‘trusting’ the website enough to supply some personal 
information (in this case their personal mobile phone number). This is as opposed to the 
same website displaying a photograph of a more generic location that is not identiﬁable as 
being unique to the user’s current location. By including a location relevant photograph as 
a salient evidential cue of communication source, it was hypothesized that user uncertainty 
about the source of the communication would be reduced through oﬀering a link between 
the service and the venue where it was deployed. 
The role of the embedded image was thus to serve as a form of physical linkage, and it would 
achieve this through means of providing a locative cue. A locative image is thus described 
as an image or other form of media that is embedded within the service’s content, and 
which represents the location where the (source of the) service is situated. The presence of 
a locative image formed hypothesis one: 
H1 Locative hypothesis: The presence of a locative image cue would increase trust in a 
Wi-Fi hotspot compared to the presence of an non-locative image. 
However, it is also important to examine what is meant by the absence of a locative cue. 
The idea of an image not representing a given location can be broken down into one of the 
following mutually exclusive categories: Anti-locative: an image representing a place that 
is speciﬁcally unlike the given location and a-locative: an image representing a location 
that could be in any of many places, including the given location. The presence of an 
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a-locative cue that, while not inconsistent with the user’s location, does not speciﬁcally 
represent that location was considered as having no eﬀect on trust investment. However, 
the potential eﬀect of an anti-locative image formed the second hypothesis: 
H2 Anti-locative hypothesis: The presence of an anti-locative image would decrease trust 
in a Wi-Fi hotspot compared to the presence of an a-locative, or locative counterpart. 
7.3.2	 Experiment environment and materials 
For the purposes of the experiment, a situated service called Fastnet was created by the re­
searcher. Fastnet purported to be a free wireless internet gateway service (a WiFi ‘hotspot’), 
and was deployed in real-world cafes in two major U.K cities (Bristol and central London). 
The venues chosen were selected based on their having existing WiFi Internet access points 
and established WiFi user bases. 
7.4 Experimental design 
The experiment was a between-subjects design that was conducted without the researcher 
present during data collection. The requirement that participants be subjected to an inten­
tional deception without their prior consent was considered carefully in terms of the ethical 
impact this activity might have on participants. To ensure conﬁdentiality and security of 
user supplied information, the experiment was conducted within SSL secure web space. Par­
ticipant mobile phone numbers were encrypted at source, transmitted securely and hashed 
upon arrival at the Fastnet web-server(s). Thus, while records of participant mobile phone 
numbers involved in the experiment were stored (for the purpose of preventing instances of 
the same participant performing the experiment more than once) they could not be read by 
the researchers, nor could they be used to identify participants directly. All participants who 
supplied their mobile phone numbers to the Fastnet system were debriefed by the system and 
multiple modes of contacting the research team were made available. Ethical approval for 
the study was applied for and granted by the University of Bath department of Psychology. 
7.4.1	 The independent variable and the creation of experimental 
materials 
Within the experiment, two independent variables (IVs) were manipulated. These were 
location with two levels (Bristol, London) and image, also with two levels (local, generic). 
The levels of image are described thus: 
Local image: The Fastnet service website contained a masthead photograph representing 
the local area immediately outside the venue used in Bristol (ﬁgure 7.2a). 
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Generic image : The same website, but with the masthead photograph replaced with a 
photograph representing a generic urban environment (ﬁgure 7.2b). 
(a) Fastnet splash screen displaying the lo­
cal image condition. 
(b) Fastnet splash screen displaying the 
generic image condition. 
Figure 7.2: Fastnet splash screen in the local and generic conditions. 
The selection of photographs for the independent variables image and location 
The selection of the photographs used to create the conditions for the IV’s image and 
location was achieved through a simple photograph ranking exercise that was undertaken 
with members of the public (at both Bristol and London venues). Participants (Bristol: n = 
21[M=12, F=9]) , London: n = 20[M=11, F=9) were asked to rank seven photographs (see 
appendix D, section D.1) in terms of the statement this photograph most clearly represents 
where I am now. Three of the photographs were of the immediate area adjacent the cafe 
venue in Bristol (thus locative for Bristol, but anti-locative for London), three were non­
speciﬁc photos of urban-style architecture (all a-locative), and the remaining image was 
a ‘wildcard’ photo that was not directly representative of either location of (a New York 
street scene that should be considered anti-locative in both London and Bristol). The 
overall highest ranked image in Bristol was used as the local image condition and the second 
lowest ranked image (disregarding the wildcard image) formed the generic image condition. 
Validating the choices made, results from the London participants indicated that the local 
image was seen to be second least representative of that locale, while the generic image was 
found as second most representative. 
Both image conditions were tested in both the Bristol and London cafes. However, as the 
location speciﬁc photograph was relevant only to participants completing the experiment in 
Bristol, to support the hypothesis, it would be expected to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in 
the levels of trust investment across the two image conditions in Bristol only. As neither 
photograph provided any relevant local cue to participants in London, no diﬀerence in the 
levels of trust invested were expected as result of the presence of one photograph over 
another. With the exception of the masthead image, the appearance and functionality of 
the Fastnet website was identical at both locations. 
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Design issues related to unattended experimentation 
Participant recruitment: The engendering of risk in the experiment was deliberately 
heightened by conducting the experiment ‘unattended’. As the researcher was not present 
however, the recruitment of participants was entirely dependent upon visitors to the cafe(s) 
both discovering and connecting to the Fastnet service of their own volition. This posed 
substantial technical problems in the design of the experiment, not least the problem that 
many mobile devices would remember services to which they had previously connected and 
would automatically reconnect to them if they are detected again. As both the cafe venues 
used had existing WiFi services available, participant engagement in the experiment was 
limited by their mobile devices failing to oﬀer the option to connect to a diﬀerent service by 
default. 
Consequently, the reality was that the collection of substantive participant data would take 
a matter of months rather than days / weeks. This issue of timescale, asides from demanding 
a degree of patience, had an additional knock-on eﬀect upon the technical aspects of the 
experiment; the Fastnet system had to be robust enough to withstand a signiﬁcant time 
period of sustained activation. In order to provide continual service over an extended time 
frame of several months, and where power sources were potentially variable, the web-servers 
used to deploy Fastnet were based on small footprint Linux-based laptops. This provided a 
increased degree of stability, and meant that the system could be restored swiftly by non­
technical persons present within the cafe(s) when required. Further, to provide the researcher 
with a commentary on progress, both web-servers also transmitted a report of their status 
via a ‘heartbeat’ that was delivered via the cellular network short messaging service (SMS) 
on a daily basis. As well as providing an early warning of system problems, this also supplied 
a useful daily report of participant engagement, and the number of participants who had 
successfully been ‘phished’. 
Assigning participants to the two levels of IV1 image: In terms of system design 
and implementation, error capture, recovery and access control were all critical factors. To 
ensure control of access and balanced participant condition assignment, the Fastnet system 
both identiﬁed and recorded the unique MAC address of each user’s device. This information 
was then used to assign each user to one of the two levels of IV1 and ensured that multiple 
access to the site by the same machine resulted in exposure only to the originally assigned 
condition. 
Fastnet service website: Aesthetic and functional considerations: The unattended 
nature of the experiment demanded a system that could cope with a myriad of potential 
devices and operating systems that could conceivably attempt to make connection. Inter­
action with the Fastnet service was conducted through a website that presented itself to 
participants upon connection to the service. 
A professional web designer was employed to create the Fastnet website. The site itself was 
deliberately designed to be minimalist in tone, content and color, while adhering to design 
conventions of sites of a similar kind. To ensure maximum salience, around 50% of the active 
space of the website was devoted entirely to the experimental manipulation (a photograph), 
and other imagery usage was minimal. On a functional level, the website code was built 
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to comply with W3C xHTML web standards, and was subject to an exhaustive testing 
schedule with a broad range of Internet browsing software that was available at the time. 
These included Safari, Internet Exporer, Firefox (Macintosh), Internet Explorer, Firefox, 
Opera (PC) and the proprietary browsers of several mobile devices (mobile phones / Pocket 
PC based devices). Finally, and in response to the Dhamjia et al (2006[38]) ﬁnding that 36% 
of participants tested on a variety of spoofed ‘phishing; websites utilised the domain name 
as well as the content of the site when making judgements of site legitimacy, our service ran 
with the domain name ‘http://www.fast-net.org’. 
7.4.2 Dependent variables / experimental measures 
Within the experiment, the dependent variable was ‘phishing success’, measured in terms of a 
simple boolean outcome: ‘phished’ or ‘not-phished’. Whether a participant was considered as 
having been ‘phished’ was dependent upon them successfully traversing the Fastnet service 
authentication process completely (‘phished’), or leaving the process prematurely (‘not­
phished’). To manage this process, the Fastnet service website consisted of eight individual 
web-pages (see ﬁgure 7.1). Four pages formed a ‘login’ process, three oﬀered help and 
information (as to the use of the service), and one was used as a ‘blocking’ page that 
prevented abuse / multiple logins from the same device. The path through the login process 
was forced: home - login - password - debrief. Each step of the process is described later in 
this section. Attempts to subvert the path through the website / jump steps (e.g. through 
direct URL entry) were automatically redirected to the ‘home’ page. Links to the help and 
information pages were available from every page. 
Web page Function of web page 
Home Presented the ‘Fastnet’ service, invited user to login. 
Login Presented the requirement of a valid mobile phone number to. Requires 
entry of phone number to proceed. 
Password Presented the requirement of the code that the system had sent via SMS 
to the supplied phone number. Required entry of a valid code to 
proceed. 
Thankyou Experiment completed with participant ‘phished’. Presented debrief. 
Blocked Displayed upon attempt to use a previously used mobile phone number. 
Terms Displayed ﬁctitious terms and conditions information, based upon actual 
websites oﬀering the same service. 
Privacy Diplayed a ﬁctitious privacy policy, based upon actual websites oﬀering 
the same service . 
Help Displayed basic website usage information. 
Table 7.1: Summary of the Fastnet website structure. 
Step 1: ‘Splash screen’ - welcome to Fastnet 
Upon connection to the Fastnet service, the MAC address of the connecting device was 
recorded and used to assign the participant to one of the two image conditions (see ﬁgure 7.2). 
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In the event of a repeat visit, assuming the same device was being used, any given participant 
would only ever be presented with their originally assigned image. When an Internet browser 
was opened, participants were automatically presented with an introductory splash screen 
that introduced Fastnet as a free wireless internet gateway with details of how it could be 
accessed. Any attempt by the user to bypass or subvert the Fastnet website (e.g. through 
direct entry of a URL) resulted in the user being redirected back to the splash screen. 
Figure 7.3: Fastnet access: Step 1: Splash screen. 
Step 2: Login to use Fastnet - please supply your mobile phone number 
Participants who chose to continue were then asked for their mobile phone number in order 
that they authenticate themselves before being able to use the service (ﬁgure 7.4). An expla­
nation was oﬀered that the service oﬀered fast access in return for a degree of accountability 
on the part of its users. 
Step 3: Authentication - please enter your unique passkey 
Upon submission of a valid mobile phone number, participants were informed that they 
would shortly receive a unique personal identiﬁcation (PIN) number via their mobile phone 
(SMS Short Messaging Service text messaging was used for this process). Participants were 
told that they would need to enter this PIN into the Fastnet website in order to complete 
their authentication and start using the service (ﬁgure 7.5) . 
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Figure 7.4: Fastnet access: Step 2: Login. 
Figure 7.5: Fastnet access: Step 3: Authenticate. 
Step 4: Participant debrieﬁng 
At the point at which the correct PIN had been entered and submitted, the experiment ended 
and the participant was debriefed by the website (ﬁgure 7.6). The debrief including details 
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of the experiment, the security of participant information supplied during the deception and 
the contact details of the experimenter and project staﬀ. 
Figure 7.6: Fastnet access: Step 4: Debrieﬁng. 
7.4.3 Participants 
The participants were 361 members of the public (n[Bristol] = 247, n[London] = 114), 
identiﬁable only by the unique MAC address of the devices they had used to connect to the 
Fastnet system. Age and gender distributions were unknown. 
7.5 Results 
The results presented in this section were generated through a combination of logs generated 
by the Fastnet web-server(s) and additional logs generated by the Fastnet system itself. Data 
was collected over a period of 29 weeks between October 2006 and July 2007. 
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7.5.1 Patterns of site access and instances of ‘phishing’ 
The distributions of unique connections (as provided by unique MAC addresses) and phishing 
events recorded by Fastnet for each of our two locations are presented in ﬁgures 7.7 and 7.8 
respectively. 
Figure 7.7: Distribution of connections made to the fastnet website recorded over the dura­
tion of the study. 
The general phishing success rate (independent of location) was approximately 32%. Around 
half (53%) of the participants who failed to be ‘phished’ exited the site without progression 
past the splash screen. 29% exited at login, 12% at password and the remaining 6% left 
from one of the three help and information pages. 80% of participants made only one visit 
to Fastnet. The spike in phishing rates noted at the Bristol venue between weeks four and 
ﬁve coincided with the period leading up to Christmas 2006, where it was assumed that 
the venue (being adjacent to the city shopping district) had encountered much higher than 
usual customer traﬃc due to the Christmas season. 
7.5.2 The eﬀect of location and image 
Any participant receiving the debrieﬁng page was considered as indicating a successful 
‘phishing’ (the system otherwise prevented access to that webpage). Raw counts of ac­
cesses made to the debrieﬁng page were calculated for each participant by location / image 
condition and are presented in table 7.2. As any given participant could only be ‘phished’ 
once, any repeat hits (e.g. as might be incurred by a participant deliberately or accidentally 
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Figure 7.8: Distribution of phishing events recorded over the duration of the study. 
reloading the web page) by the same participants on the debrief page were removed from 
subsequent analysis. 


















Total 114 39 (34.2%) 75 (65.8%) 
Grand total 361 116 (32.1%) 245 (67.9%) 
Table 7.2: ‘Phishing’ success rates by location and image. 
Comparative ‘phishing’ rates across the location and image conditions are presented as a 
plot in ﬁgure 7.9. A three-way loglinear analysis produced a ﬁnal model that retained all 
eﬀects. Results showed no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of either location (x2(1)=0.407, p=0.523 
n.s) or of image (x2(1)=2.639, p=0.104 n.s). However, there was a signiﬁcant interaction 
between location and image (x2(1)=4.886, p=0.027), whereby phishing rates were lower for 
image LBristol and higher for image NLBristol in the London location only. 
To further investigate the interaction between location and image and their eﬀect upon 
‘phishing’ success, additional chi-square tests were performed on the image and phished 
variables separately for both locations. For London, there was a signiﬁcant association 
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Figure 7.9: Proportional ‘phishing’ rates by location and image. 
between the image shown and the likelihood of subsequent ‘phishing’, x2(1)=4.41, p=0.036 
(using Yates’ continuity correction); this was not true of Bristol, x2(1)=0.177, p=0.674 n.s 
(using Yates’ continuity correction). Odds ratios indicated that participants in London were 
2.55 times more likely to be ‘phished’ when presented with the image NLBristol than if 
presented with image LBristol. 
The analysis revealed a diﬀerence in the incidence of ‘phishing’ for Bristol and London: 
while participants in Bristol were equally susceptible to being ‘phished’ regardless of the 
image displayed, participants in London were much less susceptible to being ‘phished’ when 
presented with image LBristol (the image selected as a locative cue in Bristol) than with 
NLBristol (the image selected as being a-locative in both locations). 
7.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The primary intent of the experiment presented in this chapter was to produce a means by 
which the measurement of trust was as expressed through actual trust-investment behaviours 
rather than merely through the asserted intention to trust. 
The results of the WiFi phishing experiment gave rise to two general ﬁndings. These were: 
1) a substantial rate of successful ‘phishings’ and 2) evidence for location as being relevant 
for trustworthiness in a situated service scenario. Both ﬁndings are discussed in turn. 
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A substantial rate of successful phishings. In both locations examined, irrespective of 
the image condition, around a third of people who encountered the Fastnet service trusted it 
with their mobile phone number. We might assume therefore that similar numbers of people 
might have trusted that service even if nothing was required from them in order to use it. 
The fact that so many users entered their mobile phone number into Fastnet suggests that 
Wiﬁ providers should consider protecting their users. Though an attacker might conceivably 
utilise the users mobile phone number for malicious ends, the active connection to Fastnet 
could also provide suﬃcient means for the attacker to eavesdrop all communications made 
whilst using the service and perhaps install malware on the users machine. The results of 
this experiment therefore has implications for the design of situated services such as WiFi 
hotspots: Consumers need to be protected from mistakenly trusting spoofed services, and 
designers need to consider and avoid the potential for distrust as a barrier to use of legitimate 
services. 
Evidence for location as being relevant for trustworthiness in a situated ser­
vice scenario. A signiﬁcant result was observed whereby the inclusion of an image that 
was considered anti-locative led to signiﬁcantly less trust (and by extension less successful 
‘phishings’) than an a-locative or locative image. The interaction is presented in ﬁgure 7.10. 
Figure 7.10: Support for the a-locative hypothesis. 
While the experiment was found to support the anti-locative hypothesis (H2), it failed to 
support the locative hypothesis (H1). Unfortunately, the unattended nature of the experi­
ment meant that developing a deeper understanding of these results was rendered impossible. 
As the researcher could not engage with the participants, a more detailed analysis of par­
ticipant reasoning that might have shed substantial light upon the value of location as a 
cue to trustworthiness was not available. Thus, while it was considered that the diﬀerences 
in ‘phishing’ rates that supported H2 were likely due to the anti-locative properties of the 
images shown, the possibility that some other attribute created this eﬀect cannot be easily 
dismissed. However, it was considered that, as the evidence that could conceivably be used 
in what was a real-life working cafe was limited, the result was at least compelling enough 
to warrant further investigation. 
The use of unattended experimentation in this instance had serious limitations and the re­
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searcher had to accept the consequence that interpretation of participant reasoning with no 
experimenter present in-situ would be limited to inference alone. The use of an unattended 
ﬁeld study was chosen speciﬁcally for its potential to create a scenario whereby participants 
would be exposed to (at least as far as they know) real risk. As the presence of risk is 
necessary in any scenario where trust investment can conceivably occur, it was felt that this 
was critical to the experimental design. Further, the absence of the experimenter served 
to strengthen this illusion while also reducing the possibility of the unintentional inﬂuence 
upon participant reasoning and decision making. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to propose a way 
in which this compromise might have been avoided. As the experiment utilised deception, 
obtaining participant feedback via the Fastnet system was diﬃcult for a number of reasons; 
participants who failed to be ‘phished’ could not be alerted to the true nature of the exper­
iment, and participants who were ‘phished’ could well be assumed as being not particularly 
disposed to help the researcher. Further, as the WiFi hotspot service provided by Fast-
net was in actuality a ruse (no actual connection to the wider Internet could possibly be 
reached), although provision of means by which participants who did get ‘phished’ could 
contact the researcher, no communications were ever received. 
7.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, addressing a commonly cited shortcoming of empirical trust research, an 
experiment was designed to measure actual trust-investment behaviour in a real-life situated 
service (a WiFi hotspot). Within the experiment, a physical-linkage cue was embedded 
within a website that formed the service connection protocol. The physical-linkage cue in 
this case was an image that related to the physical surroundings of the user to a variety of 
degrees. 
The results of the experiment gave rise to some interesting ﬁndings. The ﬁrst of these 
ﬁndings was a surprisingly high degree of initial-situational trust with a service that de­
manded personal information up-front and without assurances. In order that they could 
obtain the beneﬁts it purported to provide (free access to the Internet), a third of people 
who (unknowingly) participated in the experiment apparently trusted the service enough to 
volunteer their personal mobile phone number to it. 
Further, an eﬀect of linkage based evidence as a means of imbuing a sense of situated service 
trustworthiness was also found to occur, albeit to a degree that was weaker than was found 
in the experiments previously conducted. In situations where participants were exposed to 
an image that clearly did not represent their current physical surroundings, trust in that 
service as a whole was signiﬁcantly reduced, relative to an image that either directly or 
indirectly represented their current location. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and further work 
8.1 Introduction 
Consequent of the less visible, wire-free nature of pervasive technologies such as situated 
services, the number of means by which such services can convey their trustworthiness to 
their potential users is reduced. This thesis sought to address the processes and mechanisms 
by which people assess the trustworthiness of a pervasive situated service upon their ﬁrst 
encounter. Using a mixed methods research plan in both laboratory and ﬁeld, this process 
developed an understanding of how people respond to the potential risks and threats that 
are associated with this type of system. Through this understanding, the research then 
continued by both developing and evaluating methods by which users of situated services 
could be better informed about the trustworthiness of the services they encountered. In 
conducting this research, the main aim was to help inform pervasive systems designers as 
to how they might best incorporate those processes and mechanisms within their future 
designs. 
The principle prediction to which the thesis was based was that people, in the absence 
of prior knowledge, would seek to identify and use contextual evidence that was available 
in their immediate environment as a means of assessing the potential trustworthiness of a 
new situated service. This prediction was derived from Mcknight et al’s (1998) [101] model 
of initial-situational trust, in which the identiﬁcation and assessment of available evidence 
as to the intentions and competence of the trustee is presented as an antecedent factor in 
the generation of initial-situational trust investment behaviour. Over three experiments, a 
conceptual solution to this problem was posited and tested: ‘linkage’. ‘Linkage’ referred to 
means by which user perceptions of the trustworthiness of a given situated service could be 
increased by providing human perceptible links between the digital service and the immediate 
environment of the user (e.g. Fogg (2001 [46], Riegelsberger & Sasse (2001) [117], Giddens 
(1990) [51]). Through providing user-veriﬁable evidence of this link, the thesis predicted 
that user perceptions as to the trustworthiness of a given wireless digital service would be 
increased. 
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In the experimental component of the thesis, three distinct channels of linkage were iden­
tiﬁed, explored and tested for their eﬀectiveness in increasing initial-situational trust in a 
novel situated service (a WiFi ‘hotspot’). The three channels were: physical linkage, vir­
tual linkage and social linkage. Physical linkage referred to the use of artefacts that were 
connected in a simple physical sense to the environment, in such a way that it would be 
diﬃcult for an attacker to contrive (e.g. mounted to a wall). Virtual linkage referred to the 
use of interactions with a point of trust that an attacker could not easily contrive. Finally, 
social linkage referred to the use of physical persons present as a means of oﬀering evidence 
that a situated service was under active use. The results of these experiments have several 
implications for the design and deployment of pervasive situated services in urban areas. 
This chapter will continue ﬁrstly by providing an overview of the experimental results gath­
ered. The contributions of the thesis are then presented and, in conclusion, the research 
conducted so far will be reﬂected upon, with potential avenues for further work discussed. 
8.2 Overview of the experimental results 
8.2.1	 Current user experience and behaviour with technologies that 
involve issues of personal privacy and security 
In chapter three, initial investigations into user experience and behaviour relating to their 
current risk-relevant ICT service usage were conducted through the development and de­
ployment of an online questionnaire. From the results of the questionnaire, respondents were 
found as having a high level of general experience using technology to conduct activities that 
involved risks to their personal / private data. Respondents presented themselves as being 
highly security conscious and protective of their personal / private data, many having had 
personal experience of Internet-related malicious behaviour such as phishing, credit card 
fraud and virus infection. While respondents on the whole appeared content to engage in 
behaviours that would make their personal / private data vulnerable, they would only do 
so where a clear beneﬁt could be seen to using a particular technology. Technologies that 
involved invasion of user security / privacy were carefully weighed up in terms of how they 
were perceived in terms of their relative cost / beneﬁt. 
In terms of their experience with technologies that could be considered as possessing char­
acteristics of pervasive computing, despite much experience of using home-based networks 
and personal computing equipment, respondents had far less experience of conducting risk-
relevant technology-based activities in public spaces. Respondents were also found as having 
less experience still with conducting such activities using non-personal or shared equipment. 
Thus it was assumed that, with a security conscious mindset but little in the way of past 
experience, if exposed to a scenario that might be considered typical for pervasive computing 
(e.g. multiple co-present services), for users to trust those services fully, they would require 
additional reassurances that the services they chose to use were both genuine and secure. 
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8.2.2	 The eﬀect of physical/digital world linkage evidence as a 
means of increasing user perceptions of situated service trust­
worthiness 
In chapter ﬁve, a scenario was created whereby several co-present situated services were 
made simultaneously available in a real-world cafe environment, thus more closely reﬂecting 
how real-world pervasive computing services might be encountered. Using this scenario, a 
semi-laboratory based experiment was conducted to examine a speciﬁc characteristic and 
problem of pervasive computing usage: the need for secure ad-hoc device association (e.g. 
Kindberg (2003) [76]). 
Participants were invited to assess six independent situated services (WiFi ‘hotspots’ of­
fering free wireless Internet access) in terms of the degree to which they were conﬁdent 
that each service was genuinely oﬀered by the ‘management’ of the cafe. To assist them 
in this process, each service was assigned its own method of authenticating itself as being 
genuinely oﬀered by the cafe management. Of the six services evaluated, one oﬀered no form 
of authentication (a control condition), three oﬀered a simple password-based authentica­
tion and the remainder used more sophisticated interactive authentication processes. An 
appreciation of the degree to which participants considered each service as being trustwor­
thy was collected through three measures (obtained both quantitatively and qualitatively): 
‘genuineness’, ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘security ’. 
In the three password-based conditions, the password required to authenticate the system 
as being genuine was made available to the participant using artefacts that were physically 
linked (i.e. in terms of their attachment to the cafe in a simple physical sense) to the cafe 
to various degrees. These artefacts were, in ascending degrees of physical-linkage, a leaﬂet, 
a wall mounted poster and as displayed on a wall-mounted LCD screen. Measures of user 
conﬁdence in the genuineness, trustworthiness and security of an associated situated service 
were all found to increase with the degree to which participants considered the source of 
evidence that was associated with that service as being physically ﬁxed. Further, examina­
tion of the qualitative results indicated that several factors were important to participant 
reasoning about physical ﬁxedness. These were physical attachment, the degree to which an 
artefact was physically attached to some part of the cafe, legitimacy, the degree to which par­
ticipants considered an artefact to be provided by the cafe, visibility the degree to which an 
artefact was in public view (and thus potentially less susceptible to an attacker being able to 
subvert that artefact undetected) and accessibility, the degree to which participants consid­
ered the position of the artefact as being accessible by patrons. However, while perceptions 
of the relative ﬁxedness of the leaﬂet and wall-mounted poster conditions were suﬃciently 
diﬀerent to invoke a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in participant conﬁdence, the wall-mounted poster 
and LCD display-based password conditions were not considered as being any more or less 
physical linked to the cafe, at least as according to the aspects of physical-linkage that the 
participants considered. 
In the remaining two conditions, two more novel network connection protocols Synchroni­
sation and Interlock were developed that each allowed the user to verify the authenticity 
of their associated service through use of a virtually-linked interaction between their lap­
top and a wall-mounted LCD screen. In the Synchronisation protocol, an interaction was 
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created between the screen of the user’s device and the public LCD screen, in which both 
screens displayed a synchronised series of protocol-generated images. By comparing the de­
gree to which the images on both sets agreed (both in terms of their appearance and the 
degree to which both screens displayed the images in sync with one another), users were 
oﬀered visually-veriﬁable evidence that the two devices are communicating with one another 
directly. In the Interlock protocol, a user-veriﬁable out-of-band communication channel was 
used to allow users to generate, communicate and ﬁnally compare a number of items of infor­
mation between their device and the public screen. A sophisticated cryptographic technique 
underpinned the interaction that could protect the user from communication eavesdropping 
providing the interaction was performed correctly. 
The degree to which each of these protocols was aﬀorded a value of virtual-linkage was de­
pendent upon the degree to which each protocol was able to oﬀer the user protection against 
two types of communication threat: evil-twin and man-in-the-middle. As only the Interlock 
protocol could feasibly protect against both, it was considered to be of higher virtual-linkage 
value than Synchronisation. These virtually-linked protocols, when evaluated against the 
password-based authentication methods, were found to be highly eﬀective at providing user 
conﬁdence, aﬀording increases in perceptions of trustworthiness, genuineness and security 
that were signiﬁcantly above those observed using using physically-ﬁxed artefacts alone. 
Examination of the qualitative results further indicated that several factors were impor­
tant to participant reasoning related to virtual-ﬁxedness. These factors were: Complexity, 
the amount of resources that were perceived as being required to subvert the interaction, 
synchronicity, the agreement in time and content between the display and the laptop and 
causality, the degree of cause and eﬀect within the interactivity. However, despite diﬀerences 
in the actual security value of the Synchronisation and Interlock protocols, users, ﬁnding 
it hard to compare these two unfamiliar and relatively complex protocols, considered both 
protocols to be equally valuable across all of the measures that were tested. 
8.2.3	 Socially-derived evidence as a means of increasing user per­
ceptions of situated service trustworthiness 
In chapter six, A scenario was created to examine the eﬀect of a second characteristic of 
pervasive computing service usage: the need to actually locate wireless services (service 
discovery, e.g. Zhu et al, 2005 [158]). Current wireless network service discovery protocols, 
most notably those found on the most common desktop operating systems, were considered 
as lacking suﬃcient information as to the potential trustworthiness of the services that they 
detected. 
In response to this problem, the role that other persons present in a space who might conceiv­
ably be using a local wireless networking service was considered. This lead to the positing 
and empirical investigation of a third potential linkage channel termed social-linkage. To ex­
amine the eﬀect of a social-linkage channel in a scenario that would require initial-situational 
trust, a semi-laboratory based experiment was conducted in which two wireless ‘hotspot’ ser­
vices, each with a similar name, were presented to participants to choose from (with the 
understanding that only one of the services was deﬁnitely genuine). To assist them in their 
choice, an existing wireless network discovery protocol was extended to include additional 
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socially-linked information: speciﬁcally the current number of users that were associated 
with each local wireless networking service detected. 
The provision of a system derived representation of user numbers as currently associated 
with each detectable service was well received by participants. Most participants found the 
inclusion of socially-derived information at the point of service discovery useful in their de­
cision making about the relative genuineness of one service over another. In the two-service 
scenario examined in the experiment, as the proportion of users assigned to one service rose 
above 60%, there was a corresponding signiﬁcant increase in reported perceptions of ‘gen­
uineness’ for that service. Further, reported perceptions of service ‘genuineness’ continued 
to rise signiﬁcantly in with each 10% increase in proportion distribution above 60%. Below 
60%, however, rejection of both services appeared to be the most favoured outcome. 
Despite these ﬁndings however, while participants in the experiment considered socially-
linked information useful, the results of the experiment failed to fully support the notion of 
social-linkage. Very few participants appeared to make any direct comparison between the 
numbers of plausible service users (e.g. laptop users) who were physically present and the 
numbers as presented to them by their laptop. When directed to do so, participants tended 
to underestimate the true number of laptop users by around 15%. However, participant 
reasoning as to why they failed to take this evidence into account was found to be generally 
sound, if occasionally inaccurate in terms of the technologies involved. When numbers 
reported by the social-linkage system were considered as being low compared to the number 
of plausible laptop users physically present, participants felt that this could be explained by 
connections to a wireless network service being sustainable only through the use of Internet 
browsing software (and thus people not actively using their Internet browsers were not 
connected to any wireless networking service). Conversely, when numbers reported by the 
system were high (compared to the number of plausible laptop users physically present), 
participants would rationalise this by considering the nature of radio connections, coming to 
the perfectly feasible conclusion that the system was detecting people who, while proximate 
to them, were not directly visible (e.g. upstairs or outside the room in which they were 
sitting). 
8.2.4	 The eﬀect of linkage-based evidence upon actual trust invest­
ment behaviour 
A commonly cited shortcoming of much empirical trust research is that, while the collection 
of measures of stated intention to trust (as was performed in the two experiments previ­
ously described) can provide a useful means of examining speciﬁc trusting attitudes, those 
attitudes do not necessarily translate into an eventual trust-investment behaviour (e.g. Mal­
hotra (2004) [88]). Thus, concluding the experimental component of the thesis, in chapter 
seven, a ﬁeld-based experimental methodology was developed and deployed in which ac­
tual initial-situational trust-investment behaviour with a situated service could arguably be 
measured in an experimental setting. The experiment in chapter six had two roles. First, 
it had to provide a scenario within which a trust-investment behaviour could feasibly oc­
cur, and to capture that behaviour should it indeed occur. Second, the experiment would 
need to measure the eﬀect that some form of linkage-based evidence might have upon any 
142 
trust-investment behaviour that was found to have occurred. 
To facilitate actual trust-investment behaviour in a wireless situated service, it was deemed 
necessary to create a situation within which there was a true risk involved in using that 
technology. To create this risk, a wireless Internet service ‘Fastnet ’ was created by the 
researcher and made available to members of the public in two real-world cafes. People 
who encountered the Fastnet service were free to use the service, but in order to do so 
would need to supply it with some personal information - speciﬁcally their mobile phone 
number. To measure the impact of linkage-based evidence upon trust-investment behaviour, 
a physical-linkage cue was embedded within the service connection interface (a webpage) 
that related to the physical surroundings of the user to a variety of degrees. To achieve this, 
a typical password based network connection protocol was modiﬁed to include physically-
linked evidence in the form of a photograph. 
As a between-groups experiment, some people who encountered the Fastnet webpage would 
be presented with a photograph that was taken near to where they were sitting (a ‘locative’ 
image). The remaining participants would be presented with a photograph that, while 
representing a location, that location could be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways: Could be 
here, but could equally be anywhere (an ‘a-locative’ image) or somewhere, but deﬁnitely not 
here (an ‘anti-locative’ image). 
The results of the experiment were found to support only the secondary hypothesis of the 
design. Those participants who were exposed to an anti-locative cue were found to be less 
likely to trust the service than those who were exposed to an a-locative image. In more 
simple terms, when presented with an interface that contained material that was clearly not 
representative of where they physically were, users would trust that interface less than if 
it contained material that, while location-based, was more generic. Though the results of 
the experiment were unusual, the experiment was able to show that even simple attempts 
at providing linkage were able to positively modify user behaviour in response to what was 
actually a potentially malicious wireless service. However, as a consequence of needing to 
conduct the experiment without the experimenter himself being physically present during 
the data collection process, this methodological practice was found to have both positive 
and negative aspects. People who attempted to use the Fastnet service were not aware that 
they were engaging in an experiment. This was considered as being crucial to creating a 
sense that there were risks involved in engaging with Fastnet and that any degree of risk that 
users considered as being present would not contaminated through the known presence of a 
researcher. However, maintaining the deception placed severe constraints on the amount of 
data that could be captured from the experiment. Without the experimenter present, the 
methodology rendered access to participant reasoning as to the choices they made during 
their encounter with Fastnet unavailable. 
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8.3 Contributions of the thesis 
8.3.1 Immediate contributions 
The ﬁrst two contributions of the thesis relate to two aspects of human-computer trust in 
pervasive computing. The ﬁrst aspect was the development of a better understanding of 
human-computer trust as it relates to nascent pervasive technologies. The second aspect 
was the development of evidential cues of service trustworthiness that are relevant to the 
characteristics of pervasive technologies. In addition, the development and implementation 
of an unattended ﬁeld study (reported in chapter seven) forms a useful third contribution, 
containing as it does useful experiential information to practitioners working in similar ﬁelds. 
A discussion of this third contribution can be found later in this chapter (conducting ﬁeld 
research into trust: ethical and practical considerations for researchers). 
Regarding the ﬁrst two contributions, at the time the research was conducted (2006-2009) 
interactive technology users, though found to be experienced in a range of risk-relevant ac­
tivities using their own equipment at home, were also found as having substantially less 
experience conducting similar experiences in public spaces. this was particularly the case 
when using non-personal equipment. However, regarding the technologies that they cur­
rently owned and used, users considered their privacy and security to be very important; 
they engaged in a number of practices to support the protection of this information, and 
demonstrated a good working knowledge of a range of known computer-mediated threats. 
The ﬁnding of chapter seven however, that a third of people who encountered a public-access 
wireless networking service for the ﬁrst time would trust that service with personal infor­
mation indicates that providers of such services should consider protecting their users. In 
a public wireless Internet service use scenario, users were found to be generally willing to 
accept a degree of vulnerability that their personal information could be compromised, but 
only when they considered their immediate need to use such a technology would warrant 
that risk. However, in order to engage with public wireless technology services for riskier 
endeavours such as secure email account access and ﬁnancial transactions, users tended to 
require substantial reassurance that the services they encountered were both trustworthy, 
genuine and secure. However, a gulf was also found to exist between what users perceive 
the security value of a service to be and what that security value actually was. 
Practical methods by which pervasive situated service designers can present their products 
as being both trustworthy and actually secure formed the second main contribution of the 
thesis. Through a process of development and evaluation, the thesis was able to describe a 
means by which the trustworthiness of benevolent urban pervasive services could be conveyed 
to users through providing user-veriﬁable links between a wireless service and the physical 
environment within which it was encountered. This technique was termed ‘linkage’. Impor­
tantly, the use of this information also allowed for the discrimination of trustworthy services 
from similar (and possibly malevolent) services, thus providing users with conﬁdence that 
their trust, if invested, would likely be well-placed. Across a number of experimental studies, 
various techniques for providing physical- digital-world linkage were posited and evaluated. 
Physical-linkage cues were found to increase user trust in an associated service enough for 
participants to accept the risks of accessing their personal email account. By including 
virtual-linkage based evidence also, user conﬁdence was found to be increased further still, 
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to a level where they would consider trusting a service enough to perform even riskier (e.g. 
personal ﬁnance based) activities. 
8.3.2	 Lasting contributions 
That technologies develop and change over time is a continuing challenge to researchers 
keen to make lasting contributions in an ever changing world. With respect to pervasive 
computing, the pace of development since this research was originally conceived has increased 
substantially. 
Gaining a secure connection to the Internet from mobile devices, particularly mobile phones 
is now commonplace. The services oﬀered by cellular network providers are now able to oﬀer 
an end-to-end secure Internet connection experience that can at least match, if not exceed 
the experience previously only oﬀered using more dedicated protocols such as WiFi. Con­
currently, persistently Internet-connected ‘smart’ phones and tablet devices have penetrated 
the public consciousness to the degree where to not have such technology within immediate 
reach can almost be considered unusual. 
Bearing these developments in mind, it is perhaps easy to dismiss some of the contributions 
of the research reported here as being out of date. However, it is the author’s belief that 
the production of this work is actually rather timely. In 2010, the world described in the 
introduction to this thesis is now generally accepted as an everyday reality. Thus, while 
it is true that the speciﬁc type of pervasive service examined here (public access Internet 
gateways) may conceivably become less rather than more prevalent in public life, other 
services that involve ad-hoc connections between what is becoming a highly varied ecology 
of mobile devices will surely continue to rise. What will certainly not change is the fact 
that personal / private information will always be of value to opportunists. While the types 
of service that a pervasive computing world can oﬀer will change, many of the threats and 
risks attached to their use will not. 
8.4	 Limitations of the thesis: Advice and recommenda­
tions for researchers 
8.4.1	 Developing the theoretical foundation of the thesis 
Viewed in hindsight, it is worth noting that the concept of linkage, upon which a substantial 
amount of the empirical work reported here were developed around, was itself developed or­
ganically over the course of the research project. Given the limited timeframe within which 
to produce a coherent thesis, allowing this process to occur concurrently with the devel­
opment of an ongoing research programme is risky. With respect to the research reported 
here, several decision points were encountered along the way as to which path the research 
should take. A particular case in point was the decision to explore the role of people present 
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in the immediate physical environment (referred to as ‘social linkage’). Upon completion of 
the lab study reported in chapter ﬁve, within which two forms of linkage were identiﬁed and 
evaluated, a decision needed to be made as to how to take the linkage concept forward. Put 
simply, the choice was to either: 
1. Explore in more depth the role of the two forms of linkage as identiﬁed in the studies 
already conducted (i.e. physical and virtual linkage). 
2. Explore the potential for other aspects of the environment to useful in how people 
considered linkage. 
The decision to explore what later became social linkage was based upon Kindberg et al’s 
(2002) [72] observation that the physical world can be considered as being made up of three 
general categories of entity: people, places and things. While the investigation carried out 
in chapter ﬁve considered places and things, it said little, if anything, about other people 
present. Given a short amount of time with which to conduct the research, the author felt it 
more appropriate to move towards a perhaps more complete model of linkage by examining 
the role of people as a highly salient artefact within public space. A consequence of this 
choice was that the depth of analysis dedicated to physical / virtual linkage would likely be 
compromised. 
With the beneﬁt of hindsight, it is reasonable to suggest that the research would have 
beneﬁtted from more time spent planning the entire empirical research component of the 
thesis prior to completing any individual experiment. In some instances, particularly with 
the social linkage study, the consequences of a sudden change of direction might easily have 
been avoided. However, the nature of conducting individual research within a larger team 
(as was the case here) can often place additional strain on the time available to conduct 
pre-planning. Researchers working in a similar environment should be mindful of this, 
particularly with respect to less experienced researchers who are concurrently learning their 
craft. 
8.4.2 Conducting ﬁeld research into trust 
Ethical implications of empirical trust research: As has been mentioned frequently 
throughout this thesis, measuring the emergence of trust related attitudes and behaviours is 
diﬃcult, requiring an uncommon degree of subtlety and care. Designing experiments around 
trust will almost certainly involve some degree of deception on the part of the researcher 
as to the true nature of the research he/she is conducting. This issue is made particularly 
salient with respect to investigations of trust investment behaviour, which must involve a 
plausible (if in reality, bogus) degree of risk before trust behaviours can be said to emerge. 
However, even with experiments designed to explore a participant’s intention-to-trust, the 
author found that, by allowing the participant to elicit discussions about trust as a natural 
response to a potentially risky situation, a deeper understanding of a participants reasoning 
about their trust / distrust of a particular entity or situation could be obtained. 
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Whenever a researcher employs deception within the design of their empirical studies, there 
are immediate ethical implications which cannot be ignored. All of the experiments reported 
in this thesis utilised deception to some degree, hence each design was subject to a number of 
revisions before they were introduced to ‘live’ participants. Throughout the design process, 
each experimental design had to be vetted and approved by the University of Bath depart­
ment of Psychology ethics board. This process is time consuming and often frustrating. 
However, it is worth reiterating to other researchers who come to read this work that the 
role of a University Ethics board protects the researcher as well as the participant; in the 
event that a complaint is raised, the University is in a position to support the researcher, 
having previously approved the research. 
Ecological validity: A recurrent concern of academic researchers is the degree to which re­
sults derived from laboratory study can be considered ecologically valid. With research con­
ducted into psychological concepts, especially trust, the choice between using a laboratory-
based or ﬁeld-based experimental design is particularly salient and thus worthy of further 
discussion. 
Within the research reported in this thesis, the author felt strongly that, in order to gain 
the most useful insight into the mechanisms involved in human-computer trust behaviour, 
particularly with regard to how risks are identiﬁed and evaluated, he would beneﬁt greatly 
by conducting his experiments within public spaces. Conducting research in public space 
is, however, a diﬃcult process for a number of reasons. It requires that the researcher 
both identify, evaluate and potentially control a myriad of factors that are generally not 
present in the more sterile laboratory environment. It also demands a great deal of time 
and tenacity; the researcher must often obtain oﬃcial permission to work within a public 
space. As an example of this, the WiFi phishing study reported in chapter seven required 
many months of preparatory negotiation work with the University and the owners of various 
publicly-accessible spaces before it could be made ‘active’ in the ﬁeld. 
All of the experiments reported in this thesis were conducted in public spaces. Two involved 
the use of real-world cafes, and one involved the use of a University Library / social space. 
In each case, the author needed to identify the key people who had control over those spaces, 
introduce them to the nature of the research and convince them to give their consent for the 
space to be used. It was fortuitous that a project partner involved in the larger Cityware 
project had a pre-existing relationship with the Bristol-based cafe used as one of the venues in 
chapter seven. The venue had supported several previous research projects in the past, and 
the management of the cafe were both aware of the academic process and sympathetic to the 
goals of the research. However, the management of the venue were still (at least initially) 
very uneasy about hosting an experiment that was designed to intentionally deceive and 
potentially inconvenience their customers. That a well-developed relationship between the 
cafe and the University existed allowed the researcher time to address their concerns; in 
retrospect, it would be likely that the use of such a venue would not have been granted had 
there been no prior relationship from which to draw. 
In the case of the ‘WiFi phishing’ experiment reported in chapter seven, to allow the exper­
iment to proceed, the author worked closely with the management to address their concerns 
directly. Drafts of the experimental design were submitted for their approval regularly and 
their concerns were included during the ethical review process conducted by the University 
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of Bath. Consequently, several aspects of the original design were changed to minimise the 
potential ethical impact of the experiment upon members of the public. The most direct 
example of this is in the mechanism by which risk was created within the experiment. The 
original design aimed to utilise the credit card numbers of participants who would not then 
be aware that they were participating in a research experiment. Though substantial eﬀorts 
were made to ensure that these numbers would never be put at risk of theft (either through 
their storage or transmission), it was felt that the potential for participant distress was too 
high. The eventual compromise, as reported in chapter seven, was to use the participant’s 
mobile phone number. However, even at this lesser level of potential risk, signiﬁcant ef­
forts were made to protect this data - well above and beyond what might be considered 
appropriate in an otherwise analogous laboratory based study. 
Researchers who intend to conduct studies like the ones described in this thesis should be 
mindful of the substantially increased timescales involved in conducting experiments in pub­
lic space. This needs to be considered carefully before abandoning the laboratory. Further, 
researchers should seek wherever possible to identify and develop working relationships with 
the key people in control of potential study spaces, preferably well in advance of the de­
velopment of a ﬁnal experimental design. Key stakeholders should be identiﬁed early and 
managed directly. Finally, the researcher should take care to ensure that the true nature of 
the research be presented in as transparent a way as possible throughout the development 
process. 
Measuring trust investment behaviour while also capturing participant reason­
ing: Within the thesis, a number of research methodologies were employed to investigate 
the role of human-computer initial-situational trust in pervasive situated services. This 
mixed-methods research plan oﬀered a number of beneﬁcial aspects, but also a number of 
negative aspects. As was found over the course of the research programme reported in this 
thesis, intention to trust and the actual investiture of trust are indeed very diﬀerent things. 
Developing an empirical design that could eﬀectively measure both simultaneously proved 
to be an extremely diﬃcult task. As such, the experiments that were conducted in this 
thesis were only able to measure one or the other. In the experiment that measured trust-
investment behaviour (chapter seven: WiFi phishing) for example, it was strongly felt that 
the presence of a researcher during the experiment would fatally compromise the ability for 
that experiment to capture true trust investment behaviour. Whether this was indeed the 
case in actuality cannot be known, and this issue was a serious weakness of the protocol used 
in the research reported in that chapter. The unattended nature of the experiment, while 
oﬀering strength insofar as its ability to provide a means by which true trust investment 
could be observed and recorded, was weakened by its subsequent inability to capture partic­
ipant reasoning in-situ. The development of an experimental device that can facilitate both 
forms of data collection (thus providing for the capture of both trust-investment behaviour 
and the reasoning behind it), remains the subject of ongoing research by the author. 
148 
8.5 Future work 
8.5.1 Future development of the linkage concept 
A signiﬁcant issue of the research presented in this thesis was related to the way in which the 
concept of linkage, and its three (thus far) discovered sub-components came to be ‘discovered’ 
and examined. While the concept that linkage could be achieved using physical and virtual 
means had been discussed elsewhere in the literature, the identiﬁcation of the social form 
of linkage emerged naturally, and somewhat late in the research process. As previously 
mentioned (see section developing the theoretical foundation of the thesis, this chapter), 
one eﬀect of this late development was that the other two forms of linkage could not be 
examined in more depth given the time available. Further work would seek to expand upon 
the investigations of all three forms of linkage discovered thus far, and would also seek to 
compare their individual / combined eﬀects upon initial-situational trust in technologies 
developed for public consumption in the time since this research was completed. 
8.5.2 Reﬁning the Interlock protocol user experience 
As a ﬁnal contribution, one of the two virtually-linked protocols that was developed during 
the thesis (Interlock) was able to oﬀer actual security value as a means of facilitating se­
cure ad-hoc device association in a pervasive computing environment. However, its novelty 
compared to more established user-system authentication practices such as the entry of a 
password appeared to also have a negative impact on its perceived security value. Reﬁning 
the interaction, such that this gulf might be reduced, is the subject of ongoing research. 
The complexity of the Interlock protocol user-authentication process was suspected as being 
a major reason why some participants failed to fully accept it. In further reﬁnements of 
Interlock, reducing the number of steps involved in completing the interaction (without 
changing the underlying protocol) would be explored. Further, removing the requirement 
for a physically-ﬁxed public display would be an ideal advance. By using a mobile phone 
instead of a public display, two issues that were found as being important to users of the 
Interlock protocol - a lack of privacy and the diﬃculty in making visual comparisons from 
a distance - could be immediately addressed. To replace the physical-linkage aspect that 
would be lost with the removal of the screen, the user could pick up a token from a point 
that is strongly physically linked to the cafe (in all four senses identiﬁed as being important 
to the participants in that study: attachment, legitimacy, visibility and accessibility). A 
possible example of this might be a card handed over by a member of staﬀ. Upon the card 
might be a 2D barcode that is readable with the user’s mobile phone, thus linking it securely 
to the venue and obtaining a means of displaying the content as previously made available 
via the public screen. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
This thesis sought to uncover the processes and mechanisms by which people assess the 
trustworthiness of a pervasive situated service upon their ﬁrst encounter. In this thesis, two 
types of situation that involved a requirement for human-computer trust and relevancy to 
pervasive computing service usage were examined across a number of experimental studies. 
These two situations were 1) service discovery and 2) ad-hoc device association. Results 
from all of the experiments indicated that, in the absence of prior knowledge, people would 
seek to identify and use contextual evidence to support their assessment as to the potential 
trustworthiness of a new situated service. To support this ﬁnding, a number of methods 
of providing salient and credible evidence as to the genuineness of a situated service were 
explored. The provision of user-veriﬁable ‘links’ between a wireless digital service and the 
physical world in which it is encountered were found to be an eﬀective evidential cue to 
service trustworthiness. Channels of linkage evidence were found as being able to take a 






















Companion to chapter 5 
B.1	 Bertorelli’s experiment: Consent form 








Companion to chapter 6 
C.1	 Social Linkage experiment: Consent form 








Companion to chapter 7 
D.1	 Experimental materials: Photos used in a ranking 
exercise to generate the a-locative and locative im­
age conditions 
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(a) Local (Bristol) Image 1 
(b) Local (Bristol) Image 2

(c) Local (Bristol) Image 3

Figure D.1: Image ranking exercise, Local image conditions. All photos were taken in the 
immediate area outside the cafe used in Bristol, U.K. 
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(a) Generic Image 1 
(b) Generic Image 2 
(c) Generic Image 3 
(d) Wildcard Image 
Figure D.2: Image ranking exercise, generic image conditions and wildcard. All photos 
sourced from stock photography. 
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